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Thesis abstract 
The urgent need to address climate change poses a range of complex moral and 
practical concerns, not least because rising to the challenge will require cooperation 
among countries that differ greatly in their wealth, the extent of their contributions 
to the problem, and their vulnerability to environmental and economic shocks. This 
thesis by publication in the field of climate ethics aims to characterise a range of 
national responsibilities associated with acting on climate change (Part I), and to 
identify proposals for fulfilling those responsibilities through fair and feasible 
institutional arrangements (Part II). I aim not only to address substantive gaps in 
scholarly understanding of those responsibilities, but also to strengthen the ability 
of climate ethics to engage meaningfully with climate policy.  
Chapter 2 addresses the question of whether wealthy countries owe a “climate 
debt” to poor countries. It finds that even if climate debt (suitably interpreted) may 
provide a coherent and morally plausible concept, its political value as a discursive 
frame that can provide a basis for cooperation is limited. 
Chapter 3 investigates the role that equity may play in negotiations on a long-term 
climate change agreement. It argues that developed and developing countries may 
reach a “principled bargain” if both converge on a way of differentiating their 
responsibilities that places less emphasis on a rigid dichotomy between the two 
groups and more emphasis on objective criteria relating to their contribution to the 
problem and capacity to address it. 
Chapter 4 explores a question largely overlooked in climate ethics, namely whether 
wealthy countries owe compensation to those who are adversely affected by the 
climate policies which they enact. I find that enacting countries have responsibilities 
to compensate both domestic and foreign citizens who would suffer 
disproportionate losses from the effects of policies. 
Chapter 5 assesses whether wealthy countries may legitimately adopt unilateral (or 
“fragmented”) rather than multilaterally coordinated approaches to raising climate 
finance for developing countries. It finds that coordinated target-setting, 
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effort-sharing and oversight arrangements are essential, but that a mix of unilateral 
and coordinated approaches to raising funds will be necessary for securing 
legitimacy.  
In Chapter 6, through addressing the broader question of what should count as 
official aid, I consider whether wealthy countries may draw on aid budgets to 
support developing countries’ efforts to address climate change. I find that the 
current definition of official aid should be retained but supplemented by specified 
exclusions from eligibility in order to preserve the aid regime’s integrity. 
Nevertheless, some climate finance may justifiably be counted as aid provided that 
concerns relating to the diversion of aid funding are addressed. 
In addressing these research questions, the thesis seeks not only to make original 
theoretical contributions to climate ethics but also to strengthen broader scholarly 
understanding of the ways in which ethics and international public policy may 
inform one another, particularly by highlighting the role of framing considerations 
(Chapter 2), feasibility considerations (Chapter 3), and the ways in which principles 
of fairness and legitimacy map onto institutional functions (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The two greatest problems of our time—overcoming poverty in the developing world 
and combating climate change—are inextricably linked. Failure to tackle one will 
undermine efforts to deal with the other: ignoring climate change would result in an 
increasingly hostile environment for development and poverty reduction, but to try to 
deal with climate change by shackling growth and development would damage, 
probably fatally, the cooperation between developed and developing countries that is 
vital to success.1 
 
We find ourselves at a critical juncture and the situation is such that even the most 
ambitious emissions reductions by developed countries, who should have been taking 
the lead in combatting climate change in the past 2 decades, will not be enough to 
avert the crisis. It is now too late, too late to talk about the world being able to rely on 
[developed] countries to solve the climate crisis. We have entered a new era that 
demands global solidarity in order to fight climate change and ensure that pursuit of 
sustainable human development remains at the fore of the global community’s 
efforts.2 
 
1.1 The challenge of fairness in global climate policy 
Recent decades have seen considerable progress in economic and social 
development across much of the world’s population. Nevertheless, the goal of 
relieving entrenched poverty has proven elusive to date.3 At the same time, ongoing 
failure to tackle climate change adequately is placing existing development gains 
                                                     
1 Nicholas Stern, A blueprint for a safer planet: How to manage climate change and create a new era 
of progress and prosperity (London: Bodley Head, 2009), 8. 
2 Philippines negotiator Yeb Sano in a speech to the UN climate change conference in Warsaw in 
November 2013. Sano spoke in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, which had caused widespread 
devastation in the Philippines (Yeb Sano, “It’s time to stop this madness” – Philippines plea at UN 
climate talks, Responding to Climate Change, 13 November 2013, accessed 20 December 2013. 
http://www.rtcc.org/2013/11/11/its-time-to-stop-this-madness-philippines-plea-at-un-climate-
talks/#sthash.AYtmvjQ2.dpuf).  
3 Andy Sumner, "Where do the poor live?", World Development 40, no. 5 (2012). 
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under increasing threat.4 Both climate change and development are urgent practical 
problems, and the challenge of addressing them together also raises a range of 
complex moral concerns. Even if we lived in a world where incomes were roughly 
equal, it would be necessary to face the question of how to account for differences 
in responsibility for causing climate change and how to motivate countries to act 
quickly enough and to do their fair share in reducing global greenhouse gas 
emissions and adapting to climatic impacts.  
The task of sharing costs fairly becomes all the more complex once we take into 
account the fact that global efforts to address climate change play out against the 
backdrop of massive and ongoing global economic inequalities. Although 
developing countries’ share of global greenhouse gas emissions is growing rapidly, 
they have contributed considerably less to the problem of climate change to date 
but will be among the hardest hit by rising temperatures.5  
There are widely acknowledged complementarities between promoting 
development and building resilience to the impacts of climate change.6 
Nevertheless, in a world of scarce resources we cannot evade the question of how 
to address the tensions between addressing persistent poverty today and avoiding 
potential climatic catastrophe in future. The difficulty of addressing these moral 
concerns is further complicated by the fact that the international regimes for 
climate change and development remain largely compartmentalised and compete 
with one another for funding resources.  
Despite the differences between the economic circumstances and world views of 
developed and developing countries, they all share the same global climate system 
and must cooperate if they are to protect it. To be workable in practice, 
international cooperation will require forging a set of institutions that both poor 
                                                     
4 World Bank, "Turn down the heat: Why a 4°c warmer world must be avoided" A report for the 
World Bank by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012), ix. 
5 See section 1.4.1 below. 
6 See section 1.4.2; Thomas Pogge, "Poverty, climate change, and overpopulation", Georgia Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 38 (2010); and Simon Caney, "Addressing poverty and climate 
change: The varieties of social engagement", Ethics & International Affairs 26, no. 2 (2012). 
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and wealthy countries perceive to be fair.7 In order to do so, it will be necessary to 
bridge stark differences among countries over what constitutes a fair response.  
1.2 Knowledge gaps 
Much has been written about aspects of the challenges mentioned above. Climate 
change has attracted a diverse range of scholarly attention in what could broadly be 
called normative theory, ranging from more abstract analysis in political philosophy 
and political theory through to applied ethics. For brevity I will refer to this body of 
work as “climate ethics”.8 Research on climate ethics has emerged alongside a 
much larger literature on climate policy. A sizeable subset of the ethical and policy 
literature examines intersections between climate change and development.9 
One of the most stimulating yet challenging aspects of research on climate change 
as a whole is the level of interdisciplinary analysis involved in addressing the 
problem. A substantial degree of interdisciplinary collaboration has already taken 
place, particularly at the intersection between climate science, economics and 
policy. Nevertheless, substantial knowledge gaps remain, not least at the 
intersection between climate ethics and climate policy.10 While the ethics and policy 
literatures have cross-fertilised to some extent, their potential for greater 
integration and mutual reinforcement remains unfulfilled. Andrew Light, whose 
work has spanned both scholarly research in climate ethics and involvement in US 
and international climate policy, has observed, “most work in climate ethics still 
trails the policy discussion rather than directly participates in it”.11 Conversely, 
                                                     
7 See section 1.8 below. 
8 Compare Stephen Gardiner et al., eds., Climate ethics: Essential readings (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), which is a collection of papers spanning these disciplines. 
9 As reflected in the output of journals such as Climate Policy and Climate and Development.  
10 Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for example, have largely 
focused on the science-economics-policy interface, although some chapters have included discussion 
of ethical issues. See, for example, K. Halsnæs et al., "Framing issues" in Climate change 2007: 
Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge, UK and New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), Section 2.6. Forthcoming volumes of the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC 
will include an expanded treatment of ethical issues. 
11 Andrew Light, "Climate ethics for climate action" in Environmental ethics: What really matters? 
What really works?, ed. David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
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much existing economic and policy analysis of climate change incorporates 
significant but often not critically examined assumptions about the appropriate 
goals of climate policy and the value of different distributive schemes, and greater 
normative rigour and transparency would strengthen the findings of such analysis.12 
These gaps are symptomatic of a broader and as yet unresolved challenge regarding 
the relationship between philosophy and global public policy. In recent decades 
scholars have made considerable progress in articulating the relationship between 
the two. On the one hand, political philosophy has increasingly sought to take 
account of institutional feasibility considerations at the global level.13 On the other 
hand, constructivist research in the field of International Relations has improved 
our understanding of the way in which norms shape global cooperation and the role 
of individual actors within it.14 Nevertheless, these two strands of scholarship have 
largely flourished in parallel, and there remains considerably greater scope for non-
ideal theory and research on norms in International Relations to inform one 
another. 
1.3 Aims and original contribution of the thesis 
This leads us to the overarching research question of the thesis: how should we 
characterise national responsibilities for responding to climate change, and design 
institutions for fulfilling them, while taking into account global economic 
inequalities? Providing a comprehensive account of fairness across all aspects of 
climate policy would be beyond the scope of a single thesis, but my aim in this 
collection of articles is to answer this question as it applies to several crucial 
elements of the global climate change regime. In doing so, the thesis aims to make 
original contributions both by addressing substantive questions that may guide 
                                                     
559. See also Sonja Klinsky and Hadi Dowlatabadi, "Conceptualizations of justice in climate policy", 
Climate Policy 9 (2009): 88. 
12 Compare Cameron Hepburn and Nicholas Stern, "The global deal on climate change" in The 
economics and politics of climate change, ed. Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 38-39. 
13 See section 1.6.3 below. 
14 See section 1.8 below. 
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policy-making and by generating theoretical innovations that may inform climate 
ethics and broader analysis of the ethical dimensions of global public policy.  
Substantively, the thesis aims to clarify the responsibilities of developed and 
developing countries within the international climate change regime and at its 
intersection with the global development finance regime, with a particular focus on 
the responsibilities of the world’s wealthy citizens towards the poor. Questions 
cutting across several chapters include how to characterise or frame developed 
countries’ responsibilities (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 6); how responsibilities should be 
distributed among developed countries (Chapters 3, 4 and 5); and what policy 
instruments are best suited for fulfilling those responsibilities (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
Table 1.1 provides an outline of the research questions addressed in specific 
chapters, along with summaries of the substantive findings and theoretical 
contributions of each chapter. 
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Table 1.1. Outline of research questions and original contributions 
Research questions by 
chapter 
Substantive findings Theoretical innovations 
2. Do wealthy countries 
owe a “climate debt” to 
poor countries? 
Even if climate debt, suitably 
interpreted, provides a coherent and 
morally plausible concept, its political 
value is limited 
Applying a theory of rhetoric 
to provide a basis for 
distinguishing the political 
value of a concept from its 
moral value 
3. How can global 
climate negotiations 
bridge the impasse 
between developed 
and developing 
countries on sharing 
the global mitigation 
effort fairly? 
Developed and developing countries 
may reach a “principled bargain” on a 
future climate agreement that satisfies 
criteria of fairness and feasibility if the 
agreement moves closer to “national” 
rather than “categorical” 
differentiation of national 
commitments 
Articulating a set of criteria 
that enable climate ethics to 
take account of feasibility 
considerations more 
systematically in the 
formulation or evaluation of 
proposals for 
institutionalising moral 
principles  
4. Do wealthy countries 
owe compensation to 
domestic and foreign 
citizens for the adverse 
effects of the climate 
policies that they 
enact? 
Countries enacting climate change 
policies have responsibilities to 
compensate those who would suffer 
disproportionate losses from those 
policies. Those responsibilities extend 
to affected parties beyond national 
borders due to duties of fairness 
arising from countries’ common 
participation in the global climate 
regime 
Expanding the substantive 
scope of moral 
responsibilities related to 
climate change 
Extending theories of 
governmental compensation 
to provide a new way of 
thinking about the 
responsibilities of the 
wealthy for the transnational 
effects of their policies 
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Research questions by 
chapter 
Substantive findings Theoretical 
innovations 
5. In raising climate finance 
for developing countries, to 
what extent may wealthy 
countries legitimately adopt 
unilateral (or “fragmented”) 
rather than multilaterally 
coordinated approaches? 
Coordinated target-setting, effort-
sharing and oversight arrangements for 
climate finance are essential, but a mix 
of unilateral and coordinated 
approaches to raising funds will be 
necessary for securing legitimacy 
Articulating the role of 
fragmented 
governance in 
enhancing or 
undermining the 
legitimacy of global 
institutions 
6. What should count as 
official aid?  
May wealthy countries 
draw on aid budgets in 
order to support developing 
countries’ efforts to address 
climate change? 
Despite its ability to withstand some 
common criticisms, the current 
definition of official aid should be 
retained but supplemented by specified 
exemptions from aid eligibility in order 
to preserve the regime’s integrity. 
Nevertheless, some climate finance may 
justifiably be counted as aid as long as 
concerns relating to the diversion of aid 
funding are addressed 
Developing a practice-
based approach for 
defining institutional 
terms that codify moral 
responsibilities across 
national borders  
 
In addressing these research questions, the thesis seeks to make original theoretical 
contributions to climate ethics. In particular, I seek to improve scholarly 
understanding of the way in which moral principles and political practice may relate 
to one another by highlighting the role of framing considerations (Chapter 2), 
feasibility considerations (Chapter 3), and the ways in which moral principles of 
fairness and legitimacy may map onto institutional functions at the global level 
(Chapters 4, 5 and 6).  
Most of the chapters take as their starting point subjects that have received some 
attention in the theoretical literature, but develop new ways of looking at them. 
National mitigation commitments (Chapter 3) are perhaps one of the most widely 
discussed issues in climate policy, while climate debt (Chapter 2) and 
responsibilities to provide climate finance (Chapter 5) have attracted relatively less 
attention to date. The other chapters represent forays into territory that remains 
largely unexplored in normative theory. Thus Chapter 4 focuses on expanding the 
range of moral responsibilities to address climate change by highlighting the 
imperative of addressing the impacts of climate policies. Chapter 6 discusses an 
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issue that has received limited attention in normative theory—the relationship 
between climate finance and aid—but sets it in the context of a broader question 
that has remained almost wholly overlooked in normative theory (although widely 
discussed in policy debate), namely what should count as aid. 
Together the chapters seek not only to inform climate ethics but also to shed light 
on broader theories of global justice. In particular, Chapter 4 extends theories of 
government compensation—which traditionally have focused on domestic cases—
to a range of other ways in which domestic policymaking may result in adverse 
impacts on other countries, ranging from regulating tobacco and other health risks 
to product safety, labour conditions and tax evasion. Chapter 5 may inform 
assessments of the legitimacy of a broader range of international institutions and 
their associated policy functions. Chapter 6 sets out criteria for defining institutional 
terms associated with global moral responsibilities. While formulated to apply to 
the context of aid, the criteria may also apply to questions such as what should 
count as human rights and who should count as a refugee. Finally, Chapters 4 and 6 
may inform debates about the extent to which elements of global justice may (or 
must) be analysed individually or as part of a more comprehensive concept of global 
justice. 
While each chapter draws on aspects of theory specifically relevant to the question 
at hand, a common methodological concern runs through the thesis, namely that 
producing normative recommendations that are capable of guiding action at the 
global level requires an appreciation of the political, economic and institutional 
constraints and opportunities facing international institutions and the actors that 
participate in them.15 Crucially, a contextual approach of this kind requires 
understanding different conceptions of fairness held by developed and developing 
                                                     
15 I adopt the definition of institutions as “the rules of the game in society or, more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints that shape interaction” (Douglass North, Institutions, institutional 
change and economic performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3). Institutions 
may encompass norms, conventions, principles and laws (see section 1.8). I adopt the definition of 
an organisation as a “formal structure of interlocking roles” embodied by persons occupying those 
roles (Seumas Miller, Social action: A teleological account (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 28). Institutions may represent a type of organisation and vice versa, but the overlap 
between the two is not complete.  
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countries. A better understanding of these conceptions may not only help us to 
identify areas of common ground that could provide a basis for agreements that are 
widely perceived to be fair, but also inform our evaluation of the moral contours of 
a given policy context.16 
In its disciplinary orientation, the thesis is best characterised as a set of essays in the 
field of climate ethics. The evaluative methods I adopt draw primarily on works of 
political theory and political philosophy on climate change, but I also draw on 
broader research in political philosophy that addresses concerns of global justice as 
well as the relationship between moral principles and public policy. In addition, my 
emphasis on feasibility considerations has led me to draw widely on climate change 
research in other disciplines, particularly economics and International Relations, 
and to a lesser extent international law.  
In keeping with the contextual approach introduced above, I turn next to an 
account of global climate change and the evolution of international climate policy in 
order to identify key parameters for analysis. Subsequent sections of the 
Introduction elaborate upon the overall methodology and key concepts and 
principles underpinning later chapters, particularly in order to justify the ways in 
which I employ normative theorising to clarify policy issues and develop proposals 
for reform. Rather than providing a standalone literature review, subsequent 
sections of the Introduction integrate an overview of the literature on climate ethics 
with an explanation of how the thesis is situated in relation to that literature. 
Subsequent chapters review in greater detail literature relevant to chapter-specific 
research questions.  
1.4 Climate change: key concepts and background 
1.4.1 Climate science: greenhouse gas emissions, climate change and associated 
impacts 
The physical basis for human-induced (or “anthropogenic”) climate change provides 
a number of important parameters for normative analysis of (i) the distributive 
                                                     
16 For further discussion of this issue, see sections 1.6.3 and 1.8.3. 
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dimensions of the problem and (ii) the intersection between climate and 
development concerns. Natural and human-induced greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions affect the earth’s climate system due to their tendency to trap heat from 
the sun rather than release it back into space. Since the mid-nineteenth century, 
the Earth’s atmosphere has warmed by around 0.8°C, principally due to human 
activity.17 While some GHGs (such as methane) have relatively short-lived warming 
effects, others (notably CO2) have a long but variable residence time in the 
atmosphere.18 As these gases accumulate in the atmosphere, their aggregate effect 
on warming increases, and the rate of temperature rise is related in a roughly linear 
fashion to the accumulation of CO2.19  
Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have increased by around 40 per cent since 
pre-industrial levels, and are currently at their highest level in the past 800,000 
years.20 In the first decade of the twenty-first century, emissions rose on average by 
around three per cent each year.21 If current emissions trends continue, 
temperatures are likely to rise by around 2.8°C to 4.8°C compared to pre-industrial 
levels by the end of the present century.22  
The fact that temperature rise is linked to cumulative emissions of greenhouse 
gases has two important implications for the intergenerational scope of the climate 
change problem. First, emissions produced in previous generations may exert 
ongoing effects on the present generation. Second, while acting to restrain some 
                                                     
17 IPCC, "Summary for policymakers" in Climate change 2013: The physical science basis. Contribution 
of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, ed. Thomas F. Stocker, et al. (Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 3, 15. Rising CO2 emissions have also resulted in warming of the ocean, and higher 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations also produce other adverse effects apart from global warming, 
including ocean acidification (ibid., 6, 10.). 
18 Stephen M. Smith et al., "Equivalence of greenhouse-gas emissions for peak temperature limits", 
Nature Climate Change 2, no. 7 (2012). 
19 Myles R. Allen et al., "Warming caused by cumulative carbon emissions towards the trillionth 
tonne", Nature 458 (2009); M Meinshausen et al., "Greenhouse gas emission targets for limiting 
global warming to 2°C", Nature 458 (2009); IPCC, "Summary for policymakers", 25. 
20 IPCC, "Summary for policymakers", 9. 
21 Jos G.J. Olivier et al., "Trends in global CO2 emissions: 2013 report" (The Hague: PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency and The European Union, 2013), 8.  
22 IPCC, "Summary for policymakers", 18. 
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short-lived GHGs may produce some shorter-term benefits for temperature rise, 
how much the present generation acts to restrain its overall emissions will primarily 
constrain long-term rather than short-term temperature rise.23 
In addition to intergenerational implications, the causes and impacts of climate 
change have far-reaching international implications. Industrialised countries are 
largely responsible for the greenhouse gas emissions that have caused climate 
change to date.24 However, developing countries account for a growing share of 
current and cumulative global emissions. Whereas in 1990 developing countries 
accounted for around one-third of annual global CO2 emissions, in 2012 they 
accounted for almost 60 per cent.25 Nevertheless, emissions per person vary widely 
between developed and developing countries.26 
Although climate change may yield beneficial effects for some regions in the short 
term—particularly those in colder regions—its net effects over the longer term are 
likely to be negative for all regions, particularly once the risk of catastrophic impacts 
is taken into account.27 However, the types of impacts of climate change will vary 
considerably across countries, ranging from sea level rise to changes in extreme 
weather events and rainfall patterns.28 A recent World Bank report notes:  
 
No nation will be immune to the impacts of climate change. However, the distribution 
of impacts is likely to be inherently unequal and tilted against many of the world’s 
                                                     
23 Smith et al., "Equivalence of greenhouse-gas emissions for peak temperature limits". 
24 In keeping with prevailing practice under the climate regime, references to “developed” and 
“developing” countries will generally refer to Annex I and non-Annex I countries under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Annex I is composed of countries that 
were OECD members at the time of drafting (Annex II countries), as well as “Economies in 
Transition” (primarily members of the former Soviet Union). In discussions of climate finance, 
“developed” countries refer specifically to Annex II members. The Annexes do not fully reflect 
objective differences in income and emissions (see Chapter 3, section 3.4.1). See generally Joanna 
Depledge, "The road less travelled: Difficulties in moving between annexes in the climate change 
regime", Climate Policy 9 (2009). 
25 Olivier et al., "Trends in global CO2 emissions: 2013 report", 26. 
26 At the upper extreme, CO2 emissions in 2012 were around 19 tonnes per person in Australia, while 
at the lower extreme India’s emissions were around 2 tonnes per person. China and the EU were 
comparable at around 7 tonnes per person (ibid., 18.). 
27 World Bank, "Turn down the heat: Why a 4°C warmer world must be avoided", Chapter 7. 
28 IPCC, "Summary for policymakers", 17-24. 
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poorest regions, which have the least economic, institutional, scientific, and technical 
capacity to cope and adapt.29 
 
Impacts on developing countries may threaten a range of basic human rights, 
including rights to life (through casualties from cyclones and floods), water (through 
droughts), health (through infectious diseases exacerbated by higher temperatures) 
and food (through declining crop yields).30  
1.4.2 Responding to climate change: mitigation, adaptation and addressing loss 
and damage 
1.4.2.1 Categories of action 
Countries may mount a variety of responses to climate change. Climate policy and 
ethics typically draw a distinction between mitigation (addressing the causes of 
climate change) and adaptation (adjusting to the impacts of climate change).31 In 
addition, even if mitigation and adaptation strategies are implemented, some 
“residual damage” or “loss and damage” will still occur as a result of climate 
change.32 This category of action is sometimes subsumed under adaptation in 
negotiations but at other times treated as a third “pillar” of climate change policy. 
                                                     
29 World Bank, "Turn down the heat: Why a 4°C warmer world must be avoided", xiii. See also IPCC, 
Climate change 2007: Synthesis report (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 65; Hans-
Martin Füssel, "How inequitable is the global distribution of responsibility, capability, and 
vulnerability to climate change: A comprehensive indicator-based assessment", Global 
Environmental Change 20, no. 4 (2010). 
30 Simon Caney, "Climate change, human rights and moral thresholds" in Human rights and climate 
change, ed. Stephen Humphreys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); IPCC, Climate 
change 2007: Synthesis report. 
31 The IPCC defines mitigation as “An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the sources or enhance 
the sinks of greenhouse gases”, and adaptation as “Adjustment in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits 
beneficial opportunities” (R.J.T. Klein et al., "Inter-relationships between adaptation and mitigation" 
in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. M.L. Parry, et 
al. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 750). 
32 Nicholas Stern, The economics of climate change: The Stern Review (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007):404. Huq et al. distinguish between reversible damage and 
permanent loss: Saleemul Huq, Erin Roberts, and Adrian Fenton, "Loss and damage", Nature Climate 
Change 3, no. 11 (2013): 948. 
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Some authors refer to this category as “compensation for residual damage”,33 but 
since it is possible to envisage non-compensatory means of responding to damage 
resulting from climate change (such as self-help or reconciliation34), I refer to this 
category more broadly as addressing loss and damage (the latter term being more 
common in climate negotiations than residual damage).35 
1.4.2.2 Variations in the distribution of costs and benefits 
Each type of action differs according to the extent, timing and spatial distribution of 
its costs and benefits, and the degree of coordination required to achieve effective 
action. Mitigation is widely considered to be the preferable response, as it 
addresses the cause of the problem rather than its symptoms. However, if 
mitigation is to be effective in avoiding dangerous climate change,36 it will require a 
worldwide effort encompassing all countries that are major sources of emissions, 
notably among them large developing economies such as China, India, Brazil, South 
Africa and Indonesia. Particularly since mitigation requires a thoroughgoing 
transformation of industrial production, which is presently heavily reliant on fossil 
fuels, it will be costly. The Stern Review, for example, estimated that stabilising 
global concentrations of GHGs at safe levels would cost around one per cent of 
global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whereas failing to act would result in a 
permanent loss of welfare of around five to twenty per cent.37  
Moreover, due to the physical dynamics outlined above, mitigation will primarily 
benefit future generations in subsequent centuries, even though (as I discuss next) 
                                                     
33 Richard S. J. Tol and Roda Verheyen, "State responsibility and compensation for climate change 
damages—a legal and economic assessment", Energy Policy 32, no. 9 (2004): 1113. 
34 Stephen M. Gardiner, A perfect moral storm: The ethical tragedy of climate change (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 427. 
35 There may also be some losses that could never be fully compensated for, particularly those 
relating to the irreversible loss of biodiversity or ecosystems: see Andrew Dobson, Justice and the 
environment: Conceptions of environmental sustainability and dimensions of social justice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998)). 
36 Dangerous climate change is often associated with warming above 2℃ (the temperature limit 
within which countries committed to remain under the Copenhagen Accord), but lower levels of 
warming could result in dangerous impacts in some regions. Compare Darrel Moellendorf, "A 
normative account of dangerous climate change", Climatic change 108, no. 1 (2011).  
37 Stern, The economics of climate change, x, xii.  
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it may generate some shorter-term benefits.38 In that respect, mitigation efforts 
must compete with other funding priorities aimed at benefiting the present 
generation (notably domestic and international development finance). 
A further challenge is that mitigation by one country will primarily yield worldwide 
benefits due to the mixing of GHGs in the atmosphere. Mitigation activities may 
also produce indirect benefits that are more localised, for example lower emissions 
of substances that produce local pollution, or employment in low-carbon 
technology industries.39 However, the primarily global scale of benefits gives rise to 
a collective action problem, whereby countries have an incentive to free-ride on the 
efforts of others, which would lead to a shortfall in the aggregate effort required to 
solve the problem. For this reason, international cooperation is critical to achieving 
adequate mitigation.40 
Certain types of investments in adaptation may also provide supra-national and 
global benefits, for example the development of drought-resistant crops or other 
adaptive technologies. However, since the impacts of climate change vary 
depending on geographic location and other local circumstances, the adaptation 
measures required to address impacts will need to vary accordingly. As a result, 
most adaptation measures will produce primarily local benefits.41 Many adaptation 
measures are closely associated with measures that will promote human 
development, since efforts to reduce vulnerability to climate change—including 
strengthening social safety nets—will often help reduce vulnerability to other 
shocks.42 As a result, many of the indirect benefits of adaptation will be 
development-related, such that Nicholas Stern has described adaptation as 
“development in a more hostile climate”.43 For this reason alone, adaptation may 
                                                     
38 Ross Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final report (Melbourne: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 249. 
39 See Chapter 4, section 4.2.2. 
40 See Chapter 2, section 3.2. 
41 Jonathan Pickering and Dirk Rübbelke, "International cooperation on adaptation to climate change 
" in Routledge handbook of the economics of climate change adaptation, ed. Anil Markandya, Ibon 
Galarraga, and Elisa Sainz de Murieta (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming (2014)).  
42 See Chapter 4, section 4.4.4. 
43 Stern, The economics of climate change, 68. 
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yield short-term (or “no-regrets”) development benefits even if the nature and scale 
of climatic impacts remains uncertain.44 
1.5 The evolution of global climate policy 
Over the past two decades governments and private actors have established a 
range of national and global institutions and policies for addressing climate change. 
At the global level, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC; or “the climate convention”) adopted in 1992 is the founding treaty for 
global climate change cooperation.45 Cooperative efforts have not resulted in a 
single, tightly coordinated global regime under the UNFCCC, but rather what 
Keohane and Victor refer to as a “regime complex” encompassing a range of more 
or less connected regimes.46 As the UNFCCC continues to play an important role in 
shaping international cooperation, this thesis focuses mainly on UNFCCC-related 
negotiations. The thesis deals primarily with key issues in the UNFCCC negotiations 
since the Copenhagen Accord (2009; discussed below), while drawing on analysis of 
previous negotiations.  
1.5.1 The changing character of cooperation across the development divide 
Global cooperation on climate change emerged against the backdrop of earlier 
negotiations on worldwide environmental problems as well as ongoing rifts 
between developed and developing countries across a range of multilateral 
institutions.47 Earlier international declarations had portrayed global environmental 
protection as an issue that, while being of common concern to some extent, was a 
higher priority for wealthy countries. By contrast, developing countries emphasised 
                                                     
44 Stéphane Hallegatte, "Strategies to adapt to an uncertain climate change", Global Environmental 
Change 19, no. 2 (2009). 
45 UNFCCC, "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change" (1992). 
46 Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, "The regime complex for climate change", Perspectives on 
Politics 9, no. 1 (2011). While recognising this insight, for brevity I generally refer to the “climate 
regime”. 
47 See generally Joyeeta Gupta, "A history of international climate change policy", Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 1, no. 5 (2010). 
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that their overriding priority was to reduce poverty and promote national 
development.48  
In many ways the UNFCCC embeds these earlier concerns. The climate convention’s 
“ultimate objective” is “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system”.49 Critical to guiding cooperation towards this objective 
are the principles set out in Article 3: 
 
1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the 
developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the 
adverse effects thereof. 
2. The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, 
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have to 
bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full 
consideration. […] 
4. The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Policies 
and measures to protect the climate system against human-induced change should be 
appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated with 
national development programmes, taking into account that economic development is 
essential for adopting measures to address climate change.50  
 
As I outline in section 1.8.3 below and in subsequent chapters, the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR&RC) 
has played an important but contested part in shaping the roles of developing and 
                                                     
48 Peter S. Thacher, "The role of the United Nations" in The international politics of the environment: 
Actors, interests, and institutions, ed. Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992), 196; Lynton Keith Caldwell, International environmental policy: From the twentieth to 
the twenty-first century, 3rd ed., [rev. And updated with the assistance of paul stanley weiland] 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 74. 
49 UNFCCC, Article 2. 
50 Ibid., Article 3 (emphasis added). 
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developed countries in climate policy. The rigidly drawn distinction between 
developed and developing countries reflected in the convention has likewise had a 
strong influence on the dynamics of negotiations, although countries have 
increasingly voiced concerns over whether current country groupings adequately 
reflect the principle of CBDR&RC.51  
As outlined in Chapter 3, under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol only developed countries 
adopted binding mitigation targets. Nevertheless, the changing distribution of 
global emissions has prompted a reconfiguration of the role of developing vis-à-vis 
developed countries over the past decade. Notably, at the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) to the UNFCCC in 2009, developing countries pledged under the Copenhagen 
Accord to adopt “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” alongside the 
“commitments” of developed countries for the period to 2020.52 National pledges 
were formalised the following year under the Cancún Agreements.53 The aggregate 
mitigation effort resulting from these pledges is widely considered to be inadequate 
for ensuring that by 2020 parties will be on track to meet their agreed goal of 
limiting temperature rise to 2°C.54 Parties to the climate convention are currently 
engaged in negotiations for a new agreement to operate from 2020 onwards. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the mandate for negotiating the new agreement (the 
“Durban Platform for Enhanced Action”) leaves many questions unresolved about 
the future roles of developed and developing countries. 
1.5.2 Climate change finance 
Although the sharing of mitigation efforts has justifiably taken centre stage during 
much of the climate convention’s history, it has increasingly shared the stage with 
deliberations over international financial flows to support mitigation and adaptation 
                                                     
51 See especially Chapter 3 (section 3.4.1), as well as Chapters 2 (section 2.4.3) and 5 (section 5.4). 
52 UNFCCC, "Copenhagen Accord" (2009). 
53 UNFCCC. "The Cancún Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action under the Convention." 2011. 
54 UNEP, "The emissions gap report 2013: A UNEP synthesis report" (United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2013). 
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in developing countries (“climate finance”).55 Under the climate convention, 
developed countries made broad pledges to support developing countries in 
addressing climate change.56 However, until very recently those pledges have not 
been backed up with substantial resources. A watershed occurred at Copenhagen in 
2009 when developed countries committed to providing a figure approaching 
US$30 billion between 2010 and 2012 (frequently referred to as “fast-start 
finance”), scaling up to US$100 billion a year by 2020 (medium-term finance).57 
Romani and Stern have observed how the Copenhagen financing commitments 
formed part of a wider bargain between developed and developing countries  
 
[…] with developing countries signing up to it on the back of the financial commitment 
of developed countries, and developed countries on the back of the pledges made by 
developing countries. These transfers were interpreted (at least by developing 
countries) as being linked to equity: without some attention to equity an agreement 
would have been very difficult.58 
 
The idea that considerations of equity may have driven financing commitments 
derives some support from the fact that wealthy countries committed funding not 
only for mitigation (which benefits contributors as well as recipients of funding) but 
also for adaptation (which primarily benefits recipients).59 The very fact that 
adaptation finance appears more altruistic may generate greater trust on the part 
of developing countries and in turn encourage them to adopt more ambitious 
mitigation actions.60 
                                                     
55 See Chapter 5, section 5.2.2. 
56 UNFCCC, Articles 4.3 and 4.4. See also Chapter 6, section 6.5.1; and Pickering and Rübbelke, 
"International cooperation on adaptation to climate change ". 
57 Copenhagen Accord, Paragraph 8. 
58 Mattia Romani and Nicholas Stern, "Sources of finance for climate action: Principles and options 
for implementation mechanisms in this decade" in International climate finance, ed. Erik Haites 
(London: Routledge, 2013), 117. 
59 Dirk T. G. Rübbelke, "International support of climate change policies in developing countries: 
Strategic, moral and fairness aspects", Ecological Economics 70, no. 8 (2011). 
60 Ibid. 
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The Copenhagen financing commitments, while substantial compared with overall 
global aid levels of US$134 billion in 2011, fall well short of countries’ climate 
financing needs.61 In addition, developing countries have expressed concern that 
developed countries may divert funding from existing development priorities by 
using their aid budgets to fulfil climate finance commitments (as most contributors 
did during the fast-start finance period).62 Debates about the relationship between 
climate finance and aid have in turn filtered into debates outside the climate 
change regime on the nature of future international development goals to succeed 
the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which expire in 2015.63 
1.6 Methodology 
1.6.1 Approaches to evaluation in climate ethics 
From the late 1980s, coinciding with the emergence of broader policy interest in 
climate change, a number of writers in developing and developed countries began 
to engage with the ethical dimensions of climate change.64 Since the late 1990s a 
substantial and varied body of research relating to the ethics of climate change has 
emerged.65 The remainder of the Introduction will situate my approach within the 
broader literature on climate ethics. In order to do so, I begin with a schematic 
overview of some of the key variables in approaches to evaluation adopted in 
research on climate ethics. These variables are outlined in Table 1.1 below. 
                                                     
61 OECD, Statistics 2013, accessed 20 December 2013. http://www.oecd.org/statistics/. See generally 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
62 See Chapter 5, section 5.3.2 and Chapter 6, section 6.5.1. 
63 See Chapter 6, section 1.1. 
64 Notable early contributions include Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain, Global warming in an unequal 
world: A case of environmental colonialism (New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment, 1991); 
Dale Jamieson, "Ethics, public policy, and global warming", Science Technology & Human Values 17, 
no. 2 (1992); and Henry Shue, "Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions", Law & Policy 15, no. 1 
(1993). 
65 Surveyed for example by Stephen M. Gardiner, "Ethics and global climate change", Ethics 114, no. 
3 (2004); Stephen M. Gardiner, "Ethics and climate change: An introduction", Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Climate Change 1, no. 1 (2010); and Darrel Moellendorf, "Climate change and global 
justice", Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 3, no. 2 (2012). A valuable compilation of 
key contribution to the literature is Gardiner et al., eds., Climate ethics: Essential readings. 
44 
 
The remainder of this subsection outlines the ethical foundations and mode of 
evaluation used in the thesis. Subsequent sections outline the external thematic 
scope (section 1.7), moral principles (section 1.8) and internal thematic scope (1.9). 
Discussion of the level of analysis is woven into these sections, but in brief the 
scope of all the chapters is primarily global, contemporary (in the sense of focusing 
on current effort-sharing arrangements while taking intergenerational implications 
into account) and state-based. 
 
Table 1.2. Approaches to evaluation in climate ethics 
1. Evaluative framework  
a. Ethical foundations: fairness, justice; deontological, consequentialist or 
virtue ethics; egalitarian or libertarian; cosmopolitan or communitarian 
b. Mode of evaluation: ideal or non-ideal theory 
c. Moral principles: rights, entitlements or responsibilities; addressing 
harm or alleviating deprivation 
2. Thematic scope of analysis  
a. External: in isolation from or integrated with other concerns (e.g. trade 
or development) 
b. Internal: mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage  
3. Level of analysis  
a. geographical (global, national or sub-national); temporal (contemporary 
or intergenerational); subjects (nation-states, individuals, firms, 
ecosystems) 
 
1.6.2 Ethical foundations 
1.6.2.1 Benchmarks for evaluation: fairness, equity, justice and legitimacy 
In the ensuing chapters I focus primarily on considerations of fairness and equity 
(especially in Chapters 3 and 4) but also draw on ideas of justice (Chapter 2) and 
legitimacy (Chapter 5). In relation to several of these concepts, Paul Baer observes: 
 
45 
 
In debates about climate change, as elsewhere, the terms “justice,” “fairness,” and 
“equity” are used somewhat interchangeably. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that an 
institution or an outcome could be considered fair but not just, or just but not 
equitable.66 
 
As I outline below, I consider the terms fairness, equity, justice and also legitimacy 
to be closely related. Common to my understandings of these terms is that each (i) 
has substantive and procedural dimensions;67 and (ii) applies both within and across 
countries and generations. However, I note some points of distinction among them.  
The concept of “equity” referred to in the climate convention could denote (as in 
international environmental law more generally) a broad criterion of fair 
treatment.68 The concept of fairness is often taken to refer to a general principle of 
even-handed, proportionate or non-arbitrary treatment of persons and groups in 
the distribution of goods or the satisfaction of their moral claims.69 For the purposes 
of the thesis I will treat equity and fairness as roughly equivalent, but reserve 
“equity” for those aspects of fairness that are understood to flow directly from 
requirements of equity within the climate convention and in general public 
international law. 
Following Rawls, I take just institutions to be those where “no arbitrary distinctions 
are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and […] the 
rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of 
social life”.70 I distinguish claims of justice from claims of fairness primarily on the 
                                                     
66 Paul Baer, "International justice" in The Oxford handbook of climate change and society, ed. John 
Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, and D. Schlosberg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 333. 
67 Most chapters focus on substantive evaluation, although Chapter 5 discusses some aspects of 
procedural legitimacy. 
68 Compare Shelton: “Equity in international environmental law … means a rational sharing of the 
burdens and costs of environmental protection, discharged through the procedural and substantive 
adjustment of rights and duties” (Dinah Shelton, "Equity" in Oxford handbook of international 
environmental law, ed. Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée, and Ellen Hey (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 661). 
69 Compare John Rawls, A theory of justice, revised ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 5; see also John Broome, "Fairness", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
91 (1990): 95.  
70 Rawls, A theory of justice, 5. 
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basis that the former give rise to more stringent and demanding requirements.71 
However, I also consider that principles of fairness may apply even if they are not of 
sufficient status to qualify as principles of justice (and that an outcome may 
therefore be unfair even if it is not unjust).  
I define legitimacy as “the justification of authority”.72 Accordingly, an institution is 
legitimate “if there are good reasons in support of its claims to authority”.73 The 
substantive and procedural dimensions of legitimacy are often characterised 
respectively as “output” and “input” legitimacy.74 An institution that is fair or just is 
likely to be legitimate as well, but legitimacy represents a more minimal evaluative 
standard than either fairness or justice. Thus an institution may be justified in the 
exercise of authority even if it falls short of the standard of justice. One valuable 
aspect of maintaining a distinction between justice and legitimacy is that “judging 
an institution to be legitimate, if flawed, focuses critical discourse by signalling that 
the appropriate objective is to reform it, rather than to reject it outright”.75 
Legitimacy thus provides an important standard for evaluation where there is 
reasonable disagreement about what the principles of justice or fairness require.76  
1.6.2.2 Cosmopolitan and communitarian perspectives on global justice 
Much research on climate ethics has adopted a broadly cosmopolitan egalitarian 
perspective. While egalitarian cosmopolitan views vary, in rough terms they not 
                                                     
71 On stringency and demandingness, see Chapter 4, section 4.2.1. While this view adopts Rawls’ 
view regarding the priority of justice, I do not employ Rawls’ specific conception of “justice as 
fairness”, in the sense that “the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain” 
(ibid., 11.). There are other important articulations of the relationship between the principles treated 
here. See for example Thomas M Franck, Fairness in international law and institutions (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995).  
72 Daniel Bodansky, "The legitimacy of international governance: A coming challenge for 
international environmental law?", The American Journal of International Law 93, no. 3 (1999): 601; 
see also generally Allen Buchanan, Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
73 Bodansky, "The legitimacy of international governance: A coming challenge for international 
environmental law?": 601. 
74 See Chapter 5, section 0. 
75 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, "The legitimacy of global governance institutions", Ethics 
& International Affairs 20, no. 4 (2006): 407. 
76 Ibid. 
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only take all humans as moral equals but also consider that duties of egalitarian 
distributive justice apply at the global level.77 By contrast, communitarian (or statist 
or nationalist) theories of justice adopt the view that duties of egalitarian 
distributive justice apply exclusively at the level of nation-states.78 They may hold 
that some minimum duties of justice (such as a minimally decent standard of living) 
apply at the global level but that those duties fall short of requiring egalitarian 
constraints on the distribution of welfare or resources worldwide.79 Egalitarian 
cosmopolitans differ in their manner of conceiving the grounds of duties of global 
distributive justice, some appealing to people’s common humanity,80 others to the 
facts of interdependence or common participation in global institutions.81  
In the context of climate ethics, Baer observes: 
 
While not all the philosophers who have written on climate change are otherwise 
engaged in debates about cosmopolitanism, they are nearly uniformly united around 
some form of liberal egalitarianism, with a commitment to equality of dignity and 
respect. Starting from this commitment, most conclude that claims of justice do apply 
to the international distribution of the costs and benefits of climate policy. […] [T]here 
is a near consensus among the philosophers who have written on the topic that 
considerations of justice do in fact justify the obligation of rich and high-emitting 
countries to reduce their emissions, pay for emissions reductions in poor countries, 
and aid poor countries in adapting to climate change.82  
  
                                                     
77 See generally Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan justice (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 2002); 
Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, "Extra rempublicam nulla justitia?", Philosophy & Public Affairs 34, 
no. 2 (2006); Thomas W Pogge, World poverty and human rights, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 
2008); Helena De Bres, "The many, not the few: Pluralism about global distributive justice", Journal 
of Political Philosophy 20, no. 3 (2012).  
78 See generally John Rawls, The law of peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); 
Nagel, "The problem of global justice". 
79 David Miller, National responsibility and global justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
80 Simon Caney, Justice beyond borders: A global political theory (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
81 Pogge, World poverty and human rights; see also Laura Valentini, Justice in a globalized world: A 
normative framework (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
82 Baer, "International justice", 326. 
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In this thesis I adopt a similar starting point regarding the applicability of principles 
of justice at the global level, while noting here several points of clarification and 
qualification that are elaborated subsequently (particularly in Chapter 4). First, 
while I consider individual persons to be the ultimate units of moral concern, I will 
assume that moral responsibilities may attach to collectives.83 I will focus primarily 
on states as agents of collective responsibility for the advancement of domestic and 
global justice, while noting that national responsibilities may be distributed so as to 
take account of relevant variations within countries.84 This is a particularly 
important concern given that the geography of global poverty has shifted 
substantially in recent decades. While many countries in Africa remain poor despite 
recent improvements in economic growth rates, the majority of the world’s poor 
now live in middle-income countries such as China and India.85 
Second, I take a pluralist approach to the scope of and grounds for the 
responsibilities or duties that states may have.86 I consider that states may have 
domestic or global responsibilities of justice or fairness as well as responsibilities to 
promote the wellbeing of their own citizens.87 I take the view that the stringency 
and demandingness of duties of justice may vary depending on whether they apply 
to one’s fellow citizens or to those beyond one’s national borders.88 A state’s 
responsibilities to address deprivation (or its “remedial responsibilities”89) beyond 
                                                     
83 Given the common usage of developed and developing “countries” in climate policy, I use the 
terms “country” and “state” interchangeably. For economy of expression, I will also use “national” to 
refer to an attribute of states or countries (e.g. “national responsibility”), while recognising that 
some authors draw distinctions between nations and states. See generally Miller, National 
responsibility and global justice. 
84 See Paul Baer et al., "Greenhouse development rights: Towards an equitable framework for global 
climate policy", Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21, no. 4 (2008): 329-30; Paul G. Harris, 
World ethics and climate change: From international to global justice, Edinburgh studies in world 
ethics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010). 
85 Sumner, "Where do the poor live?". 
86 Whereas some authors distinguish between the terms “responsibilities” and “duties”, I use the 
two interchangeably. I use the term “obligation” to refer to self-assumed responsibilities pursuant to 
a political or personal relationship. See generally Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the vulnerable: A re-
analysis of our social responsibilities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
87 John Broome, Climate matters (New York; London: W.W. Norton, 2012), 50-51. 
88 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.3. 
89 I adopt this term from David Miller, who defines remedial responsibility as “the responsibility we 
may have to come to the aid of those who need help”. He distinguishes remedial responsibility from 
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its territory may arise where one or more of a range of moral considerations apply, 
such as the state’s contribution to harm, its capacity to assist those suffering 
deprivation, or the fact that its citizens have benefited from injustice.90 In taking this 
approach I do not rely on an explicit distinction between distributive and 
rectificatory justice.91 I consider that responsibilities associated with preventing or 
remedying harm are in general more stringent and demanding than those 
associated with assisting those suffering deprivation, but that the relative strength 
of harm-based responsibilities may vary according to the type of harm involved.92 
This aspect is of particular relevance for climate ethics as climate change involves a 
range of harms mediated through global environmental and economic systems. In 
addition, I consider that at the global level duties of distributive justice may become 
more stringent and demanding where countries are involved in cooperative or 
coercive institutions (such as the global climate change and trade regimes).93  
Finally, the fulfilment of principles of global justice may be affected by a range of 
feasibility constraints. I turn to the implications of this aspect next.  
1.6.3 Mode of evaluation: a contextual approach 
1.6.3.1 Climate ethics, policy and non-ideal theory 
A key question of method concerns the extent to which climate ethics should strive 
to integrate insights from the much larger body of empirical and political analysis on 
climate change, or whether it should seek largely to coexist alongside that work. 
This question echoes a broader debate about the way in which “ideal” theories of 
                                                     
outcome responsibility (“the responsibility we bear for our own actions and decisions”). See Miller, 
National responsibility and global justice, 81; and David Miller, "Distributing responsibilities", Journal 
of Political Philosophy 9, no. 4 (2001). 
90 I outline in more detail the nature of these principles as they relate to climate change in section 
1.8. 
91 For a discussion in climate ethics that explores this distinction, see Steve Vanderheiden, 
"Globalizing responsibility for climate change", Ethics & International Affairs 25, no. 1 (2011). 
92 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.3. 
93 See Chapter 4, section 4.3.3. 
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distributive justice should relate to “non-ideal” theory.94 Ideal theory is generally 
thought to be “ideal” in at least two respects: it contains substantial “idealisations” 
away from real circumstances (such as the assumption of strict compliance with the 
precepts of justice), and it also sets out a vision of an “ideally” just society.95 
Non-ideal theory, by contrast, focuses greater attention on the steps required to 
make progress from current conditions towards a more just (or ideally just) 
society.96 In doing so it focuses greater attention on empirical circumstances and 
questions of feasibility.97  
The question of whether it is necessary to have a fully-fledged ideal theory in place 
before pursuing non-ideal theorising has attracted considerable debate.98 While I 
cannot hope to resolve that debate here, I believe it is preferable to see ideal and 
non-ideal theorising as necessary and complementary parts of the division of moral 
inquiry. As such, non-ideal theorising may adopt points of orientation from others’ 
work in ideal theory.99 
As noted earlier in the introduction, the thesis adopts what I refer to as a 
“contextual” approach to evaluation in that it seeks to interpret and apply principles 
on the basis of an understanding of the institutional context in which they operate. 
The idea that moral principles may have different applications depending on the 
empirical circumstances of the context at hand is a commonplace of applied 
                                                     
94 The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory gained currency through John Rawls’ 
pioneering work on distributive justice and the large body of commentary that it has spawned. See 
Rawls, A theory of justice, 216; Rawls, The law of peoples, 5, 89-90. 
95 Ingrid Robeyns, "Ideal theory in theory and practice", Social Theory and Practice 34, no. 3 (2008): 
344; Laura Valentini, "On the apparent paradox of ideal theory", Journal of Political Philosophy 17, 
no. 3 (2009): 337-38. 
96 Robeyns, "Ideal theory in theory and practice": 346. 
97 Ibid., 347.; see also Rawls, A theory of justice, 8 and A. John Simmons, "Ideal and nonideal theory", 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 38, no. 1 (2010): 18-19. 
98 For arguments that ideal theory must be developed first, see Rawls, The law of peoples, 90; 
Simmons, "Ideal and nonideal theory": 31-36. For arguments to the contrary see Amartya Sen, The 
idea of justice (London: Allen Lane, 2009), Chapter 4; and Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit, "The 
feasibility issue" in The Oxford handbook of contemporary philosophy, ed. Frank Jackson and Michael 
Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
99 Compare Zofia Stemplowska, "What’s ideal about ideal theory?", Social Theory and Practice 34, no. 
3 (2008). 
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ethics.100 There is little room for doubt, for example, that research in climate ethics 
should be informed by accurate scientific understanding of the functioning of the 
climate system and its impacts on humans and their environment.101 Nevertheless, 
debate remains over the extent to which theory development should take into 
account (i) empirical evidence about conceptions of fairness that people hold, and 
(ii) feasibility constraints. I address each issue in turn. 
1.6.3.2 Conceptions of fairness 
Contextual approaches may draw on empirical evidence about conceptions of 
fairness from a number of sources and for a number of purposes. Sources may 
include the structure of conventions or social practices,102 widely agreed norms as 
institutionalised (for example) in domestic and international law,103 as well as the 
normative beliefs that people hold about a particular issue. I employ this evidence 
principally for two purposes. First, evidence of widely agreed principles (such as 
those outlined in section 1.5 in relation to the climate convention) may direct 
attention towards moral concerns that matter most in a given situation.104 Second, 
empirical evidence of principles and normative beliefs may inform judgements 
about what kinds of normative prescriptions are likely to be feasible in practice. I 
elaborate on these aspects in section 1.8.  
                                                     
100 John M. Doris and Stephen P. Stich, "As a matter of fact: Empirical perspectives on ethics" in 
Oxford handbook of contemporary philosophy, ed. Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Sebastian Schleidgen, Michael C. Jungert, and Robert H. Bauer, "Mission: 
Impossible? On empirical-normative collaboration in ethical reasoning", Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice (2009). 
101 Simon Caney, "Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility, and global climate change", Leiden Journal of 
International Law 18 (2005): 750. 
102 See Chapter 6, section 6.2.1. 
103 Robert E. Goodin, "What is so special about our fellow countrymen?", Ethics 98, no. 4 (1988): 667. 
104 Adam Swift et al., "Distributive justice: Does it matter what the people think?" in Social justice 
and political change: Public opinion in capitalist and post-communist states, ed. James R. Kluegel, 
David S. Mason, and Bernd Wegener (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1995). 
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1.6.3.3 Feasibility constraints 
I define the term “feasibility” broadly as “compatibility with the limits imposed by 
our best understanding of human nature and social institutions”.105 Political 
feasibility generally encompasses aspects of accessibility (the availability of a 
practical route from one state of affairs to another) and stability (whether the 
proposed state of affairs can be maintained once it is reached).106 In Chapter 6 I 
discuss the roles of accessibility and stability in informing criteria for evaluating 
possible definitions of aid.107 However, in other chapters I focus primarily on 
feasibility constraints that relate to accessibility.  
One of the most valuable aspects of incorporating feasibility considerations into 
non-ideal theory is that it may enable theories to generate recommendations for 
intermediate steps for progressing from current conditions towards a fairer or 
ideally fair set of arrangements, or what Stephen Gardiner refers to as an “ethics for 
the transition”.108 Nevertheless, there is a concern that incorporating feasibility 
considerations may result too readily in ethical theory being compromised by 
political expediency.109 I respond to this concern in section 1.8, but for the present I 
briefly outline several feasibility constraints that I address in subsequent chapters. 
A first constraint involves empirical uncertainty. This may extend to the causes or 
impacts of climate change, and our ability to attribute particular actions, costs or 
benefits to specific actors. This factor may influence our ability to take account of (i) 
how responsibilities associated with climate change affect wider responsibilities of 
global justice (section 1.7) and (ii) how distributive principles should be 
implemented (section 1.9). A second constraint concerns the urgency of the 
                                                     
105 Christian Barry and Laura Valentini, "Egalitarian challenges to global egalitarianism: A critique", 
Review of International Studies 35, no. 03 (2009): 508. 
106 Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith, "Political feasibility: A conceptual exploration", Political 
Studies 60, no. 4 (2012): 3; see Chapter 3, section 3.2.3. 
107 Chapter 6, section 6.3. 
108 Pablo Gilabert, "Global justice and poverty relief in nonideal circumstances", Social Theory and 
Practice 34, no. 3 (2008):416; Stephen M. Gardiner, "Climate justice" in The Oxford handbook of 
climate change and society, ed. John Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, and D. Schlosberg (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), Chapter 11. 
109 Compare Stemplowska, "What’s ideal about ideal theory?": 339. 
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problem. This may affect the relative importance of ensuring distributive fairness 
vis-à-vis advancing other moral concerns such as preventing harm (see section 1.8) 
or the availability of reform options (section 1.9). A third constraint involves the fact 
of reasonable pluralism about moral principles. As noted above, assessment of 
people’s views about normative principles and their attitudes towards particular 
framings of principles may provide important indications of how readily those 
principles will be accepted in practice. A final constraint concerns institutional 
feasibility. Institutions may enable certain types of action—notably by overcoming 
collective action problems—but they may also present a range of constraints upon 
action. Institutional constraints may affect the scope of the issues that an institution 
may address (section 1.8) as well as the design of policy instruments (section 1.9).  
1.7 External scope of analysis: linking climate change and development 
1.7.1 An overview of research themes in climate ethics  
Now that I have outlined an overall methodology for the thesis, let us consider in 
more detail the thematic scope of analysis in the thesis. Two recent reviews of 
climate ethics converge on a tripartite categorisation of major research themes in 
the field.110 The first three columns of Table 1.3 link the categories of action 
mentioned above to these categories of research question. For comparative 
purposes I add a column on development that helps to situate aspects of Chapters 5 
and 6. 
 
                                                     
110 Gardiner, "Climate justice"; Baer, "International justice". I modify the terminology used by each 
author slightly to match categories I have set out earlier in the Introduction. For parsimony—and 
reflecting the categorisation outlined in the two reviews—I treat adaptation and loss and damage 
together. 
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Table 1.3. Categories of action on climate change and development 
 Mitigation  Adaptation/ loss 
and damage (L&D) 
Development 
 1. Target-setting 2. Effort-sharing 3. Addressing 
impacts 
4. Promoting 
development/ 
reducing poverty 
A. 
Global 
 Global 
mitigation 
targets and 
trajectories 
 National 
mitigation 
targets [Chs 2, 
3] 
 International 
emissions 
trading 
 International 
finance for 
mitigation [Chs 
2, 5, 6] 
 Addressing 
transnational 
impacts of 
mitigation 
policies [Ch 4] 
 International 
finance for 
adaptation/ 
L&D [Chs 2, 5, 
6] 
 Addressing 
transnational 
impacts of 
adaptation/ 
L&D policies 
 
 International 
development 
finance, 
including aid 
[Chs 5, 6] 
 Other policies 
that affect 
international 
development  
B. 
National 
 National 
mitigation 
targets and 
trajectories 
[derived from 
global effort-
sharing] 
 National 
mitigation 
measures 
(carbon pricing, 
regulation, 
funding) 
 Addressing 
domestic 
impacts of 
mitigation 
policies [Ch 4] 
 National 
adaptation/ 
L&D measures 
 Addressing 
domestic 
impacts of 
adaptation/ 
L&D policies 
 
 National 
development 
planning  
 
Subsequent chapters focus primarily on the issue of sharing the efforts of mitigation 
and adaptation, with an emphasis on international effort-sharing (cells 2A and 3A). 
Chapter 4 is unique among the chapters in comparing impacts of mitigation policies 
at both the international and domestic levels (cells 2A and 2B respectively). 
Accordingly, I will have little to say about setting overall targets for mitigation 
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(column 1) but will consider effort-sharing arrangements against the backdrop of a 
target that has a reasonable likelihood of avoiding dangerous climate change.111 
1.7.2 Sharing the costs of addressing climate change: isolated and integrated 
approaches 
The preceding discussion of global climate policy has already suggested a number of 
ways in which fairness in climate policy relates to the broader global distribution of 
economic resources. There is considerable debate over how the two areas should 
be understood in relation to one another (the question of external thematic 
scope).112 The debate poses the challenge of how to formulate a complete theory of 
global justice to set the various issues in an adequate theoretical context.113 
However, as I argue below, it is not only possible but necessary to explore the 
morality of individual issues to achieve at least a provisional evaluation of major 
policy issues, since progress in international negotiations may require focusing on 
particular pieces of the moral jigsaw. 
Caney has drawn a distinction between approaches that consider justice in the 
distribution of climate-related costs and benefits in isolation from justice in the 
distribution of economic resources globally (the “Method of Isolation”) and those 
that integrate the two (the “Method of Integration”).114 Individual theories may not 
reside only at one extreme or the other, but somewhere on a continuum between 
them.115 The distinction between isolation and integration forms part of a cluster of 
distinctions (including Caney’s further distinction between atomism and holism) 
that I will employ and discuss in the remainder of this chapter (see Table 1.4 below).  
                                                     
111 See Chapter 3. On target-setting generally, see for example Moellendorf, "A normative account of 
dangerous climate change"; Henry Shue, "Human rights, climate change, and the trillionth ton" in 
The ethics of global climate change, ed. Denis G. Arnold (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2011). 
112 See Table 1.2. 
113 See also Gardiner, A perfect moral storm, Chapter 11. 
114 Although Caney applies the distinction specifically to the context of the distribution of 
greenhouse gas emissions, he notes that the distinction could be applicable to climate justice more 
broadly (see Simon Caney, "Just emissions", Philosophy & Public Affairs 40, no. 4 (2012): 259, 
footnote 7).  
115 For a finer-grained set of categories, see Gardiner, A perfect moral storm, 436. See also Robeyns, 
"Ideal theory in theory and practice": 344. 
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Table 1.4. Structural variations in climate ethics and policy analysis 
External thematic scope Isolation  
from other considerations of 
global justice  
Integration  
with broader considerations of 
global justice 
Internal thematic scope Atomism  
different principles applied to 
different categories of action 
Holism 
a single set of principles 
applied to all categories of 
action together  
Structure of climate 
governance 
Fragmentation 
unilateral and/or 
uncoordinated action 
Coordination 
coordinated and/or mutually 
reinforcing action 
 
Caney notes that supporting the method of integration at the level of principle does 
not necessarily commit one to the same position at the level of practical 
implementation.116 Caney ultimately rejects isolation at both levels. At the level of 
principle, Caney makes a compelling case that we should not treat greenhouse gas 
emissions as a good with intrinsic moral importance; rather, emissions are a means 
to secure other morally important goods (food, shelter, livelihoods and so on); 
accordingly, we need to consider the distribution of greenhouse gas entitlements in 
the context of a wider set of goods.117 Moreover, he presents two arguments for 
rejecting an isolationist view at the level of implementation. I will briefly address 
these arguments and explain the extent to which my own approach differs. 
1.7.2.1 The intractability argument 
The first argument for isolated implementation rejected by Caney is that, given the 
difficulty of agreeing on even a just distribution of greenhouse gas emissions 
                                                     
116 Caney, "Just emissions": 277. I consider these levels to be roughly comparable with those of ideal 
and non-ideal theory. 
117 Ibid., 285. 
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entitlements, attempting to resolve broader issues of global justice in the present 
negotiating process would result in an impasse.118 Caney refers to this as the 
“intractability argument”. Such an argument has been advanced by Eric A. Posner 
and David Weisbach. A redistributive climate treaty, they argue, would also 
incorporate a form of multilateral aid treaty, but given that disagreements about 
how aid should be distributed have impeded agreement on an aid treaty to date, 
linking the two issues could result in deadlock.119 Among other responses, Caney 
argues that isolationist approaches may in fact be more rather than less likely to 
generate an impasse, since developing countries with considerable influence in 
negotiations (including China and India) are likely to resist any international 
agreement on climate change that fails to take into account their own development 
priorities.120 
I find Caney’s response to the intractability argument plausible. As noted above, the 
climate convention already incorporates principles that bear on broader 
development concerns. While some might think that the convention thus 
entrenches the intractability of the climate problem, it is important to note the 
limited scope of the principles set out in the convention: 
 
Fundamentally, the Convention’s principles distinguishing burdens of the developed 
and the developing states is not about resource redistribution, then, although it has 
been maligned as such. Rather such principles serve to ensure that neither climate 
change nor a climate change treaty worsen the prospects for development for poor 
countries.121 
 
Even if the convention is not a vehicle for the general redistribution of global 
resources, it remains the case that substantial financial resources will be required 
                                                     
118 Ibid., 277-80. 
119 Eric A. Posner and David Weisbach, Climate change justice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2010), 86. 
120 Caney, "Just emissions": 279. 
121 Moellendorf, "Climate change and global justice": 133. Moellendorf notes that the “maligners” he 
has in mind are Posner and Weisbach.  
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specifically to address climate change in developing countries. Basing financing 
commitments on credible assessments of developing countries’ climate-related 
needs may help reinforce in negotiations the idea that such commitments aim to 
address the climate change problem in an equitable fashion rather than secure a 
general transfer of wealth.122   
In addition, the intractability argument intersects with the question of the 
constraint of empirical uncertainty noted above. That is, both scholars and 
policymakers necessarily have a limited understanding of the ways in which specific 
problems intersect with others. In many cases a problem may become more 
tractable conceptually if it is broken down into smaller components, or if one 
focuses on addressing a specific injustice.123 Approaches of this kind may run the 
risk that fixing one injustice could create or exacerbate another. However, this risk 
could be addressed by adopting an iterative approach to problem-solving that can 
take account of unanticipated effects at successive stages of reform.124  
1.7.2.2 The fragmentation argument 
The second argument in favour of isolation (which Caney refers to as the 
“impotence argument” but which I will refer to as the “fragmentation argument”) is 
that it is better to deal with greenhouse gas emissions in isolation because of the 
current fragmentation of decision-making at the international level.125 Caney argues 
that, despite the fragmentation of global governance, climate negotiations do in 
fact take into account a range of issues other than the allocation of emissions 
entitlements, including funding for mitigation and adaptation in developing 
countries. Moreover, even if negotiators did not have the power to influence the 
distribution of other goods apart from greenhouse gas emissions, they could still 
distribute greenhouse gas emissions in a way that takes into account the existing 
                                                     
122 See Chapter 5, section 5.3.2. 
123 David Wiens, "Prescribing institutions without ideal theory", Journal of Political Philosophy 20, no. 
1 (2012). In some circumstances empirical uncertainty about the causes of a problem could instead 
point to the need for greater integration: see Chapter 4, section 4.4.4. 
124 Ibid., 66. 
125 Caney, "Just emissions": 280-82. I define and elaborate upon the idea of fragmentation in Chapter 
5, section 5.2.1.  
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distribution of other goods, for example by providing a larger share of 
climate-related resources to the extremely disadvantaged.126 
Caney’s case against the fragmentation argument justifiably cautions against a 
narrow focus on distributing emissions rights. Nevertheless, this does not amount 
to a positive argument in favour of complete integration. Indeed two of the 
underlying causes of fragmentation suggest that complete integration may be 
infeasible. The first relates to the idea of state sovereignty. States will generally only 
delegate authority to multilateral bodies where cooperation is necessary to achieve 
their national interests. As a result, cooperation tends to emerge only on a 
piecemeal basis.127 In particular, it is unlikely that countries would entrust a global 
entity with comprehensive powers of taxation and social welfare that could bring 
about a systematic distribution of global economic resources comparable to that 
brought about by national governments domestically.128  
A second cause of fragmentation involves functional limitations. That is, just as it is 
often considered preferable to employ different policy instruments to advance 
different policy objectives,129 an individual international institution may be capable 
of achieving some objectives but not others. Posner and Weisbach present one 
variation of this argument. They argue that, to the extent that wealthy countries 
have a general ethical obligation to assist the poor, such an obligation should be 
discharged through more targeted means of redistribution.130 Their argument 
validly points to the concern about not overloading the climate regime with too 
many competing objectives. However, even if the climate regime could not provide 
a substitute for the aid regime (for example), it is not clear that it is incapable of 
addressing a range of other climate-related concerns, notably facilitating adaptation 
to the effects of climate change that cannot be avoided through reducing emissions. 
                                                     
126 Ibid., 282. 
127 See Lisa L. Martin, "Interests, power, and multilateralism", International Organization 46, no. 4 
(1992). 
128 See Chapter 5, section 5.5.2. 
129 Richard A Musgrave, The theory of public finance: A study in public economy (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1959), 5-6. 
130 Posner and Weisbach, Climate change justice, 74. 
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Nevertheless, there may also be value in breaking down some components of the 
climate regime into smaller “building blocks” (such as dealing with short-lived 
climate pollutants or mitigation in sectors such as aviation or shipping) as this may 
both facilitate progress on more tractable issues as well as enable the creation of 
policy instruments tailored to specific circumstances.131 
1.7.3 A mutual reinforcement model 
In response to the intractability and fragmentation arguments, I agree with Caney in 
rejecting a strong isolationist view of the scope of climate justice. However, my view 
is closest to what Gardiner terms the “mild rectification” model, or what I would 
prefer to term a “mutual reinforcement” model.132 That is, even if the climate 
regime is not capable of achieving comprehensive global justice, it should at a 
minimum not harm countries’ development prospects.133 Moreover, the climate 
regime should seek out opportunities to reinforce development objectives where 
appropriate.  
This approach has the implication that the climate regime should address the risk 
that climate policies could exacerbate poverty, for example if poorer countries are 
required to switch to lower-polluting but more expensive sources of energy at the 
cost of other pressing development priorities. International funding could help 
address this concern, but in doing so should address the further risk that such 
funding could divert aid from other development objectives.134 At the same time, 
the climate regime should seek out ways in which this funding can simultaneously 
promote resilience to climate change while also advancing development. The global 
aid regime, for its part, should not invest in measures that worsen the climate 
problem (such as heavily polluting coal-fired power plants) but should identify ways 
                                                     
131 David G. Victor, "Fragmented carbon markets and reluctant nations: Implications for design of 
effective mechanisms" in Architectures for agreement: Addressing climate change in the post-Kyoto 
world, ed. Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
Robert Falkner, Hannes Stephan, and John Vogler, "International climate policy after Copenhagen: 
Towards a ‘building blocks’ approach", Global Policy 1, no. 3 (2010). 
132 Gardiner, A perfect moral storm, 436. 
133 To this extent it is similar to Gardiner’s “neutrality model”: ibid. 
134 See Chapters 5 and 6, section 6.5.1. 
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in which development activities may also promote climate resilience (such as 
“climate-proofing” infrastructure investments).135 
1.8 Principles of fairness in global climate policy 
Let us now consider the question of the principles of fairness and associated 
responsibilities that could apply under the mutual reinforcement model that I have 
sketched. I begin by responding to a general challenge to the role of fairness in 
climate negotiations, before providing a positive account of the principles invoked 
in the remainder of the thesis.  
1.8.1 Does the need for an urgent response take priority over fairness? 
We saw previously that climate change poses an urgent global challenge. Some 
argue that in some circumstances the imperative of avoiding harm must displace or 
marginalise considerations of distributive fairness.136 No doubt in some extreme 
emergencies the imperative of avoiding harm trumps that of ensuring fairness. 
However, even though catastrophic climate change could indeed wipe out decades 
of development progress, we have already seen that a collective response to 
climate change requires broad participation of developing countries, which in turn 
requires addressing basic development concerns.137 As I discuss in Chapter 4, it is 
misleading to consider addressing climate change and poverty as an either/or issue. 
Although the costs of doing both are substantial, they are not overwhelmingly so 
(although in the case of climate change they may become so if countries delay 
action for too long).138 In particular, wealthy countries could make substantial 
                                                     
135 Jessica M. Ayers and Saleemul Huq, "Supporting adaptation to climate change: What role for 
official development assistance?", Development Policy Review 27, no. 6 (2009). 
136 As Gardiner notes (Gardiner, A perfect moral storm: The ethical tragedy of climate change, 309). 
137 I assume here that alternative “quick fixes” to climate change such as geo-engineering would 
likewise face insuperable hurdles if they imposed unfair costs on other countries. See ibid., Chapter 
10. 
138 Volker Krey and Keywan Riahi, "Implications of delayed participation and technology failure for 
the feasibility, costs, and likelihood of staying below temperature targets—greenhouse gas 
mitigation scenarios for the 21st century", Energy Economics 31, no. Supplement 2 (2009). 
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inroads into both by supporting developing countries’ efforts without unreasonable 
sacrifices of their own wellbeing.139  
1.8.2 The function of norms in international negotiations 
Let us now begin supplying more specific content to the principles that may inform 
evaluations of fairness under the climate regime. In line with the contextual 
approach outlined above, our understanding of the principles invoked by 
participants in the climate regime may provide useful guidance on both the relevant 
moral principles at stake as well as the feasibility of translating principles into 
practice. Chapter 3 addresses two common reductive challenges to such an 
approach, namely: (i) that principles of fairness espoused by participants are merely 
a guise for their material interests; and (ii) that what is actually fair is reducible to 
what participants perceive to be fair.  
Here I elaborate on two points regarding the nature and function of norms that are 
only touched upon briefly in Chapter 3. First, norms may be defined as “shared 
expectations about appropriate behavior held by a community of actors”,140 and 
may entail “a collective evaluation of behavior in terms of what ought to be done, a 
collective expectation as to what will be done, and particular reactions to compliant 
versus noncompliant behaviour”.141 Norms as I understand them constitute a broad 
category that also includes abstract or general principles as well as context-specific 
rules and laws.142 
Second, norms may have a variety of influences on negotiations. On a realist 
conception of international relations, what matters most in explaining action is 
material interests; ethical arguments are likely to be merely self-serving and have 
                                                     
139 See section 1.4 above. 
140 Martha Finnemore, National interests in international society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1996), 22. 
141 Gregory A. Raymond, "Problems and prospects in the study of international norms", Mershon 
International Studies Review 41, no. 2 (1997): 218.  
142 Ibid., 218-19. For similar usage in a philosophical context, see Nicholas Southwood and Lina 
Eriksson, "Norms and conventions", Philosophical Explorations 14, no. 2 (2011): 198. 
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no independent causal role.143 Somewhat less minimally, some argue that 
agreements that are perceived to be fair are often more likely to be effective, 
particularly in international negotiations where agreements must generally be “self-
enforcing” in the absence of legitimate supra-national means of coercion.144 
Another view of a relatively limited role for fairness is that it functions as a “soft 
constraint” on self-interest, or as a guide to decision where self-interest does not 
prescribe a conclusive course of action.145 As David Miller argues: 
 
A more accurate picture is that claims are advanced in the name of fairness, but the 
negotiating parties tend to choose the particular principles of justice that best serve 
their interests – since in many cases there are indeed different principles that can 
plausibly be advanced. This is not merely hypocrisy, however, because by moving to 
the level of principle in the first place, you rule out a number of possible solutions, 
including almost certainly the ones that are most to your advantage.146 
 
Finally, one may adopt a maximal view according to which norms may have a more 
expansive or transformative influence on the outcomes of negotiations.147 While I 
am open to this view, I assume for the purposes of the thesis only the more limited 
view that, at the very least, norms impose some soft constraints on material 
interests. As we will see in the next subsection, this has important implications for 
our understanding of feasibility constraints.  
What significance do norms held by countries have for the process of identifying 
applicable principles in normative theory? We need not accept at face value what 
                                                     
143 Neta C. Crawford, Argument and change in world politics: Ethics, decolonization, and 
humanitarian intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 83. 
144 Scott Barrett, Environment and statecraft: The strategy of environmental treaty-making (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), xiv; Steve Vanderheiden, Atmospheric justice: A political theory of 
climate change (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 59; David Miller, "Global justice and 
climate change: How should responsibilities be distributed?" in The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2009), 123. 
145 L. Ringius, A. Torvanger, and A. Underdal, "Burden sharing and fairness principles in international 
climate policy", International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 2, no. 1 
(2002): 3. 
146 Miller, "Global justice and climate change", 124. 
147 Compare Crawford, Argument and change in world politics. 
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countries say, since they may have tactical or other reasons not to say what they 
think (or to say only part of what they think), and in any case what they think may 
be tainted by ignorance or prejudice. Thus, as Chapter 3 argues, we may still judge 
an agreement to be unfair even if all participants consider it to be fair.148 However, 
theory may be guided by those views that are expressed by citizens or their 
representatives as part of a credible deliberative process, or may subject uncritical 
opinions to modes of scrutiny that are publicly acceptable.149 As Norman Daniels 
notes, agreement among groups about how to resolve a particular issue may not be 
merely a “moral compromise but a principled moral solution to a policy 
problem”.150 A sophisticated approach could justify recourse to public views on 
fairness on the basis that a theory of justice, which envisages and requires 
implementation through political institutions, will only be feasible and legitimate if 
it can be publicly accepted or justified through political debate.151 
1.8.3 Norms of fairness under the climate regime 
The literature that has emerged on the role of norms in climate and environment 
negotiations has established some solid findings about the existence of a limited 
range of broad norms, including those of equity, CBDR&RC, sustainable 
development and the precautionary principle.152 Theorists frequently consider 
equity norms to have more weight in global environmental policy than in other 
areas of international relations.153 This may be due to the nature of specific aspects 
                                                     
148 Chapter 3, section 3.2.2. 
149 Swift et al., "Distributive justice: Does it matter what the people think?", 22. 
150 Norman Daniels, Justice and justification: Reflective equilibrium in theory and practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15. 
151 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Hepburn and Stern 
note the possible value of Rawls’s idea of ‘reflective equilibrium’ in mediating among different 
ethical frameworks for addressing climate change (Hepburn and Stern, "The global deal on climate 
change", 39). 
152 Lavanya Rajamani, Differential treatment in international environmental law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006); Chukwumerije Okereke, "Equity norms in global environmental governance", 
Global Environmental Politics 8, no. 3 (2008); Darrel Moellendorf, "A right to sustainable 
development", The Monist 94, no. 3 (2011). 
153 Okereke, "Equity norms in global environmental governance": 36; compare Patricia Birnie, Alan 
Boyle, and Catherine Redgwell, International law and the environment, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 378. 
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of the issue of climate change, such as clearer evidence of causality or responsibility 
on the part of certain parties for the problems that need to be addressed through 
negotiation, and the scope for vulnerable groups—who are conspicuously entitled 
to equitable treatment—to exert some leverage in negotiations.154 
In several chapters I employ the principle of CBDR&RC—interpreted as a moral 
principle rather than exclusively a legal one—to structure the analysis of principles 
of fairness.155 Employing this principle presents several advantages. First, CBDR&RC 
incorporates two factors widely considered in climate ethics to be central to 
allocating responsibilities under the climate change regime: (i) responsibility for 
causing the problem of climate change, and (ii) capability (or capacity) to respond to 
the problem.156 A second advantage is that the principle is firmly embedded in the 
climate convention, thus providing a foothold for further elaboration of what the 
principle specifically requires. Despite this, CBDR&RC also poses the challenge that 
parties continue to hold widely varying views about how to interpret the principle. 
1.8.4 Rhetoric and framing 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the discursive framing of moral principles may enhance or 
inhibit the likelihood that they will attract wide acceptance in climate change 
negotiations.157 In general, developing countries have been much more likely than 
developed countries to frame their arguments in negotiations in terms of fairness or 
equity.158 As I outline in Chapter 3, the frame of “equity” itself has been a point of 
controversy in recent negotiations. At a broad level, developing countries have 
                                                     
154 Okereke, "Equity norms in global environmental governance": 37. 
155 See Chapters 2-5. 
156 Examples of works in climate ethics that invoke various interpretations of the CBDR&RC principle 
include Caney, "Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility, and global climate change": 774; Baer et al., 
"Greenhouse development rights"; and Darrel Moellendorf, "Treaty norms and climate change 
mitigation", Ethics & International Affairs 23, no. 3 (2009). 
157 I define “frame” in Chapter 2, section 1.1. For more recent literature on frames related to climate 
change, see Elisabeth Gsottbauer and Jeroen C J. M. den Bergh, "Bounded rationality and social 
interaction in negotiating a climate agreement", International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics 13, no. 3 (2013); and Mattias Wahlström, Magnus Wennerhag, and Christopher 
Rootes, "Framing “the climate issue”: Patterns of participation and prognostic frames among climate 
summit protesters", Global Environmental Politics 13, no. 4 (2013). 
158 Pickering, Vanderheiden, and Miller, "Ethical issues in the United Nations climate negotiations", 
22. 
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tended to focus more on the challenge of “burden-sharing” or “effort-sharing”, 
whereas developed countries have tended to focus more on the opportunities 
presented by the development of cleaner technologies.159 Contentious frames 
employed to varying degrees by developing countries include ideas of climate debt 
(as discussed in Chapter 2) and compensation (Chapter 4). Conversely, a 
contentious frame employed by developed countries is the idea that climate finance 
for developing countries may be classed as “aid” (Chapter 6).160 
1.9 Internal scope of analysis: linking responsibilities to policy instruments 
In order to translate norms into action, they must not only attract wide acceptance 
but must be institutionalised through policy instruments. Here I discuss two key 
policy considerations for implementing principles: the range of actions to which a 
particular principle applies; and the extent of multilateral coordination involved in 
institutional design. 
1.9.1 Holist and atomist approaches to categories of action 
An area of debate mirroring that between isolation and integration is whether 
approaches to climate justice should apply distinct moral principles to different 
categories of action (such as mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage), or apply 
principles to all categories together. Caney refers to these views as “atomist” and 
“holist” positions respectively.161 The issue-by-issue approach taken in subsequent 
chapters of the thesis therefore requires some justification. 
As with the distinction between isolation and integration, we may envisage the 
atomist-holist distinction as applying at the levels of principle and implementation. 
Recent writing has highlighted the ethical significance of the distinction between 
                                                     
159 Compare Simon Zadek, "Beyond climate ﬁnance: From accountability to productivity in 
addressing the climate challenge", Climate Policy 11, no. 3 (2011). 
160 See also Jonathan Pickering et al., "Acting on climate finance pledges: Inter-agency dynamics and 
relationships with aid in contributor states" Centre for Climate Economics and Policy (CCEP) Working 
Paper 1306, October 2013 (Canberra: Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National 
University, 2013). 
161 Caney, "Just emissions": 258. 
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adaptation and mitigation,162 often pointing to the fact that the responsibilities 
associated with each generate different types of benefits and may be discharged in 
various ways by different actors.163 Since the thesis focuses primarily on the level of 
implementation it is not necessary to opt for one view or the other at the level of 
principle. I will focus therefore on the case for each view at the level of 
implementation.  
A first point to note is that at the level of implementation the atomist-holist 
distinction may apply not only to the three substantive categories of action already 
mentioned (mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage) but also to different 
components of those actions (such as the direct and indirect costs of each type of 
action) and different policy instruments or functions (such as national mitigation 
targets and international finance for developing countries).  
Thus in Chapter 4 I argue that, even if at the level of principle we take a holistic 
approach to distributing the direct and indirect costs of action, there may be good 
reason for taking an atomist approach to those costs in practice given the empirical 
uncertainties about the scope of indirect costs.164 The same uncertainties 
nevertheless point to an integrationist approach to protecting those who are 
vulnerable to both climatic and other shocks.  
Similarly, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 point to several arguments in favour of a degree of 
atomism in relation to policy instruments, in particular by identifying distinct 
principles associated with climate finance. This view is based on a key insight 
shaping the design of global climate policy that 
 
[…] by separating who finances climate action from where it occurs, flows of climate 
finance from developed to developing countries are a key way to reconcile economic 
                                                     
162 See Chapter 2, section 2.4.4. 
163 Vanderheiden, "Globalizing responsibility for climate change": 67. 
164 Chapter 4, section 4.4.1. 
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efficiency with equity in dealing with the challenge of climate change and 
development.165 
 
There may be compelling reasons to enact a separation between where action takes 
place and which countries fund it. Importantly, many of the opportunities for 
reducing emissions at low cost are located in developing countries.166 At the same 
time, many developing countries lack the domestic resources to capture these 
mitigation opportunities or to fund adequate adaptation measures. One option for 
increasing support for action in developing countries would be to introduce a 
system of tradeable emissions entitlements. However, as I argue in subsequent 
chapters, the capacity of emissions trading to secure an equitable distribution of 
costs remains limited.167 Thus a range of other policy instruments will be needed to 
bring about a fairer climate regime.168 
Taking the possibility of financial transfers into account might suggest that we 
should take a holist approach to implementation.169 However, I take an 
intermediate approach. Reasons of institutional feasibility may render it necessary 
to establish dedicated effort-sharing arrangements for specific policy instruments. 
Nevertheless, we may achieve some commonality across effort-sharing 
arrangements by employing the principle of CBDR&RC to each instrument, while 
quantifying capacity and responsibility in somewhat different terms in each. Thus I 
apply CBDR&RC to mitigation responsibilities (Chapter 3), to the allocation of the 
costs of remedying adverse impacts of climate policies (Chapter 4), and to effort-
sharing arrangements for generating climate finance (Chapter 5).170 
                                                     
165 Milan Brahmbhatt and Andrew Steer, "Mobilizing climate finance" in International climate 
finance, ed. Erik Haites (London: Routledge, 2013), 135. 
166 Cameron Hepburn, "International carbon finance and the clean development mechanism" in The 
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168 For further references to climate finance in the ethical literature, see Chapter 5, section 0. 
169 Compare Caney, "Just emissions": 281-82. 
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1.9.2 Fragmented and coordinated approaches to institutional design 
A final challenge concerns the role of institutional constraints and reasonable 
pluralism in shaping the range of available policy instruments. These factors may 
bear on institutional design in a variety of ways. In the thesis I focus in particular on 
their relationship with the degree of international coordination required. This 
aspect is central to the analysis of climate finance in Chapter 5, but also features in 
the discussion of mitigation targets in Chapter 3. As noted in those chapters, a 
substantial amount of scholarly research has addressed the advantages and 
disadvantages of coordinated vis-à-vis fragmented (or “top-down” versus 
“bottom-up”) institutional frameworks for environmental effectiveness, equity and 
legitimacy.  
Here I briefly note two important challenges arising in those chapters that this 
aspect of institutional design poses for efforts to implement moral principles. First, 
since parties to negotiations hold a range of conceptions about fairness, it may be 
very difficult to reach consensus on a simple yet authoritative normative framework 
that could guide decisions about the distribution of climate policy costs. 
Nevertheless, there are various other ways in which principles may inform 
coordinated effort-sharing arrangements, for example through a process where 
countries make successive rounds of national pledges that are then compared 
against a non-binding “equity reference framework”.171 Second, seeking to 
implement effort-sharing arrangements through multilateral coordination may pose 
difficult trade-offs between procedural and substantive fairness, as effective action 
may be stymied by cumbersome decision-making processes and institutional 
inertia.172 
1.10 Thesis structure 
As indicated in previous sections of the introduction, all the chapters interlink in 
various ways. While addressing theoretical or policy questions to varying degrees, 
                                                     
171 Jennifer Morgan and David Waskow, "A new look at climate equity in the UNFCCC", Climate Policy 
14, no. 1 (2013): 18. 
172 Chapter 3, section 3.3.3; and Chapter 5, section 5.3.1. 
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the chapters fall most neatly into those that address overall responsibilities of 
fairness in climate change negotiations and those that relate more specifically to 
responsibilities to provide funding for developing countries either to address 
climate change or the impacts of climate policies. The following chapters of the 
thesis are thus structured as follows: 
 Part I. Characterising and distributing national responsibilities to address climate 
change 
 Chapter 2. On the concept of climate debt: Its moral and political value 
 Chapter 3. “If equity’s in, we’re out”: Scope for fairness in the next global 
climate agreement 
 Chapter 4. Regulating the “new tobacco”: Do those who lose out from 
climate policies deserve compensation? 
 Part II. Designing fair institutions to finance action on climate change in 
developing countries 
 Chapter 5. Splitting the difference in global climate finance: Are 
fragmentation and legitimacy mutually exclusive? 
 Chapter 6. What should count as aid? 
 Chapter 7. Conclusion
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to address climate change 
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Chapter 2. On the concept of climate debt: Its moral and political 
value 
 
Jonathan Pickering and Christian Barry1 
Introductory note 
This chapter was the first in the thesis to be submitted for publication. It represents 
an initial foray into climate ethics, taking as its starting point an issue that made 
international headlines at the time of the UN climate conference in Copenhagen in 
2009. This collaborative project drew on Christian Barry’s background in research 
on developing country debt as well as my interest in how responsibilities associated 
with climate change are framed in public debate. 
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74 
 
Abstract 
A range of developing countries and international advocacy organisations have 
argued that wealthy countries, as a result of their greater historical contribution to 
human-induced climate change, owe a “climate debt” to poor countries. Critics of 
this argument have claimed that it is incoherent or morally objectionable. In this 
essay we clarify the concept of climate debt and assess its value for 
conceptualising responsibilities associated with global climate change and for 
guiding international climate negotiations. We conclude that the idea of a climate 
debt can be coherently formulated, and that while some understandings of the 
idea of climate debt could lead to morally objectionable conclusions, other 
accounts would not. However, we argue that climate debt nevertheless provides an 
unhelpful frame for advancing global justice through international climate 
negotiations—the only existing means of resolving political conﬂict over the 
collective action problems posed by human-induced climate change—due to its 
retrospective and potentially adversarial emphasis, and to problems of 
measurement. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Do developed countries, as a result of their greater historical contribution to 
causing human-induced climate change, owe a “climate debt” to poor countries? 
Numerous developing countries and international advocacy organisations have 
argued that they do. They assert this on the ground that these countries have used 
more than their fair share of the Earth’s ability to absorb the greenhouse gas 
emissions that cause climate change. The resulting need to reduce emissions 
globally now constrains the ability of poorer countries to develop. Further, climate 
change is increasingly generating adverse impacts for poor countries, many of 
which are particularly vulnerable to a warming climate. This debt should be repaid, 
it is argued, through developed countries rapidly reducing their emissions and 
providing ﬁnance to help developing countries adopt low-emissions technologies 
and adjust to the adverse impacts of climate change. Many others, including senior 
ofﬁcials of wealthy countries, on the other hand, have resisted these claims. They 
have done so principally by means of two arguments: that the idea of a climate debt 
makes no sense—we will call this the incoherence argument; or that employing 
climate debt as a frame for understanding climate related responsibilities will lead 
to morally objectionable conclusions—which we refer to as the implausibility 
argument. 
Our aim in this essay is to clarify the idea of climate debt and assess its value for 
conceptualising responsibilities associated with climate change and guiding 
international climate negotiations. There are various ways in which responsibilities 
relating to climate change could be distributed. Invoking climate debts is one way 
of providing a “frame” for understanding how these responsibilities should be 
distributed. Frames represent “interpretive storylines that set a speciﬁc train of 
thought in motion, communicating why an issue might be a problem, who or what 
might be responsible for it, and what should be done about it”.1 As such, they pro- 
vide rationales for particular distributions of responsibilities, and involve distinctive 
                                                     
1 Matthew C. Nisbet, "Communicating climate change: Why frames matter for public engagement", 
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 51, no. 2 (2009): 15. 
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forms of rhetoric. There may often be several possible frames in which complex 
policy issues can be encapsulated, and incompatibility among frames proposed by 
different actors may give rise to entrenched conﬂicts.2 The analysis of conceptual 
“frames” for global policy debates is of signiﬁcance to the broader question of 
global political justice insofar as such frames structure the interface between the 
moral arguments in which responsibilities of distributive justice are debated and 
determined, and the political conﬂicts and authoritative actions through which 
decisions are taken and executed as matters of political justice. 
When assessing the value of particular frames, we can distinguish between ethical 
and political analyses. An ethical analysis of a frame examines whether the 
premises and line of reasoning it invokes are morally plausible. Political analysis 
of a frame seeks to determine whether it is likely to be a feasible and desirable 
means of advancing valuable goals.3 While political analysis may indicate whether 
a particular frame is likely to further the interests of the individual party 
proposing it, here we focus on the question of whether the frame of climate debt 
helps to resolve a collective action problem—in this case a fair allocation of 
responsibilities to address human-induced climate change. 
Accordingly, our article proceeds along two tracks. In the ﬁrst part of the paper, 
we provide an ethical analysis of climate debt arguments. We begin by giving 
examples of how the idea of climate debt has been employed recently in 
discussions of climate policy and identify ﬁve core propositions that appear to 
underlie the use of this framing concept. We explicate each of the propositions and 
examine whether they are individually or jointly vulnerable to the incoherence or 
implausibility arguments. Against critics of the idea of climate debt, we shall argue 
that climate debt is indeed a coherent concept, and that while some 
understandings of this idea could indeed lead to morally objectionable or 
                                                     
2 Frank Fischer, Reframing public policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
3 Emphasising the ethical aspects of a particular problem may itself represent a political strategy—
as in the case of successful efforts by activists to reframe debt relief for developing countries as 
a moral and religious issue rather than as a purely economic concern (J. Timmons Roberts and 
Bradley C. Parks, A climate of injustice: Global inequality, north-south politics, and climate policy 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 240)—but this is consistent with the distinction between forms 
of analysis drawn here. 
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implausible conclusions, it need not do so. Indeed, the climate debt frame 
highlights considerations that must be given signiﬁcant weight in any fair 
agreement on climate-related responsibilities. In the second part of the paper, we 
provide a political analysis of climate debt arguments. Against proponents of the 
idea of climate debt, we argue that it provides a largely unhelpful and potentially 
counterproductive frame for guiding future international climate negotiations. 
While this frame may have played a valuable role in giving voice to the claims of 
some developing countries, we argue that there are alternative frames that are 
more likely to foster reﬂective deliberation and eventually cooperation in the 
form of binding agreements. 
2.2 The use of climate debt 
The theoretical roots of the concept of climate debt can largely be traced back 
to broader themes such as the global distribution of ecological resources and the 
allocation of responsibilities for addressing environmental harms. Since the early 
1990s, theorists—notably in Latin America but also more broadly—have 
developed variations on the concept of “ecological debt” as a way of 
characterising unsustainable patterns of resource use, encompassing not only 
climate change but also overuse of other resources such as forests and ﬁsheries.4 
These accounts in turn have built on earlier theorists’ characterisations of global 
environmental issues as involving global commons or common pool resources5 as 
well as structuralist accounts of global economic relations.6 Climate debt (or carbon 
                                                     
4 See e.g. K.R. Smith, "Allocating responsibility for global warming: The natural debt index", Ambio 
20, no. 95-96 (1991), Joan Martinez-Alier, "Distributional obstacles to international environmental 
policy: The failures at Rio and prospects after Rio", Environmental Values 2 no. 97-124 (1993); U.T. 
Srinivasan et al., "The debt of nations and the distribution of ecological impacts from human 
activities", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 105, no. 5 (2008), Andrew Simms, 
Ecological debt: Global warming and the wealth of nations , 2nd ed. (London: Pluto 
Press, 2009). 
5 Garrett Hardin, "The tragedy of the commons", Science 162, no. 3859 (1968), Elinor Ostrom, 
Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
6 Roberts and Parks, A climate of injustice, 165. 
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debt as it also sometimes called7) is ordinarily viewed as a component of a broader 
ecological debt.8 Such debts are commonly conceived as both intergenerational—
accrued by current people and owed to future generations—and international—
accrued by the populations of some countries and owed to the populations of 
other countries. Accounts of climate debt vary in their relative emphasis on each 
dimension.9 
Although arguments asserting climate debt are not altogether new to international 
climate negotiations conducted under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), they have recently come into increased currency, 
particularly since the lead-up to the UNFCCC conference in Copenhagen in 2009. 
Climate debt arguments have been raised in formal submissions (notably by 
Bolivia, the most vocal proponent of climate debt in the UNFCCC negotiations), 
draft negotiating texts, and arguments by activists and non-government 
organisations seeking to inﬂuence the negotiations.10 
While calls for repayment of climate debt have been highly visible in media 
reporting of recent climate change negotiations, they have been omitted from 
resulting agreements, with other principles for allocating responsibilities such as 
“comparable effort” or equity gaining far more traction. However, minority 
discourses often garner signiﬁcant attention in negotiations due to the 
consensus-based nature of decision-making under the UNFCCC. Although Bolivia’s 
attempt to block consensus single-handedly at the 2010 Cancún conference was 
neutralised by a procedural workaround, such tactics may not always be available 
                                                     
7 Carbon being a component of major greenhouse gases emitted through human activity (including 
carbon dioxide and methane). 
8 See e.g. Tim Hayward, "Global justice and the distribution of natural resources", Political Studies 
54, no. 2 (2006); Edward A. Page, "Intergenerational justice of what: Welfare, resources or 
capabilities?", Environmental Politics 16, no. 3 (2007). Simms uses ecological debt in a narrow sense 
to refer primarily to climate debt (Simms, Ecological debt: Global warming and the wealth of 
nations). 
9 Compare Hayward, "Global justice and the distribution of natural resources", W.J.W. Botzen, J.M. 
Gowdy, and J.C.J.M. van den Bergh, "Cumulative CO2 emissions: Shifting international responsibilities 
for climate debt", Climate Policy 8 (2008). 
10 See, for example, Naomi Klein, "Climate rage," Rolling Stone, 11 November 2009. 
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in future, and it remains important to engage substantively with claims about 
climate debt. 
2.3 Core elements of the climate debt idea 
While arguments for climate debt vary in some respects, the focus in negotiations 
has been mainly on international rather than intergenerational aspects of climate 
debt, and our essay will accordingly focus on arguments for this type of debt.11 We 
interpret common arguments for climate debt as having the following features: 
A1. Moral responsibilities. Countries that have emitted more than their fair share 
of the Earth’s capacity to safely absorb emissions have moral responsibilities 
towards low-emitting countries and those vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change. 
A2. Characterisation of these responsibilities as debts. The stringency of these 
moral responsibilities is such that they constitute a debt that is claimable as a 
matter of right by the agents to whom the debt is owed. 
A3. The content of the responsibility. A primary factor in calculating the extent of 
each country’s debt is the magnitude of its share of global cumulative emissions 
since the Industrial Revolution. 
A4. Identity of debtors and creditors. The debt is owed speciﬁcally by developed 
countries towards developing countries. 
A5. Form of repayment required. Climate debt must be repaid by (i) distributing 
emissions rights in ways that effectively compensate developing countries for 
historical overuse and allow developing countries’ emissions to rise in order to 
accommodate their development needs (repayment of “emissions debt”); and (ii) 
compensating developing countries for the adverse effects of climate change 
(repayment of “adaptation debt”).12 
                                                     
11 Of course the idea of international climate debt has an intergenerational element, since 
responsibilities are being attributed to the present populations of developed countries for ‘debts’ 
acquired largely by their ancestors. 
12 This distinction has been highlighted in Bolivia, "Commitments for Annex I parties under 
paragraph 1(b)(i) of the Bali Action Plan: Evaluating developed countries' historical climate debt to 
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We discuss these elements in turn, examining as we go whether they involve 
propositions that are vulnerable to the incoherence or implausibility arguments. 
We focus primarily on arguments A2 and A3, which we see as representing the 
core issues that are speciﬁcally contested in the context of climate debt, while 
brieﬂy discussing the other arguments. 
2.4 Ethical analysis 
2.4.1 Threshold issues: causal and moral responsibilities associated with climate 
change 
The ﬁrst premise of the argument (A1) involves both factual and moral claims. The 
factual claims are relatively uncontroversial. It is now increasingly accepted that 
the Earth has a ﬁnite capacity over the very long term to absorb emissions.13 
Developed countries14 have emitted the larger proportion of cumulative emissions 
since the Industrial Revolution and their per capita emissions are higher than 
those of developing countries, even though developing countries’ current 
aggregate annual emissions now exceed those of developed countries, largely due 
to the rapid growth of populous countries such as China and India.15 There is also 
widespread agreement that poorer countries are particularly vulnerable to climate 
change. Not only do the impacts of climate change affect access to goods such as 
health protection, food, water and shelter, but constraints on emissions may (in 
the absence of support for costly low-emitting technologies) have adverse 
impacts on the livelihoods of poor people.16 
                                                     
developing countries (25 april 2009)" (Bonn: UNFCCC, 2009) and Climate-justice.info, World people’s 
conference on climate change and the rights of Mother Earth, Cochabamba, Bolivia (19-20 april 
2010): Outcome on climate debt 2010, Accessed 20 December 2013. http://climate-
justice.info/2010/04/world-peoples-conference-outcome-on-climate-debt/. 
13 Allen et al., "Warming caused by cumulative carbon emissions towards the trillionth tonne". 
14 While noting some complexities about the precise categorization of parties to the UNFCCC, for 
simplicity we will generally use ‘developed’ countries to refer to parties listed in Annex I of the 
UNFCCC, and ‘developing’ countries to refer to non-Annex I parties. 
15 World Bank, "Development and climate change" World Development Report 2010 (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2009). 
16 Simon Caney, "Cosmopolitan justice, rights and global climate change", Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 19, no. 2 (2006), Caney, "Climate change, human rights and moral thresholds". 
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The moral claims in A1 are somewhat more contentious, but some possible 
theoretical bases for climate debt rely on accounts of responsibilities relating to 
natural resource use that are very widely held. The idea that the atmosphere is a 
global commons has been argued for or simply assumed by philosophers and 
economists of different temperaments and political stripes.17 Similarly, there is 
considerable support for the idea that commons—whether conceived as originally 
owned by humankind in general or as unowned—give rise to certain moral 
responsibilities relating to fair use.18 The best-known account of such 
responsibilities is John Locke’s proviso that the use of natural resources be 
constrained by the requirement to leave “enough, and as good” for others.19 A 
related and more recent formulation that has gained currency among both 
researchers and negotiators is that of the equitable distribution of ‘ecological 
space’.20 
Given the Earth’s limited capacity to absorb emissions safely, most people generally 
accept that global emissions should be subject to some criterion of fair use. 
Variants on Locke’s proviso, for example, have been employed by a number of 
authors in support of arguments for roughly equal per capita allocations of 
emissions rights.21 Whether fair-use criteria require equality or sufﬁciency in the 
allocation of emissions remains subject to dispute.22 But developed countries 
seem to have used more than their fair share on any plausible understanding of 
                                                     
17 See, for example, William D Nordhaus, Managing the global commons: The economics of climate 
change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994); Gardiner, A perfect moral storm: The ethical tragedy of 
climate change. 
18 see e.g. Hayward, "Global justice and the distribution of natural resources";  Vanderheiden, 
Atmospheric justice: A political theory of climate change. 
19 John Locke, Two treatises of government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988 [1690]), 288–89. 
20 See, for example, Page, "Intergenerational justice of what: Welfare, resources or capabilities?"; 
Tim Hayward, "Human rights versus emissions rights: Climate justice and the equitable distribution 
of ecological space", Ethics & International Affairs 21, no. 4 (2007);  Bolivia, "Commitments for 
Annex I parties under paragraph 1(b)(i) of the Bali Action Plan: Evaluating developed 
countries' historical climate debt to developing countries (25 april 2009)" . 
21 See e.g. Peter Singer, One world: The ethics of globalisation (Melbourne: Text, 2002); 
Vanderheiden, Atmospheric justice. 
22 Luc Bovens, "A Lockean defense of grandfathering emission rights" in The ethics of global climate 
change, ed. Denis G. Arnold (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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this notion. We conclude that the propositions in A1 are defensible against both 
the incoherence and implausibility arguments. 
2.4.2 Guiltless responsibility, excusable ignorance and the intergenerational 
objection 
One fundamental objection to the idea of climate debt is that even if excessive 
emissions result in some kind of moral obligation, this falls short of being an 
obligation of “debt”, as asserted in A2. 
This type of argument was made, for example, at the Copenhagen conference by 
the United States’ chief climate negotiator Todd Stern: 
 
I actually completely reject the notion of a debt or reparations or anything of the like. […] 
Let’s just be mindful of the fact for most of the 200 years since the Industrial Revolution, 
people were blissfully ignorant of the fact that emissions cause the greenhouse effect. 
It’s a relatively recent phenomenon. It’s the wrong way to look at this. We absolutely 
recognize our historical role in putting emissions in the atmosphere that are there now. 
But the sense of guilt or culpability or reparations, I categorically reject that.23 
 
These objections are also typically advanced against premise A3—the claim that 
responsibility for debt should be apportioned largely according to a country’s 
cumulative emissions. We consider in turn three interconnected objections to 
climate debt that may be distinguished in Stern’s statement. 
2.4.2.1 Guiltless responsibility 
The objection from guiltless responsibility asserts that it only makes sense to speak 
of debt where there is culpability or a responsibility to provide reparations, but it 
does not follow from the fact that wealthy countries are responsible for having 
caused emissions that they were culpable for having done so. But surely, as Bolivia’s 
ambassador to the United Nations pointed out in his response to Stern’s 
                                                     
23 Darren Samuelsohn, "No 'pass' for developing countries in next climate treaty, says U.S. Envoy" 
New York Times, 9 December 2009; see also Bryan Walsh, "Do rich nations owe poor ones a 
climate debt?," Time, 10 December 2009. 
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statement, the point of discussing climate debt need not be to assign guilt, but 
merely responsibility for bearing cost.24 As a general matter, liability for debt does 
not imply guilt or direct culpability. We can become indebted by bad luck, even 
when we have acted prudently. Consider, for example, ordinary contractual debts, 
which are acquired through reciprocal arrangements freely entered into, and are 
frequently associated with legal obligations. It is true that contractual debtors are 
thought to be responsible or liable for repaying their debts, but this is quite 
distinct from responsibility that carries connotations of blameworthiness (although 
failure to service these debts may of course carry such connotations). 
So too with respect to non-contractual debts.25 While we may speak coherently of 
non-contractual debts that result from deliberate wrongdoing (resulting, for 
example, in a ﬁgurative “debt to society”) or negligent harm under tort law, debts 
may also arise in circumstances involving neither voluntary bargaining nor 
culpable harm. One such circumstance, which seems particularly pertinent to 
claims of climate debt, is unjust enrichment. If you receive a mistaken payment, 
for example, you are by law strictly liable to repay it, even if you were unaware 
that you were not entitled to it.26 The same applies to cases in which you 
appropriate (however innocently) that which you are not entitled to appropriate. 
The fact that overuse of the earth’s emissions absorptive capacity was neither the 
subject of a contractual resource-sharing arrangement nor clearly the result of a 
deliberate intent to appropriate that capacity does not provide a convincing 
objection to the idea that there are climate debts. 
                                                     
24 Climate Justice Now, Bolivia responds to U.S. On climate debt: “If you break it, you buy it.”, 11 
December 2009, Accessed 20 December 2013. http://www.climate-justice-now.org/bolivia-
responds-to-us-on-climate-debt-if-you-break-it-you-buy-it/. Compare also Henry Shue, "Global 
environment and international inequality", International Affairs  75, no. 3 (1999): 535 and 
Vanderheiden, Atmospheric justice , 174. 
25 Joan Martinez-Alier, The environmentalism of the poor: A study of ecological conflicts and 
valuation (Cheltenham, UK; Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2002), 228. 
26 Peter Birks, Unjust enrichment (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003), 6–9. 
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2.4.2.2 Excusable ignorance 
The objection from excusable ignorance asserts that because countries were 
reasonably ignorant of the harmful effects of emissions until relatively recently, 
they should not be held morally responsible for those emissions or their effects.27 
Since there is no moral responsibility, there is no debt involved. 
Although reasonable ignorance may ordinarily be a legitimate defence to claims 
of negligence in tort law, it may not be sufﬁcient in all circumstances to provide 
relief from liability to bear cost when damage has occurred. Bolivia’s response to 
the United States’ statement suggests some parallels—albeit using examples that 
do not involve common pool resources—where responsibility for inadvertent harm 
may arise: 
 
Admitting responsibility for the climate crisis without taking necessary actions to address it 
is like someone burning your house and then refusing to pay for it. Even if the ﬁre was 
not started on purpose, the industrialised countries, through their inaction, have 
continued to add fuel to the ﬁre. As a result they have used up two thirds of the 
atmospheric space, depriving us of the necessary space for our development and 
provoking a climate crisis of huge proportions. … We are not assigning guilt, merely 
responsibility. As they say in the US, if you break it, you buy it.28 
 
Are these analogies and arguments cogent? The second (“shop breakage”) 
example in Bolivia’s response is a common example of a strict liability rule. 
However, it is not particularly apt for thinking about climate debt, since in such 
cases strict liability is generally assumed only after the agent is taken to have 
accepted the terms and conditions of entry analogous to a contractual 
arrangement. 
What about the ﬁrst (“burning house”) analogy? Should the neighbour be held 
responsible if they unintentionally (and excusably) allow a ﬁre on her property to 
                                                     
27 This argument is generally extended both to emissions of previous generations and emissions of 
the present generation before the point at which excusable ignorance no longer applied. 
28 Climate Justice Now, "Bolivia responds to U.S. On climate debt: ‘If you break it, you buy it.’". 
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escape to a neighbouring property? Our willingness to attribute liability to bear 
cost in such cases will surely depend in some measure upon whether some 
element of fault (such as recklessness or negligence) can be identiﬁed—the more 
reckless or negligent the conduct, the more it seems appropriate to allocate most 
or all of the cost to the agent causing harm. But how should we allocate costs in 
the absence of any fault whatsoever? 
As a matter of international law, the answer to this question is not entirely clear. 
In cases of transboundary pollution, states are not usually held liable for “harm 
resulting from risks of which the state concerned was not and could not have 
been objectively aware”.29 While strict liability may apply to certain instances of 
harm from ultra-hazardous activities,30 it is widely considered that state liability 
for climate-induced damage would require a failure of due diligence by a state 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.31 
As a moral matter it is ordinarily preposterous to leave innocent victims to bear 
the entire cost of accidents that have been caused faultlessly by others.32 If a ﬁre 
is started innocently and burns down a house, we are faced with a choice of how 
distribute the cost of the ensuing harm between these two innocent people and 
uninvolved third parties.33 Cost sharing between those who are causally 
responsible for the damage, those who suffer its damages, and third parties 
may be a more appropriate solution, particularly where others have much deeper 
pockets than the victim.34 Some have argued on these grounds that the current 
                                                     
29 Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, International law and the environment, 217. 
30 Alex Kiss and Dinah L. Shelton, "Strict liability in international environmental law" in Law of the 
sea, environmental law and settlement of disputes: Liber amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah, ed. 
Tafsir Malick Ndiaye and Rüdiger Wolfrum (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2007). 
31 Michael G Faure and André Nollkaemper, "International liability as an instrument to prevent and 
compensate for climate change", Stanford Journal of International Law 43, no. 123-179 (2007), 
Christina Voigt, "State responsibility for climate change damages", Nordic Journal of 
International Law 77, no. 1-2 (2008). 
32 Not always, because it may well be plausible to allocate costs in this way if the agent who has 
suffered the damage has very deep pockets and those who non-culpably caused it has very shallow 
ones. 
33 Compare Vanderheiden, "Globalizing responsibility for climate change". 
34 Guido Calabresi, The cost of accidents: A legal and economic analysis (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1970). 
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international law of transboundary harm fails to protect adequately the victims of 
such harm and thus stands in need of substantial reform.35 
Even if excusable ignorance were to provide exemption from liability for climate 
debt, states may nevertheless subsequently acquire responsibility for taking on 
additional cost to address the harm through subsequent acts or inaction 
undertaken after the country acquired knowledge of the harmful effects of the 
earlier act. Importantly, we will attribute greater responsibility to an actor for 
exacerbating actions (such as adding fuel to a ﬁre, or continuing to emit at 
unsustainable levels), and for failing to assist those at risk when they could do so 
at very low cost.36 
The objection from excusable ignorance would no longer apply once the risks 
associated with greenhouse gas emissions became widely recognised 
internationally. For this reason, a number of authors have proposed that liability 
for emissions could begin at a point such as 1990, when the ﬁrst report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was published.37 And it could 
plausibly be argued that liability should begin signiﬁcantly earlier than this.38 The 
argument from excusable ignorance would therefore not show that the idea of 
climate debt is incoherent or implausible, but only that we should in some 
circumstances discount the amount owing. 
2.4.2.3 The intergenerational objection 
The intergenerational objection claims that it is implausible to hold countries 
responsible now for conduct that was undertaken before anyone living in them 
was alive. Objections to the intergenerational transmission of debts have a long 
                                                     
35 Noah Sachs, "Beyond the liability wall: Strengthening tort remedies in international environmental 
law", UCLA Law Review 55, no. 4 (2008). 
36 Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland, "On the implications of failing to assist" in Unpublished 
manuscript (2011). 
37 Vanderheiden, Atmospheric justice, 190. 
38 In morality (if not always in law), the recognition that one’s conduct may carry risk of doing 
severe harm gives one a relatively stringent (though of course defeasible) reason not to engage 
in it until its effects are further under- stood, and to compensate victims in case these risks ripen 
into injuries (Carl Cranor, "Some moral issues in risk assessment", Ethics 101, no. 1 (1990), Christian 
Barry, "Applying the contribution principle", Metaphilosophy  36, no. 1-2 (2005)). 
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pedigree.39 However, while individuals generally do not inherit personal debts from 
one generation to the next, this is not the case for sovereign debt, which can 
remain owed by a country over successive generations. Pacta sunt servanda, or 
“agreements must be kept”, is the basic norm that underlies the present 
treatment of sovereign debt contracts, so that when a sovereign borrower 
defaults it is treated as being in breach of contract and under obligation to repay 
the loan.40 Unless a creditor decides to “forgive” (or cancel) a debt, the creditor 
retains full rights to claim it. 
There are good incentive-based reasons to uphold intergenerational 
responsibilities of this sort. Since intergenerational transmission of sovereign 
debts facilitates borrowing by boosting lenders’ assurance of ultimate repayment, 
it is ordinarily justiﬁed as facilitating a beneﬁcial practice. Inter- generational 
transmission may also be justiﬁed in the case of non-contractual international 
debts. Intergenerational transmission of non-contractual debts could serve a 
number of important functions, not least by providing incentives for countries to 
take a more cautious approach when engaging in activities that may pose long-
term risks to the populations of other countries. 
This is not to say that the transmission of debts should not in some ways be 
limited by consideration of the circumstances under which the debt was initially 
acquired. With respect to contractual sovereign debt, for example, there are 
precedents for the cancellation of “odious debt” acquired by illegitimate heads of 
state.41 Non-contractual debts (such as reparative debts) may also be subject to 
limitation over time, for example as structures of expectation form around 
resources that were originally appropriated unjustly, or if the background 
                                                     
39 Janna Thompson, Intergenerational justice: Rights and responsibilities in an intergenerational 
polity (New York: Routledge, 2009), 120. 
40 Christian Barry and Lydia Tomitova, "Fairness in sovereign debt", Ethics & International Affairs 21, 
no. S1 (2007). 
41 Ashfaq Khalfan, Jeff King, and Bryan Thomas, "Advancing the odious debt doctrine" Centre for 
International Sustainable Development Law working paper (Montreal: McGill University, 2003), 
Jonathan Shafter, "The due diligence model: A new approach to the problem of odious debts", Ethics 
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distribution of economic and social resources among agents and victims 
changes.42 
Insofar as developed countries owe a climate debt to developing countries, it is 
hard to argue that such debts are odious. Indeed, the great wealth of many 
developed countries is in large measure dependent on their having made use of 
the global commons in excess of their fair share. While an uneven global pattern of 
emissions commenced when the Earth’s ability to absorb emissions was plentiful, 
that capacity is now scarce, making the responsibility to account for the emissions 
debt of past generations correspondingly greater.43 
One could also argue that current generations should be held responsible for 
historical emissions because they have beneﬁted from those emissions in the form 
of the higher standards of living produced by industrialisation.44 Do agents have 
responsibilities to service debts that were incurred by them without their 
knowledge? There are certainly cases in which it seems that they do. Suppose, 
for example, you discover that something you possess has come to you as a 
result of wrongdoing, and that you beneﬁt at the expense of those to whom 
wrongdoing has been done. You learn that a car that your mother gave you as a 
gift was stolen. What are your responsibilities in this case? In the ﬁrst instance it 
seems you have a duty to relinquish the beneﬁts of the wrongdoing and return 
the property to its rightful owner.45 But a similar principle seems to apply in cases 
where direct restitution—giving a discrete and wrongfully appropriate “thing” 
back—is not possible.46 The crucial point, as David Miller points out, is “that a claim 
                                                     
42 Jeremy Waldron, "Superseding historic injustice", Ethics 103, no. 1 (1992). 
43 Compare ibid., 24–25. 
44 Lukas H. Meyer and Dominic Roser, "Climate justice and historical emissions", Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2010): 234. 
45 It does not seem important that the person making the bequest was your mother – your duty 
to disgorge the beneﬁt would hold even if it were given to you by a stranger. Nor does it seem to 
matter whether your mother knew or should have known of these abuses. What matters in the 
ﬁrst instance is that you have been unjustly enriched (see, e.g. Birks, Unjust enrichment; Lionel 
D Smith, The law of tracing  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997)). 
46 If you discover, for example, that your father’s bequest to you upon his death is the result of 
proﬁts from a mining company that he owns whose extraction practices inﬂict serious human 
rights violations on its workers, you should disgorge this beneﬁt. And you should redistribute these 
gains to those who have been disadvantaged by the wrongdoing that was materially involved in 
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to inherit must depend on the bequeathers having a valid title to the assets 
they are bequeathing”.47 
Some deny that there is a direct link between a unique, identiﬁable beneﬁciary 
and a unique, identiﬁable victim of unfair resource usage. However, in the case of 
climate change, both the beneﬁts and costs of climate change have been 
transferred across generations through individuals’ participation in ongoing 
economic structures.48 While some developing countries have acquired some 
beneﬁts (and great beneﬁts in some cases) from industrialisation (in the form of 
technology, physical and human capital, and public goods), it seems hard to argue 
that they have by and large enjoyed a fair share of them.49 
2.4.3 Identity of debtors and creditors 
Proponents of climate debt generally argue that climate debt is owed by 
“developed countries” towards “developing countries” (A4).50 This claim may 
seem to provide a broad-brush approximation of who owes debts to whom based 
on trends in global emissions, but it is problematic. A range of countries now 
reasonably argue that the categories of “developed” and “developing” countries as 
deﬁned by the UNFCCC—which have remained largely static since its inception—
may not neatly map objective differences in wealth and emissions.51 Moreover, a 
number of countries currently classed as developing would likely also have 
exceeded their fair share or will soon do so.52 There are also now a large number 
                                                     
producing them insofar as this is possible (cf. Robert E Goodin and Christian Barry, "Benefitting 
from other people's wrongdoing" in Unpublished working paper (2011)). 
47 Miller, National responsibility and global justice, 154. 
48 Shue, "Global environment and international inequality": 536–37. 
49 Ibid.: 534. 
50 Bolivia, "Commitments for Annex I parties under paragraph 1(b)(i) of the Bali Action Plan: 
Evaluating developed countries' historical climate debt to developing countries (25 april 2009)", 46. 
51 Depledge, "The road less travelled: Difficulties in moving between annexes in the climate change 
regime"; Jonathan Pickering, Steve Vanderheiden, and Seumas Miller, "'If equity’s in, we’re out': 
Scope for fairness in the next global climate agreement", Ethics & International Affairs 26, no. 4 
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52 Jiahua Pan and Ying Chen, "Carbon budget proposal: A framework for an equitable and sustainable 
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of wealthy individuals in otherwise low-income countries whose per capita 
emissions are comparable to average per capita emissions of wealthy countries.53 
In order to be plausible, climate debt arguments will need to move away from a 
from a rigid emphasis on developed and developing countries as the only 
categories of analysis and identify debtors as those individuals or groups that have 
used more than their fair share of the Earth’s emissions absorptive capacity, 
however fair shares are deﬁned. 
2.4.4 Forms of repayment 
The distinction between emissions debt and adaptation debt (A5) may provide a 
useful way of delineating climate-related responsibilities and associated forms of 
repayment. The speciﬁc distinction has not been elaborated, to our knowledge, in 
academic literature,54 but other authors have highlighted the distinct ethical 
responsibilities associated with mitigation and adaptation.55 
Climate debt proposals generally place strong emphasis on the idea that emissions 
debt should be discharged primarily by the reallocation of future emissions rights 
to offset past overuse. However, once we acknowledge that climate debt could 
be repaid in more than one currency, we could envisage the possibility of other 
forms of repayment, provided that they are agreed to and yield equivalent 
beneﬁts for creditors.56 One alternative could be to allocate prospective emissions 
entitlements on an equal per capita basis, but to compensate for retrospective 
overuse by imposing additional responsibilities on high-emitting countries for 
ﬁnancing any reductions needed in other countries to meet their per capita 
                                                     
53 Shoibal Chakravarty et al., "Sharing global CO2 emission reductions among one billion high 
emitters", Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 106 (2009). 
54 Although Neumayer has proposed a formula for quantifying countries’ ‘Historical Emission 
Debt’ (Eric Neumayer, "In defence of historical accountability for greenhouse gas emissions", 
Ecological Economics 33, no. 2 (2000): 186). 
55 Sverker C. Jagers and Göran Duus-Otterström, "Dual climate change responsibility: On moral 
divergences between mitigation and adaptation", Environmental Politics 17, no. 4 (2008); 
Vanderheiden, "Globalizing responsibility for climate change" . 
56 Compare Simon Caney, "Justice and the distribution of greenhouse gas emissions", 
Journal of Global Ethics  5, no. 2 (2009): 137. 
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entitlements. Thus ﬁnancing could address both the retrospective element of 
emissions debt as well as servicing adaptation debt. 
2.5 Political analysis 
Even if we accept that the idea of climate debt is coherent and morally plausible, 
this does not mean that it must necessarily be useful for informing climate 
negotiations. In this section we provide a political analysis of climate debt 
arguments, and conclude that that their future political value is likely to be quite 
minimal. 
2.5.1 Measurement problems 
When compared with harms to poorer countries resulting from other historical acts 
(such as slavery and colonialism), the prospect of quantifying responsibilities for 
climate-related harms seems at ﬁrst glance to be much easier. However, while 
relatively sound country-level emissions data is available for recent decades, its 
coverage becomes progressively limited for decades preceding 1990, and there are 
a number of other methodological choices that add further complexity to the 
accounting task.57 As noted above, since the idea of climate debt itself does not 
necessarily imply debt for all historical emissions, this is not a decisive objection to 
the application of the concept. However, it does suggest that those arguing in 
favour of an expansive notion of liability for historical emissions should take into 
account the very real problems of quantifying pre-1990 emissions, as well as the 
ethical complexity—for reasons rehearsed above—of allocating responsibility for 
such emissions. If problems of quantiﬁcation proved insuperable, there may be 
other ways of taking a broader notion of historical responsibility into 
consideration. For example, it could shift the burden of proof onto developed 
countries to demonstrate why they should not take on a greater share of the costs 
of adaptation and mitigation than they otherwise would on the basis of their 
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current emissions alone.58 The problem, however, is that unless reasonably 
accurate estimates of climate debt can be produced, assertions of climate debt are 
likely to be interpreted more as aggrieved political rhetoric than as considered 
policy proposals. As such, these arguments are more likely to undermine reﬂective 
deliberation than to foster it, and consequently reduce the prospects for binding 
agreements on climate-related responsibilities. 
2.5.2 Rhetorical emphasis 
Climate debt represents one of several possible frames for characterising the 
responsibilities to address climate change outlined so far in our article. Identifying 
frames that resonate with others is an important component in the emergence of 
norms of international cooperation.59 However, frames may serve a broader range 
of political purposes by virtue of their rhetorical emphasis. In a related context 
John Dryzek usefully distinguishes between “bonding rhetoric”, which aims to 
motivate people who are already similarly disposed, and “bridging rhetoric” that 
aims to reach (and persuade) an audience whose dispositions are different.60 Both 
forms of rhetoric, Dryzek points out, can have value and can play an important 
role in public deliberation about political issues.61 Bridging rhetoric is frequently 
preferable as a means of facilitating reﬂective deliberation and cooperation. 
However, bonding rhetoric can help to mobilise dispossessed groups and bring 
wider public attention to their political concerns. Just which form of rhetoric is of 
greatest value depends highly on context, and it is also actor-speciﬁc: reﬂective 
public deliberation may be best promoted overall if some actors employ bonding 
rhetoric while others employ bridging rhetoric. 
Climate debt is best characterised as a form of bonding rhetoric. It is notable for 
its adversarial emphasis on dividing the world into debtors and creditors, where 
the former group is comprised of poorer countries and the latter group richer 
                                                     
58 Compare Barry, "Applying the contribution principle". 
59 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International norm dynamics and political change", 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998). 
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countries. In this sense, the rhetoric of climate debt is consistent with and 
expressive of the oppositional tactics used by some of its main advocates, the 
Latin American ALBA group.62 At ﬁrst glimpse the rhetoric of climate debt may 
seem to exemplify the commonly observed technique of seeking to establish a new 
norm by grafting it onto an existing one (namely the obligation to repay 
conventional debts).63 However, the appeal of the idea to constituencies in 
developing countries and international advocacy communities arguably derives 
more from the fact that it inverts the prevailing narrative according to which 
poorer countries are economically indebted to wealthy ones.64 
Regardless of its value as a bonding mechanism, it could be argued that the 
adversarial approach implied by climate debt has signiﬁcant value for the 
broader system of climate governance by holding richer countries to account. 
Indeed the use of climate debt has likely helped to attract attention to the 
concerns of countries and civil society groups that typically have little inﬂuence in 
climate negotiations. However, given the nature of the collective action problem 
involved in addressing climate change, a multilateral framework freely accepted by 
a consensus or near-consensus of the 195 parties to the UNFCCC is required to 
address climate change effectively. Overcoming the mistrust that has plagued 
climate negotiations since their inception will require serious efforts on the part of 
both developed and developing countries to adopt mutually acceptable frames 
for collective action. In this context, bridging rhetoric has a greater prospect of 
facilitating a meaningful and reasonably fair agreement. The bonding rhetoric of 
climate debt may at best serve to challenge the intransigence of countries that 
have failed so far to take sufﬁciently strong action to curb climate change. But 
it is highly unlikely to provide the foundation for a speciﬁc policy framework for 
allocating responsibilities among countries. At worst the idea of climate debt may 
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be perceived therefore as a mere slogan, in the process tarring the idea of 
climate justice (which is frequently also voiced by the same actors) with the same 
brush. Understandably then, many developing countries (including highly 
vulnerable small island states) have themselves eschewed the rhetoric of climate 
debt in favour of other strategies for boosting collective responsibilities to address 
climate change. 
Furthermore, as Stern’s statement suggests, many developed countries link the 
idea of debt with that of reparations, which bears associations with uncomfortable 
and politically contentious issues such as reparations for slavery and colonial 
injustices. If the climate debt arguments are sound, then the fact that some 
countries associate it with other notions of obligation that they reject does not 
of course justify discarding the concept. But it may make it less feasible to employ 
this concept in support of a meaningful and reasonably fair agreement on 
climate-related responsibilities. 
Addressing the problem of climate change requires not only taking account of past 
patterns of emissions, but also working out a fair distribution of rights and 
responsibilities for the future.65 Developing countries’ emissions are growing 
rapidly, and will eventually exceed those of developed countries even in 
cumulative terms. Thus some countries that were previous creditors may 
ultimately become debtors, and vice versa.66 The idea of climate debt is capable in 
principle of representing future as well as present liabilities, and it does not seem 
to be inherently incompatible with incorporating distributional considerations 
(including a country’s capacity to pay) as well. Nevertheless, use of the term as a 
frame for characterising climate-related responsibilities poses the risk of 
overemphasising retrospective liability at the expense of future distributive 
concerns. 
These objections to climate debt as a rhetorical frame are by no means decisive, 
but they do give us good reason to explore other formulations that could provide a 
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more constructive approach—emphasising bridging over bonding rhetoric—to 
framing and distributing responsibilities in a morally defensible manner. 
Considerations of space preclude a detailed discussion of alternatives, but we 
note one example brieﬂy. The concept of a global “carbon budget” is being used 
increasingly in scientiﬁc and policy analysis for quantifying the maximum level of 
cumulative global emissions that is permissible over time to avoid dangerous 
climate change.67 The concept of a carbon budget may encompass both 
forward-looking and backward-looking considerations. As such, while the carbon 
budget concept is compatible with recognition of the existence of climate debt, 
the former does not depend on positing the latter. Although some of the 
terminology associated with a budget may appear similar to that of climate debt 
(e.g. some countries’ budgets may be in “deﬁcit” while others are in “surplus”), 
the carbon budget idea does not highlight a divisive two-way relationship 
between debtors and creditors. Instead, it suggests that all countries participate in 
a broader common (though of course contentious) enterprise of “balancing the 
budget”. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this essay we have argued that climate debt is a coherent idea that can 
potentially be used to express a plausible account of moral responsibilities related 
to climate change provided that its scope is clearly circumscribed. We have also 
argued, however, that climate debt has at best a limited role to play in 
negotiations, and that other frames are likely to present more promising means 
for promoting a reasonably fair distribution of climate change related 
responsibilities. Given the mistrust among parties currently impeding effective 
coordinated action on climate change, parties concerned about climate justice 
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may be more likely to present a workable basis for advancing this aim by 
proposing frames that seek to bridge rather than exacerbate existing divides. 
The example of climate debt may yield broader implications for the relationship 
between theory and policy. The rhetorical elements that accompany the use of 
certain normative concepts can impact signiﬁcantly the degree to which arguments 
invoking them will foster more reﬂective public deliberation and help resolve 
collective action problems. For this reason, even if we ﬁnd that a normative 
concept may have some plausibility in theory, we need to assess at the very least 
its feasibility and rhetorical implications before assuming it has merit as a speciﬁc 
device for advancing global justice. 
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Chapter 3. “If equity’s in, we’re out”: Scope for fairness in the next 
global climate agreement  
Jonathan Pickering, Steve Vanderheiden, and Seumas Miller1 
Introductory note 
As with the previous chapter, this chapter begins with a discursive frame that is 
contested in climate negotiations, namely that of equity. While Chapter 2 
represented more of a critique of a particular frame, Chapter 3 broadens out the 
analysis to present a positive proposal for a fair and feasible long-term agreement 
on climate change. Collaboration on this chapter originated in a working paper that 
presented documentary analysis of countries’ views on fairness in climate change 
negotiations.2  
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Abstract 
At the United Nations climate change conference in 2011, parties decided to launch 
the “Durban Platform” to work towards a new long-term climate agreement. The 
decision was notable for the absence of any reference to “equity,” a prominent 
principle in all previous major climate agreements. Wealthy countries resisted the 
inclusion of equity on the grounds that the term had become too closely yoked to 
developing countries' favoured conception of equity. This conception, according to 
wealthy countries, exempts developing countries from making commitments that 
are stringent enough for the collective effort needed to avoid dangerous climate 
change. In circumstances where even mentioning the term equity has become 
problematic, a critical question is whether the possibility for a fair agreement is 
being squeezed out of negotiations. To address this question we set out a 
conceptual framework for normative theorising about fairness in international 
negotiations, accompanied by a set of minimal standards of fairness and plausible 
feasibility constraints for sharing the global climate change mitigation effort. We 
argue that a fair and feasible agreement may be reached by (1) reforming the 
current binary approach to differentiating developed and developing country 
groups, in tandem with (2) introducing a more principled approach to 
differentiating the mitigation commitments of individual countries. These two 
priorities may provide the basis for a principled bargain between developed and 
developing countries that safeguards the opportunity to avoid dangerous climate 
change without sacrificing widely acceptable conceptions of equity. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In the final hours of the United Nations climate change conference held in Durban, 
South Africa, in late 2011, senior negotiators from wealthy and developing 
countries clustered in a widely reported “huddle” to resolve outstanding points of 
discord on how to launch negotiations for a long-term global climate agreement to 
succeed the Kyoto Protocol. Among the statements voiced in the huddle, one of the 
most intriguing was attributed to the lead United States negotiator, Todd Stern: “If 
equity’s in, we’re out.”1 In other words, if the resulting decision contained any 
references to the term “equity,” the United States would refuse to participate. As it 
transpired, the United States and like-minded countries succeeded on this point. 
The agreed upon Durban Platform for Enhanced Action contained no references 
either to equity or to the “common but differentiated responsibilities” of all parties 
for protecting the climate system.2 These omissions were notable since both are 
core principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC, Article 3.1), under whose auspices these negotiations took place. 
The debate about equity at Durban is the latest turn in a long-standing dispute 
between developed and developing countries on how principles of equity or 
fairness should apply to differentiating each group’s respective contributions to 
reducing or limiting (“mitigating”) global greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S. 
position voiced at Durban is consistent with its long-held view that any global 
climate agreement must include all “major emitters,” which now notably includes 
developing countries, such as China and India, in addition to developed countries. 
Developing countries for their part have persistently argued that since the 
convention links equity to wealthy countries’ responsibility to “take the lead” in 
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addressing climate change (Article 3.1), this implies that developing countries 
should not be required to take on equivalent commitments.  
What is new is that whereas the United States had been willing previously to 
countenance differing interpretations of equity, it now seems to see the term as so 
closely yoked to the conception of equity favoured by developing countries that it 
has become an obstacle to agreement. As Lavanya Rajamani observes, “the fact 
that the divisions on the application of this principle are such as to preclude even a 
rote invocation of it signals a likely recasting of differentiation in the future climate 
regime.”3 Rajamani cautions about the implications of this trend: 
 
While the international regime can survive the erosion of certain limited forms of 
differential treatment, a wholesale rejection of differential treatment, and of the 
“equity” concerns that animate it, would destabilize the normative core of the regime.4 
 
In these circumstances it is critical to assess what scope exists for achieving a fair 
agreement within the time frame mapped out under the Durban Platform, which 
aims to conclude no later than 2015 a “protocol, another legal instrument or an 
agreed outcome with legal force” that would be implemented from 2020 
(paragraph 4).  
The remainder of this article begins by setting out a conceptual framework for 
normative theorising about fairness in international negotiations, with a particular 
emphasis on the role of feasibility considerations. We then outline a set of 
minimum fairness standards and feasibility constraints that should be taken into 
account in developing proposals for reforming differentiation under the multilateral 
climate regime. Based on these considerations, we argue that a fair and feasible 
agreement will require reforming the current dichotomy between developed and 
developing countries’ commitments, coupled with a more principled approach to 
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differentiating the level of national mitigation efforts. In the final section of the 
article we illustrate how these reforms could form the basis of a principled bargain 
between developed and developing countries.5 
3.2 Effectiveness, fairness, and feasibility in climate negotiations: 
concepts and methods  
Fairness represents one of several possible criteria for evaluating proposals and 
outcomes in climate ethics and policy, along with such others as environmental 
effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, and institutional feasibility.6 All of these criteria 
are scalar rather than purely binary in nature—in the sense that an agreement 
could be more or less feasible, more or less fair, and so on—and it is common to 
frame negotiations as a process of making trade-offs among these criteria. 
However, the quotation with which we commenced the article raises the prospect 
that there may be some fundamental incompatibility between certain criteria. In 
order to investigate this concern, we progressively introduce a set of seven 
constraints that we believe a future climate agreement should meet if it is to be 
minimally effective, fair, and feasible. In doing so we recognise that trade-offs may 
be necessary in order to satisfy maximal accounts of certain criteria, but first we 
wish to ascertain if an effective agreement could be feasible without thereby 
sacrificing minimal standards of fairness. 
3.2.1 Effectiveness 
We will assume that in order to meet a plausible standard of environmental 
effectiveness, the global climate regime must aim to meet at a minimum the 
international pledge to “hold the increase in global temperature below two degrees 
Celsius.”7 Scientists and policy-makers have now widely recognised that this 
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requires holding cumulative emissions within a finite intergenerational “budget” for 
the foreseeable future.8 We assume further that over the next few decades the 
primary means of pursuing the temperature goal will be conventional mitigation 
(for example, through shifting to low-emitting energy production) rather than 
employing geoengineering technologies, which remain largely untested and 
controversial for their potential side effects. 
Given the dispersion of polluting activities across the world’s major economies, 
adequate mitigation cannot be achieved by any one state alone. Since mitigation 
involves substantial present costs to individual states while providing a more 
general global benefit over the longer term (in the form of a safer climate), there is 
a risk that countries will seek to free-ride on the efforts of others, thus undermining 
the overall effectiveness of mitigation efforts. Multilateral agreement is therefore 
necessary to provide restraints on free-riding. Due to the rapid observed and 
projected rise in the share of global emissions in developing countries and the 
limited availability of low-cost mitigation options in developed countries, action by 
developed countries alone will be insufficient to avoid dangerous climate change.9 
Substantial mitigation could be achieved in principle through coordinated action by 
a smaller number of major emitters (such as the G20), although such an 
arrangement may not adequately protect smaller emitters vulnerable even to 
moderate levels of climate change.10 Nevertheless, the argument we advance here 
could apply to a multilateral agreement whether or not its membership were 
universal. These considerations lead us to the first of our constraints: 
 
1. Effectiveness. A global response to climate change will be effective only if it includes 
a multilateral agreement entailing substantial mitigation efforts within a critical mass 
of major developed and developing economies. 
 
                                                     
8 Shue, "Human rights, climate change, and the trillionth ton". 
9 Gupta et al., "Policies, instruments and co-operative arrangements", 776. 
10 Robyn Eckersley, "Moving forward in climate negotiations: Multilateralism or minilateralism?", 
Global Environmental Politics 12, no. 2 (2012). 
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It is important to underscore that this constraint posits multilateral agreement as a 
necessary but insufficient condition for avoiding dangerous climate change. It is 
therefore compatible with the view that responding to climate change requires a 
“polycentric” approach encompassing national and subnational policy reforms, 
private sector innovation, and action by citizens and consumers.11 A polycentric 
approach combined with a multilateral agreement could conceivably secure an 
adequate level of mitigation even if one major economy (the most obvious 
potential holdout at present being the United States) does not sign on to the 
agreement. The constraint is also consistent with the widespread assessment that 
ambitious action on mitigation will need to commence well before 2020 if 
excessively high stabilisation costs are to be avoided.12 Finally, as elaborated below, 
the constraint does not make any assumptions about the distribution of mitigation 
costs among countries. The constraint simply emphasises that without a critical 
mass of participants cooperating under a multilateral agreement, the global 
response to climate change will be ineffective. 
3.2.2 Fairness 
We take the concept of fairness to denote a criterion of even-handed, impartial, or 
non-arbitrary treatment of persons and groups in the distribution of benefits (or 
goods) and burdens.13 Consistent with the practice of many parties to climate 
negotiations and the usage in recent literature, we will use the terms “fairness” and 
“equity” interchangeably as broader moral and political concepts applicable to 
negotiations, while recognising that equity also has specific legal connotations 
under the convention.14 Both fairness and equity may apply to the substantive 
distribution of goods as well as procedures for distribution; here we focus primarily 
on the substantive aspect. Research on fairness in climate negotiations may 
evaluate policy options on the basis of their compatibility with both (1) independent 
                                                     
11 Elinor Ostrom, "Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental 
change", Global Environmental Change 20, no. 4 (2010). 
12 Meinshausen et al., "Greenhouse gas emission targets for limiting global warming to 2°C". 
13 Compare Rawls, A theory of justice, 5. 
14 See, e.g., Friedrich Soltau, Fairness in international climate change law and policy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3-4. 
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standards of fairness as well as (2) conceptions of fairness that actors may either be 
committed to or invoke for strategic reasons. In subsequent sections we outline 
constraints relating to each of these aspects. 
3.2.3 Feasibility 
The term “feasibility,” as commonly employed in political theory, comprises 
dimensions of accessibility (the existence of a practical route from one state of 
affairs to another) and stability (whether the proposed state of affairs can be 
maintained once it is reached).15 If we are concerned about fairness, we will have 
good reason to be concerned about feasibility, since an arrangement that is fair but 
unfeasible may result in the persistence of an unfair status quo. A considerable 
amount of research in the field of climate ethics already incorporates some real-
world constraints, such as partial (rather than full) compliance of actors with moral 
requirements.16 Nevertheless, a key limitation of many proposals for fairly 
distributing the benefits and burdens of mitigation—both in climate ethics and 
climate economics—is a tendency to pay limited attention to their feasibility. 
Accordingly, if research is to heed a recent call for “climate ethics for climate 
action,” it must incorporate feasibility considerations more systematically.17 
Whereas the accessibility dimension of feasibility is arguably less relevant at the 
stage of formulating core normative principles, it is central to theorising strategies 
for political reform.18 Formulating an appropriate conception of accessibility is 
particularly important in policy contexts with long time horizons, such as climate 
change. As Pablo Gilabert and Holly Lawford-Smith observe: “What may have very 
low accessibility now may turn out to be highly accessible in the future, given a 
sufficiently long sequence of dynamic expansions of the feasible sets of political 
reform.”19 Taking this perspective can help us avoid the twin pitfalls of (1) the overly 
                                                     
15 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, "Political feasibility: A conceptual exploration": 3. 
16 A recent example in this journal is Henry Shue, "Face reality? After you!—a call for leadership on 
climate change", Ethics & International Affairs 25, no. 1 (2011). 
17 Light, "Climate ethics for climate action". 
18 Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, "Political feasibility: A conceptual exploration": 11-12. 
19 Ibid.: 13. 
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pessimistic view that a policy will never be feasible simply because it is not feasible 
now and (2) the overly optimistic view that a policy that may be feasible at some 
point in time is feasible now and will remain so. 
An important intersection between fairness and feasibility arises once we take 
account of the fact that any global agreement must rely on the voluntary 
participation of states. There is a widely observed empirical link between the 
perceived fairness of an international agreement among parties and its likelihood of 
being adopted and complied with.20 When combined with effectiveness, this 
provides the basis for an initial feasibility constraint:  
 
2. Perceived fairness. An effective multilateral climate agreement will be feasible only 
if it is accepted as fair by all parties whose participation is necessary to satisfy 
effectiveness.  
 
Once conceptions of fairness are incorporated into a normative account, two 
reductive challenges must be addressed. The first is that parties’ conceptions of 
fairness are ultimately reducible to parties’ calculations of material interests. On 
this view, commonly associated with realist theories of international relations, 
moral argument is of little or no consequence in affecting the substantive outcome 
of negotiations. This empirical account lends support to normative claims that any 
agreement should satisfy an international version of the Pareto principle, whereby 
no state loses more than it gains from participating.21 Granted, some evidence 
suggests that parties to climate negotiations largely choose principles of fairness 
that match their own interests most closely.22 However, a growing body of 
literature based on constructivist theories suggests that ethical arguments and 
norms may influence international relations—on issues ranging from the end of 
colonialism to prohibitions on certain types of weaponry—not least by shaping the 
                                                     
20 Barrett, Environment and statecraft: The strategy of environmental treaty-making, xiv. 
21 As exemplified by Posner and Weisbach, Climate change justice. 
22 Andreas Lange et al., "On the self-interested use of equity in international climate negotiations", 
European Economic Review 54, no. 3 (2010). 
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way in which different countries perceive their own interests.23 Thus, conceptions 
of fairness and moral arguments may play both an enabling and a constraining role 
in influencing what is feasible in negotiations. 
A second reductive argument posits that the fairness of an agreement should be 
judged solely according to what parties perceive to be fair. But even where 
negotiations are conducted under procedurally fair conditions, it is conceivable that 
the resulting distribution of benefits and burdens could be unfair from the 
perspective of plausible normative theories, or that parties may need to choose 
among several mutually acceptable settlements, some of which may be fairer than 
others.24 Reference to independent standards of fairness is therefore important for 
ethical analysis of international negotiations. In order to provide action-guiding 
recommendations such standards should be applied to the set of feasible 
agreements, which will be circumscribed by what parties could plausibly be 
persuaded to consider as fair.25 The independent standard need not correspond to 
a single theoretical conception of fairness, but (as we illustrate below) could 
represent a minimal standard incorporating common elements of robust theories of 
fairness.  
3.3 Differentiation in climate negotiations: key issues and constraints 
With this conceptual framework in place, we now focus on the question of how a 
fair and feasible agreement may be reached regarding the differentiation of 
mitigation efforts among countries. First we distinguish two types of differentiation, 
then we introduce several further constraints that apply specifically to fairness and 
feasibility in differentiation. 
                                                     
23 Compare Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, "Reuniting ethics and social science: The Oxford 
handbook of international relations", Ethics & International Affairs 22, no. 3 (2008). 
24 Compare Cecilia Albin, Justice and fairness in international negotiation (Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
25 See Adam Swift, "The value of philosophy in nonideal circumstances", Social Theory and Practice 
34, no. 3 (2008): 369. 
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3.3.1 Categorical and national differentiation 
We use the term “differentiation” in a broad sense to encompass the idea of 
“differential treatment” (“the use of norms that provide different, presumably more 
advantageous, treatment to some states”) as well as norms that may require more 
stringent actions by some states.26 In the remainder of the article we distinguish 
two types of differentiation that are particularly relevant to climate negotiations. 
The first type relates to how groups of countries are delineated (“categorical 
differentiation”), while the second concerns the way in which national levels of 
commitment are set within individual groups (“national differentiation”). 
To place the Durban debate on equity in context, we provide some brief 
background on how each type of differentiation has evolved in previous climate 
agreements. Categorical differentiation reached its high point in the Kyoto Protocol 
(adopted in 1997), which required only developed countries to meet legally binding 
emissions limitations.27 The protocol also included a degree of national 
differentiation among developed countries’ targets, albeit one that emerged 
through a largely ad hoc approach.28 
In tandem with growing recognition that maintaining a safe limit on temperature 
rise requires substantial mitigation in developing countries, the last decade has 
seen a progressive erosion of formerly prominent aspects of categorical 
differentiation.29 In particular, outcomes of recent negotiations, including the 2009 
Copenhagen Accord and the 2010 Cancún Agreements, include not only 
“commitments” by developed countries but also “actions” by developing countries 
on mitigation. The Copenhagen Accord also introduced a far more flexible form of 
national differentiation than under the protocol, whereby each country could make 
                                                     
26 Rajamani, Differential treatment in international environmental law, 1. 
27 Rajamani, "The changing fortunes of differential treatment in the evolution of international 
environmental law": 605-06. 
28 Harald Winkler, Bernd Brouns, and Sivan Kartha, "Future mitigation commitments: Differentiating 
among non-Annex I countries", Climate Policy 5, no. 5 (2006): 475. 
29 Rajamani, "The changing fortunes of differential treatment in the evolution of international 
environmental law": 616. 
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political pledges (rather than legally binding commitments) whose form and extent 
could be determined unilaterally. 
The absence of the term “equity” from the Durban Platform appears to rule out at 
the very least a rigid Kyoto-style form of categorical differentiation. Nevertheless, 
the decision allows considerable leeway for an approach lying anywhere between 
the current level of differentiation and much greater symmetry between developed 
and developing countries’ commitments than at present. Moreover, in specifying 
that the agreement will be “under the Convention,” the Durban Platform implicitly 
imports key principles from the convention, including equity and common but 
differentiated responsibilities.30  
3.3.2 Minimal standards of fairness in differentiation 
A starting point for a minimal independent standard of fairness would be to require 
that any form of differentiation should reflect (implicitly or explicitly) moral 
principles widely accepted in climate ethics as relevant to distributing the costs and 
benefits of addressing climate change. Among prevailing approaches in climate 
ethics one may draw a broad distinction between those that focus on how to 
allocate national efforts contributing to global mitigation (“effort-sharing 
approaches”) and those that focus on how to distribute global atmospheric 
resources (“resource-sharing approaches”).31 Effort-sharing approaches most 
frequently invoke principles of (1) contribution to the problem (through 
proportional contribution to cumulative or current greenhouse gas emissions) and 
(2) capacity to pay (for domestic or international mitigation).32 Somewhat less 
widely accepted but still commonly invoked is (3) the benefit that current 
generations have inherited from centuries of emissions-intensive economic 
development.33 Resource-sharing approaches most commonly invoke the principle 
                                                     
30 Ibid., 618. 
31 BASIC experts, "Equitable access to sustainable development: Contribution to the body of scientific 
knowledge" (Beijing, Brasilia, Cape Town and Mumbai: BASIC expert group, 2011), 9-11. 
32 See Simon Caney, "Climate change and the duties of the advantaged", Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2010). 
33 See, e.g., Shue, "Global environment and international inequality". 
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that each person should have an equal per capita entitlement to a share of Earth’s 
capacity to absorb emissions.34 
We have discussed the relative merits of some of these approaches elsewhere,35 
but for present purposes we formulate a minimal standard of fairness that captures 
core elements of the most widely discussed allocation methods: 
 
3. Fairness. A climate agreement is minimally fair only if: (1) each actor’s mitigation 
efforts are proportional to its responsibility for present and/or past emissions and 
capacity to pay for mitigation, and/or (2) it facilitates the progressive global 
convergence of per capita emissions toward a cumulative limit compatible with 
avoidance of dangerous climate change.  
 
Note that this criterion, while broad, already rules out certain distributive 
approaches, such as those based on equal per capita sharing of costs or 
grandfathering of existing emission levels, both of which tend to favour wealthy 
high-emitting countries. At the same time, while this approach requires a 
substantial degree of national differentiation, it is indifferent as to whether any 
form of categorical differentiation is used. Further fairness constraints could be 
specified (particularly requirements for fairness in adaptation), but this should be 
sufficient for illustrating our general approach to differentiating mitigation efforts. 
3.3.3 Feasibility constraints: plural conceptions of fairness and institutional 
inertia 
We may now introduce several further feasibility constraints that must be met if fair 
differentiation is to be achievable under a post-2020 climate agreement. Each could 
be said to represent a conception of fairness strongly held by some or all 
negotiating groups, thus fleshing out the more general constraint of perceived 
                                                     
34 See, e.g., Singer, One world. 
35 See, e.g., Vanderheiden, Atmospheric justice. 
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fairness. Here we select from a set of feasibility constraints specified by Valentina 
Bosetti and Jeffrey Frankel based on their analysis of recent negotiations: 36 
 
4. Participation. “The United States will not commit to quantitative targets unless 
China and other major developing countries commit to quantitative targets at the 
same time.” 
5. Basis for differentiation. “China, India, and other developing countries will not make 
sacrifices they view as a. fully contemporaneous with rich countries, b. different in 
character from those made in the past by richer countries, c. preventing them from 
industrializing, d. failing to recognize that richer countries should be prepared to make 
greater economic sacrifices to address the problem than poorer countries, or e. failing 
to recognize that the rich countries have benefited from an unfair advantage in being 
allowed to achieve levels of per capita emissions that are far above those of the poor 
countries.” 
6. Costs. “No country will accept a path of targets that is expected to cost it more than 
Y percent of income [set at 1 percent by Bosetti and Frankel] throughout the twenty-
first century (in present discounted value).” 
 
While participation appears to permit unfairness if one takes the view that the 
United States ultimately has a responsibility to act unconditionally, the participation 
of major developing countries is nevertheless a corollary of the effectiveness 
constraint outlined above. Moreover, participation does not stipulate that 
developing countries should pay for all their domestic emissions reductions 
themselves (since they could be financed by developed countries), although equally 
the costs criterion implies that it would be implausible to expect developed 
countries to bear all the costs of global mitigation. One could also argue that costs 
would permit an unfair agreement since countries may have a responsibility to 
remedy harm regardless of the cost to themselves. However, given the voluntary 
nature of participation in a global agreement it is highly unlikely that countries 
                                                     
36 Valentina Bosetti and Jeffrey Frankel, "Politically feasible emissions targets to attain 460 ppm CO2 
concentrations", Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 6, no. 1 (2012): 89-90. The 
numbering and titles are our own. 
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would inflict very large economic costs on themselves in the absence of 
international legal liability to do so. 
We introduce one final feasibility constraint not included by Bosetti and Frankel, 
based on the idea of institutional inertia in the multilateral climate regime: 
 
7. Institutional compatibility. A medium-term climate agreement will be feasible only if 
it maintains a sufficient degree of compatibility with deeply embedded institutional 
elements of the climate regime.  
 
Including this constraint may seem controversial given the numerous challenges 
that the UNFCCC has faced in recent years, ranging from efforts by the United 
States and others to construct alternative bodies for addressing climate change 
among a smaller group of parties, to the near collapse of the multilateral process in 
Copenhagen. Yet the UNFCCC has demonstrated a significant degree of resilience as 
“minilateral” initiatives, such as the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate, have fallen by the wayside, while at Cancún in 2010 parties reaffirmed 
their willingness to invest in the multilateral process.37 At the same time, numerous 
commentators have highlighted the difficulties of enacting thoroughgoing reform of 
the UNFCCC.38 One reason for the difficulty of institutional change in the UNFCCC is 
the prevailing consensus-based decision-making procedure, which itself has proved 
resistant to reform. Certain kinds of institutional dysfunction should not be taken as 
given but rather as the object of reform proposals themselves. Nevertheless, there 
are some entrenched features of the climate regime whose reform or abolition 
would arguably require an implausibly large amount of political will to enact in the 
foreseeable future. In the next section we discuss one institutional feature widely 
considered to be deeply embedded—namely, the categorisation of developed and 
developing countries into formal groupings. 
                                                     
37 See Eckersley, "Moving forward in climate negotiations"; and Michael Grubb, "Cancún: The art of 
the possible", Climate Policy 11, no. 2 (2011). 
38 See, e.g., Joanna Depledge, "The opposite of learning: Ossification in the climate change regime", 
Global Environmental Politics 6, no. 1 (2006). 
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Finally, we note another possible feasibility consideration relevant to the Durban 
debate on equity—namely, the prospect that parties could simply reject as unfair 
approaches that are couched in certain terms. Arguably terms such as “climate 
debt” constitute rhetorical constraints due to the connotations of blame they hold 
for developed countries.39 However, Stern’s response to a question about what he 
meant by “If equity’s in, we’re out” is noteworthy: 
 
It’s not that there’s anything wrong with . . . talking about equity in the context of 
climate negotiations, and the term appears in the framework convention, and we tend 
to look at the phrase as calling for fairness to all parties, and we think that’s fine. 
But in this context, when we’re talking about setting up a negotiation, . . . the key 
element of which for us, was to include all the major players in the same legal system 
kind of together, we just thought that that would be a distraction that would tend to 
drive people back into the old paradigm, if you will, and we didn’t want to go there.40 
 
This, coupled with the reference to the convention mentioned above, suggests that 
it would be premature to see the lack of reference to equity in the Durban Platform 
as conclusive evidence for a rhetorical constraint on explicit reference to equity in a 
future agreement, let alone on giving that principle substantive effect. 
3.4 Priorities for reforming differentiation 
3.4.1 Categorical differentiation: the need to reform the annex system 
The divide between developing and developed countries that is characteristic of 
many areas of international negotiation has become especially entrenched in the 
climate regime as a result of the structure of the convention, which divides 
countries into Annexes according to whether they are developed (roughly 
equivalent to Annex I) or developing (non-Annex I).41 Non-Annex I countries may 
                                                     
39 See Pickering and Barry, "On the concept of climate debt" [Chapter 2]. 
40 United States Department of State, "United Nations climate change conference in Durban, South 
Africa ". 
41 Depledge, "The opposite of learning: Ossification in the climate change regime": 9. 
113 
 
voluntarily move to Annex I, but few have done so to date, largely owing to 
procedural hurdles as well as limited incentives to take on binding commitments.42 
While some countries have recently challenged current approaches to country 
groupings, most non-Annex I countries have resisted what they see as efforts to 
undermine a “firewall” that safeguards Kyoto-style categorical differentiation.43  
There are strong reasons for seeing the current approach to country listings as 
seriously flawed. Even if differentiation by listing may aim to capture some of the 
essence of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, a binary 
distinction is a crude way of doing so. Moreover, it is clear that the distinction 
between developed and developing countries is not tied reliably to objective 
criteria. For example, a number of non-Annex I countries—notably such countries as 
Singapore, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—have higher per capita incomes or emissions 
than many Annex I countries.44 As a result, some countries that should be taking on 
a greater share of the global mitigation and financing effort by virtue of their 
national circumstances remain unfairly exempt from comparable commitments.  
Arguably an even more serious problem for effective global mitigation is the lack of 
distinction among countries still properly classed as “developing.” Although the 
convention requires special treatment for certain groups of developing countries on 
the basis of their poverty or vulnerability to climate change, there is no clear 
distinction between (1) large and economically advanced developing economies and 
(2) a diverse range of smaller, lower-emitting developing countries. This is despite 
the fact that major developing economies have increasingly coordinated their 
positions in negotiations, particularly the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India, 
and China), and have often found themselves at odds with vulnerable countries 
seeking more ambitious action on mitigation. 
                                                     
42 Depledge, "The road less travelled". 
43 Lavanya Rajamani, "The making and unmaking of the Copenhagen Accord", International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 59, no. 3 (2010): 831-32. 
44 Australia, "Mitigation: Submission to the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP (24 November 2008)" (Bonn: 
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Is the solution to dispense with the Annex system altogether? Numerous proposals 
in climate ethics and policy, for example, adopt approaches based purely on 
national rather than categorical differentiation by using a sliding scale applicable to 
all countries.45 This approach may offer greater theoretical robustness but 
encounters two major feasibility concerns. First, there may be good reasons to 
distinguish some countries’ commitments according to qualitative or non-scalar 
features, such as their legal stringency, or the scope of their emissions 
measurement and reporting obligations. Second, the Annex system is arguably so 
entrenched that it could be described without exaggeration as “the political and 
procedural cornerstone of the climate change regime.”46 Accordingly, eradicating it 
altogether would divert scarce political will that could better be applied to other 
reform priorities. Instead, the preferable avenue would be to focus on ways to 
modify the Annex system so as to address its critical deficiencies.  
3.4.2 National differentiation: the case for a principled approach 
The minimal fairness standard outlined above requires that national mitigation 
efforts must reflect widely accepted principles of fairness, such as responsibility, 
capacity, and equality. While many developing countries have also argued for a 
morally principled approach to distributing mitigation efforts, this view appears to 
be at odds with the position of many developed countries, which (with the notable 
exception of the European Union) have generally resisted criteria-based 
approaches. Developed countries have frequently contended that no single 
approach to fairness could capture the diversity of parties’ national circumstances.47  
An initial appeal of ad hoc approaches is that they appear to respect the diversity of 
views on effort-sharing and to allow each country to take its national circumstances 
into account. However, unstructured approaches tend to downplay factors that 
many parties consider as important, such as the responsibility of countries to 
                                                     
45 See, e.g., Baer et al., "Greenhouse development rights ". 
46 Depledge, "The road less travelled": 273. 
47 These views were evident in a recent UNFCCC workshop; see UNFCCC, Workshop on equitable 
access to sustainable development (AWG-LCA 15) 2012, Accessed 20 December 2013. 
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prevent and remedy harm to other countries, regardless of whether they would 
otherwise gain or lose from an agreement. Furthermore, a lack of comparability in 
ad hoc approaches may exacerbate suspicions among parties that others are free-
riding on their actions, as well as allowing unequal bargaining power among 
countries to operate unchecked. Analysis of the Copenhagen pledges suggests that 
many developing countries’ mitigation pledges are at a level comparable to those of 
developed countries when measured against their projected “business as usual” 
emissions level.48 Thus, even though the current ad hoc approach may have 
encouraged greater participation of developing countries—ensuring a far wider 
coverage of global emissions than the Kyoto Protocol—it has arguably failed to 
encourage developed countries to take on their fair share of the global burden.  
Even if a principled approach were desirable, one could still argue that reaching 
agreement on a common set of principles would be impossible. However, several 
countervailing arguments could be made. One suggestive response would be to 
point to formulaic approaches used in other areas of international relations, 
including UN peacekeeping and ozone protection, and the distribution of the EU’s 
emissions target among its member states.49 Nevertheless, the challenge of 
reconciling multiple conceptions of fairness in climate change mitigation is arguably 
much greater than in any of these contexts. Not only are the over 190 parties to the 
convention far more diverse in wealth, institutional composition, and cultural 
tradition than EU member states, but the economic costs involved are much higher 
than in any other context where burden-sharing formulae have been adopted. For 
example, the UN’s budget for peacekeeping and regular operations together is 
around $10 billion a year, whereas recent estimates of the incremental investment 
in mitigation required globally by 2030 range from $380 billion to $1.2 trillion a 
year.50 For these reasons, arguments from analogy need to be supplemented with a 
                                                     
48 Frank Jotzo, "Comparing the Copenhagen emissions targets" Crawford School Centre for Climate 
Economics & Policy Paper No. 1.10. (2010). 
49 See Scott Barrett, Why cooperate? The incentive to supply global public goods (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007); and Paule Stephenson and Jonathan Boston, "Climate change, equity and the 
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more direct assessment of whether and how major disagreements could be 
overcome.  
Given highly divergent conceptions of fairness, any principled approach will 
need to incorporate multiple criteria common or tolerable to the different 
approaches in order to achieve the requisite level of acceptability.51 However, there 
remains a considerable risk that one country’s favoured principle cannot be 
incorporated without thereby violating that of another. The paradigm example of 
such a dilemma is the question of how responsibility for past emissions should be 
taken into account. Once historical emissions are included, some allocation 
methods would require countries, such as the United States, to reduce their 
emissions to zero or even below zero by 2050.52 Developed countries have argued 
that the investments required to achieve such targets would too massive to secure 
their citizens’ support (thus violating costs). Developing countries, however, would 
see a failure to take account of historical responsibility as denying them the right to 
develop that wealthy countries have enjoyed (thus violating basis for 
differentiation). 
Most work in climate ethics strongly supports explicit consideration of past 
emissions in determining a country’s responsibilities in the belief that countries 
should be held responsible for avoiding and remedying their contribution to harm. 
One of us has previously advanced a specific proposal on the treatment of historical 
responsibility,53 but here we limit our discussion to highlighting two approaches 
that may help break the impasse on this question, while recognising that other 
theories may also be capable of satisfying both fairness and perceived fairness.  
First, while some authors suggest that full responsibility for historical emissions 
could be justified on the grounds that contemporary citizens of developed countries 
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have benefited from historical emissions, others have suggested that historical 
responsibility may be constrained by considerations of foreseeability and 
avoidability of harm.54 On this basis, as well as on pragmatic grounds of data 
availability, counting emissions from a date such as 1990 (the date of publication of 
the first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC]) may be 
preferable.55 While choosing 1990 rather than 1750 makes a tangible difference to 
developed and developing countries’ share of cumulative emissions, the recent 
swift rise of global emissions means that pre-1990 emissions will represent an ever 
smaller proportion of cumulative emissions in coming decades.56 Nevertheless, 
outstanding questions would need to be resolved over whether responsibility 
should accrue for all post-1990 emissions or only those above a level required for a 
minimally decent standard of living. 
Second, historical responsibility could be reflected not solely through the allocation 
of emissions entitlements but also in the allocation of responsibilities for mobilising 
climate finance for developing countries, particularly to support adaptation to the 
adverse consequences of climate change resulting from past emissions.57 Allowing 
substitution between these types of resources would be consistent with a basic 
point commonly underscored by theorists that there is no human “right to emit” 
per se. Rather, emissions are merely an instrumental means of securing such basic 
rights or goods as health, food, water, and shelter.58  
Although a substantive agreement on how historical responsibility should be 
applied will face considerable obstacles, it is notable that the Cancún Agreements 
explicitly referred to historical responsibility for the first time in a consensus-based 
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UNFCCC decision, which may open up scope for deliberation on this issue.59 
Disagreement over other substantive principles may likewise be expected to be 
difficult but not impossible to overcome. The principle of long-term convergence 
toward equal per capita emissions, for example, has been supported by developed 
countries, such as EU members, as well as many developing countries.60 At present, 
however, the accessibility of such an approach is limited by the steep transitional 
costs faced by countries with high or quickly rising per capita emissions, among 
which are both developed countries (such as the United States) and developing 
countries (such as China). As we outline in the next section, a phased approach to 
principled allocation could help to resolve this issue. 
3.5 Toward a principled bargain 
We now illustrate how the two reform priorities outlined above—improved 
categorical differentiation through reforming the existing Annex system, and a more 
principled approach to national differentiation—could be translated into elements 
of a coherent institutional framework.  
The first element of the framework—aimed at improving categorical 
differentiation—would involve introducing a tiered approach to developing 
countries’ mitigation efforts. This could be achieved by adding one or more new 
Annexes under the convention or the new agreement, although creating further 
subcategories within the non-Annex I group may be easier to reconcile with 
developing countries’ concern for maintaining differential treatment. Membership 
in each category should be based on objective criteria, such as per capita income or 
emissions. This would imply, among other things, that the wealthiest non-Annex I 
countries could be deemed candidates for joining Annex I. In order to enable rapidly 
industrialising developing economies to take on binding commitments 
commensurable with their circumstances, certain categories would entail 
intermediate forms of mitigation commitment, such as targets to reduce emissions 
                                                     
59 Grubb, "Cancún: The art of the possible": 847. 
60 Compare A. Lange, C. Vogt, and A. Ziegler, "On the importance of equity in international climate 
policy: An empirical analysis", Energy Economics 29 (2007): 547. 
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compared to a business-as-usual projection or to reduce the emissions intensity of 
national production. To ensure predictability in tracking global emissions trends, all 
developing economies with high aggregate emissions (such as the BASIC countries) 
could be required to comply with stringent emissions monitoring standards. This 
would be compatible with national differentiation under which countries with much 
lower per capita emissions and income (such as India) had less demanding targets 
than those with higher per capita income and emissions (such as the other BASIC 
countries). Positive incentives for adopting the approach—such as eligibility to 
receive financial support or to participate in international emissions trading 
mechanisms—could be attached to membership in particular categories. 
The second element of the framework would involve the progressive incorporation 
of principles for national differentiation within and across country categories. 
National differentiation could be guided at a broad level by a shared long-term goal, 
such as convergence to roughly equal per capita emissions by 2050, with countries 
adopting steeper convergence trajectories as they graduate to more stringent 
categories of commitment. A tiered approach may help to make agreement on 
effort-sharing principles somewhat more tractable, since formula-based allocation 
methods will initially apply most stringently to a limited range of countries that 
have met certain threshold criteria. Even so, for the reasons we have outlined 
above, agreement on substantive principles will be challenging. We therefore 
outline further transitional steps that may be required.  
An initial step would involve strengthening existing avenues for facilitating 
deliberation on effort-sharing principles within and outside the UNFCCC.61 This 
could include: quantitative comparison of the effectiveness, costs, and distributive 
implications of different effort-sharing options in the next assessment report of the 
IPCC (due for staged release in 2013–2014); further official workshops on effort-
sharing hosted by the UNFCCC; and regular publication of nongovernmental indices 
that can “name and shame” laggards while giving credit to those that have made 
stronger pledges. A further transitional step would be to integrate deliberation on 
                                                     
61 Compare John S. Dryzek and Hayley Stevenson, "Global democracy and earth system governance", 
Ecological Economics 70, no. 11 (2011). 
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criteria into the process of formulating national targets well before the long-term 
agreement commences. For example, as part of the current process of “clarifying” 
existing mitigation pledges and possible measures to update pre-2020 pledges, each 
party could be required to report the criteria it has used to select its level of 
mitigation (similar to the way in which each developed country must justify the 
sense in which its climate finance contribution is “new and additional”).62 While this 
alone would not ensure that the resulting commitment reflects widely accepted 
principles, the transparency thereby achieved would raise the reputational costs to 
parties that base their commitments on self-serving grounds. 
Having sketched the elements of the institutional framework, we must answer the 
critical question of whether it (or indeed any comparable framework) can satisfy all 
the constraints we have set out. A key advantage of our framework is that the two 
types of improved differentiation provide the basis for a principled bargain between 
developed and developing countries. Achieving such a bargain would require 
significant compromises but yield substantial gains on both sides. On the one hand, 
the calls by developed countries for more robust developing country participation 
can be satisfied if developing countries agree to the reform of categorical 
differentiation. On the other hand, recognition of developing countries’ special 
circumstances and wealthy countries’ responsibility to lead (which are necessary for 
satisfying basis for differentiation) can be achieved if developed countries and some 
developing countries compromise on their resistance to principled approaches to 
national differentiation (which would then provide a foundation for satisfying 
fairness). Working within a reformed Annex system would help to ensure 
institutional compatibility. By addressing core concerns of each negotiating group, 
the elements of the bargain taken together would help to ensure perceived fairness. 
Perhaps the most difficult outstanding question is whether all these constraints 
could be met while simultaneously ensuring effectiveness at reasonable costs. A 
precise answer to this question would require quantitative modelling of effort-
                                                     
62 UNFCCC, "Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention", Decision 2/CP.17. 17th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. Durban, 
2011. (2012), paras. 5 and 34. 
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sharing arrangements, which is beyond the scope of this article. However, some 
findings from existing research may help shed light on the question. While 
numerous quantitative models find that stabilisation at 2 degrees Celsius remains 
physically and technically feasible despite recent high emissions, the task becomes 
considerably more challenging once constraints relating to cost, equity, and 
incomplete participation are incorporated.63 Under tight constraints—such as full 
historical responsibility and delayed participation of developing countries until 
2030—stabilisation at 2 degrees Celsius becomes infeasible under many models.64  
Since our framework is compatible with limited recognition of historical 
responsibility and allows only limited delay in the participation of major developing 
countries, its degree of feasibility would lie somewhere between scenarios based 
purely on securing environmental effectiveness and those with tight constraints. 
Some analysis suggests that limited delay can substantially reduce overall costs 
compared to delay until 2030.65 Other research has modelled frameworks that bear 
substantial similarities to our own, where a progressively wider range of countries is 
incorporated into a “staged” system of commitments over time. Among the best-
known examples of this type are the South-North Dialogue proposal and Multi-
Stage Convergence.66 Recent modelling of some of these proposals suggests that 
most of the constraints outlined above could be fulfilled, although the Multi-Stage 
proposal would likely yield warming of around 2 degrees Celsius at relatively high 
cost, while Bosetti and Frankel estimate their proposal would yield warming of 2.8 
                                                     
63 Joeri Rogelj et al., "Emission pathways consistent with a 2°C global temperature limit", Nature 
Climate Change 1, no. 8 (2011). 
64 Massimo Tavoni, Shoibal Chakravarty, and Robert Socolow, "Safe vs. Fair: A formidable trade-off in 
tackling climate change", Sustainability 4, no. 2 (2012); and Leon Clarke et al., "International climate 
policy architectures: Overview of the EMF 22 international scenarios", Energy Economics 31, 
Supplement 2 (2009). 
65 Peter Russ and Tom van Ierland, "Insights on different participation schemes to meet climate 
goals", Energy Economics 31, Supplement 2 (2009). 
66 Winkler, Brouns, and Kartha, "Future mitigation commitments: Differentiating among non-Annex I 
countries"; and Michel den Elzen et al., "Multi-stage: A rule-based evolution of future commitments 
under the climate change Convention", International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and 
Economics 6, no. 1 (2006). 
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degrees Celsius, albeit at lower cost.67 Further analysis—some of which will be 
undertaken as part of the next IPCC assessment report—is required to enable 
comparative evaluation of these models and where necessary lead to the 
development of alternative models. However, the available analysis suggests that a 
framework fulfilling the constraints we have outlined cannot be dismissed out of 
hand as infeasible. 
3.6 Conclusion  
We have argued that despite continuing contestation over the meaning of equity, 
considerations of fairness are not fundamentally incompatible with reaching an 
effective global climate agreement. At the centre of our proposal for fair 
differentiation is a principled bargain between developed and developing countries 
involving the moderation of categorical differentiation in exchange for a more 
principled approach to national differentiation. In taking this approach we have 
aimed to illustrate not only how negotiations can (and should) take fairness into 
account but also how policy-oriented research in climate ethics can (and should) 
pay more systematic attention to feasibility considerations. 
What gives us reason to think that a more principled approach could work in future 
when other past efforts have failed? Arguably, the key catalyst is that an effective 
global climate agreement now urgently requires mitigation within all large 
economies, which will in turn require an agreement that is perceived as fair by 
developing as well as developed countries. The bargain we have sketched here 
would help ensure that even if large and advanced developing economies 
participate in an agreement on a similar legal footing to developed countries, the 
scope of their commitments would continue to reflect important differences in their 
per capita emissions and income compared to wealthy countries.  
The challenge of arriving at such a bargain cannot be underestimated. It is 
vulnerable not least to the risk that the United States may refuse to participate in 
                                                     
67 Tommi Ekholm et al., "Effort sharing in ambitious, global climate change mitigation scenarios", 
Energy Policy 38, no. 4 (2010); and Bosetti and Frankel, "Politically feasible emissions targets to 
attain 460 ppm CO2 concentrations": 105. 
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an agreement even if its participation demand is met. In that case prospects for 
effective global action would depend more on such factors as domestic advocacy on 
climate change within the United States, possibly trade measures initiated by 
participants in the agreement, and non-climate drivers, such as competition for 
clean energy markets and energy security concerns. An even greater risk is that if 
ambitious global mitigation efforts are delayed beyond 2020, whatever 
opportunities remain to avoid dangerous climate change without sacrificing fairness 
will rapidly diminish. Still, it is too soon to concede the impossibility of an 
agreement that is both effective and fair. Indeed, the chances of securing the 
necessary degree of participation may ultimately be greatest where equity—
appropriately conceived—is not left out of the framework but rather built into its 
foundations. 
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Chapter 4. Regulating the “new tobacco”: Do those who lose out 
from climate change policies deserve compensation? 
Jonathan Pickering1 
Introductory note 
The previous two chapters sought to present new ways of looking at questions that 
have already received considerable attention in climate ethics, namely the 
distribution of responsibilities for mitigation (and to a lesser extent adaptation). 
Chapter 4 turns to a question that has been largely overlooked in climate ethics to 
date, namely how to characterise and distribute responsibilities for addressing the 
adverse impacts of climate change mitigation policies. Whereas previous chapters 
have primarily considered responsibilities at the global level, this chapter involves a 
comparison of the global and domestic levels.  
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Abstract 
The example of climate change poses a challenge to the widely held view that 
governments have no obligation to compensate for falls in income or asset values 
that occur when they regulate public harms (the ‘non-compensable loss objection’). 
I establish a provisional case for considering all adverse climate policy impacts—as 
with the impacts of policies to curb smoking—as non-compensable losses. However, 
I argue that the non-compensable loss objection could be overridden where policies 
fall disproportionately on (i) those least responsible for causing the problem or (ii) 
those least able to avoid hardships resulting from measures to address the problem, 
in particular low-income workers and consumers. Governments may have duties of 
domestic distributive justice to compensate their own citizens for disproportionate 
losses. Whether or not governments have comprehensive of duties of global justice, 
they have stringent and demanding duties to compensate those suffering 
disproportionate losses abroad. Those duties arise from the joint participation of 
enacting countries and affected countries in cooperative efforts to address public 
harms (in this case the global climate regime). The analysis thereby helps to inform 
broader philosophical and policy debates about the extent of a government’s duties 
of compensation to those living outside its territory. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The idea that governments have no general obligation to compensate those 
adversely affected by the introduction of measures to regulate harmful activities 
such as smoking, gambling and other hazardous products is widely accepted in legal 
theory and philosophy.1 Nevertheless, governments frequently do compensate 
some domestic businesses and households facing higher production costs or prices 
for consumer goods as a result of climate change policies.2 By contrast, at the 
international level industrialised countries and many commentators are far less 
willing to acknowledge that other countries affected by the same policy measures 
may be entitled to any compensation.3 In response to longstanding claims by 
oil-exporting countries for compensation for potential lost revenue resulting from 
climate policies introduced abroad, one representative of a prominent 
environmental organisation wryly commented: “It is like the tobacco industry asking 
for compensation for lost revenues as a part of a settlement to address the health 
risks of smoking”.4  
Many argue that more urgent attention should be directed instead towards 
compensation for damage resulting from the impacts of climate change itself (as 
opposed to damage from policies aiming to address climate change) such as sea 
level rise, crop failure and the spread of infectious diseases.5 Yet, as the range and 
                                                     
1 William A Fischel, Regulatory takings: Law, economics, and politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 355. See also Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private property and the power of 
eminent domain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), Chapter 9; Robert E. Goodin, 
"Theories of compensation", Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 9, no. 1 (1989), 57. 
2 Some emissions trading schemes (such as those of the EU and New Zealand) have provided 
compensation for businesses but not for households. Others (such as Australia’s carbon pricing 
mechanism, which a new government elected in 2013 plans to dismantle) would compensate both 
businesses and households. See Peter Lloyd, "Designing a carbon price policy: Introduction", 
Australian Economic Review 45, no. 1 (2012): 82. 
3 See for example Jon Barnett and Suraje Dessai, "Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the UNFCCC: Adverse effects 
and the impacts of response measures", Climate Policy 2, no. 2 (2002). 
4 Jake Schmidt, International Climate Policy Director, Natural Resources Defense Council, quoted in 
Jad Mouawad and Andrew C Revkin, "Saudis seek payments for any drop in oil revenues" New York 
Times, 13 October 2009. 
5 See for example Daniel A Farber, "Basic compensation for victims of climate change", University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 155 (2007). 
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ambition of climate policies have grown in recent years, it has become increasingly 
apparent that they will produce a variety of other spillover effects beyond 
fluctuations in oil prices. As a result, a rising number of countries are concerned 
about the adverse impacts of climate policies and measures (hereafter “climate 
policy impacts”6) on areas as diverse as food prices, transportation costs and 
employment.  
In this article I introduce the example of climate change in order to evaluate the 
claim that governments have no obligation to compensate for falls in income or 
asset values that occur when they regulate public harms (which I will refer to as the 
“non-compensable loss objection”). I establish a provisional case for considering all 
adverse climate policy impacts as non-compensable losses based on the fact that, as 
with policies to curb smoking, they result from governments’ efforts to regulate a 
public harm. However, I argue that the non-compensable loss objection could be 
overridden where policies fall disproportionately on those least responsible for 
causing the problem or those least able to avoid hardships resulting from 
addressing it.  
Through this analysis I illustrate how the example of climate policy impacts may 
inform broader philosophical and policy debates about the extent of a 
government’s duties of compensation to those living outside its territory. Duties of 
distributive justice operating at the domestic level may more readily ground some 
responsibilities for governments to compensate their own citizens. However, I argue 
that countries that enact policies to regulate harm (“enacting countries”) may have 
stringent remedial duties towards affected countries. Those duties are triggered at 
least in part by the common participation of enacting and affected countries in the 
global trade regimes as well as by cooperative arrangements to regulate harm (such 
as the global climate change regime).  
                                                     
6 Losses of this kind are included under the terms the “impact of the implementation of response 
measures” (UNFCCC, "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change", Article 4.8) and 
“economic and social consequences of response measures” (UNFCCC, "The Cancún Agreements: 
Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention" (2011), Part III.E), among other formulations. 
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The article is structured as follows. In section 4.2 I begin by evaluating the case for 
compensation at the domestic level. In section 4.3 I assess how far the non-
compensable loss objection extends to claims for transnational compensation. 
Section 4.4 then combines consideration of the domestic and transnational levels to 
outline proposals for distributing and fulfilling compensatory responsibilities. 
4.2 Should governments compensate for economic losses when they 
regulate harmful activities? 
4.2.1 Compensation in context 
Although a large body of work has emerged on compensation for losses stemming 
from government action,7 only a moderate body of policy analysis has engaged with 
climate policy impacts.8 One of the few insightful examples of normative theory 
specifically addressing climate policy impacts is Robyn Eckersley’s analysis of border 
measures. 9 —I will return to aspects of Eckersley’s analysis at various points in the 
article, while noting that her article addresses the question of compensation as part 
of a broader set of concerns and does not encompass the wider range of impacts I 
will discuss here. To the extent that normative theorists working on climate change 
have addressed compensation issues, they have focused primarily on rationales for 
compensating countries for their own mitigation costs10 or for the adverse effects of 
                                                     
7 Prominent examples discussed in this article include Henry Sidgwick, The elements of politics, 2nd 
ed. (London: Macmillan, 1897); Frank I Michelman, "Property, utility and fairness: Comments on the 
ethical foundations of "just compensation" law", Harvard Law Review 80, no. 6 (1967); Epstein, 
Takings: Private property and the power of eminent domain; Goodin, "Theories of compensation"; 
and Robert E. Goodin, "Compensation and redistribution" in Utilitarianism as a public philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
8 See for example Barnett and Dessai, "Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the UNFCCC: Adverse effects and the 
impacts of response measures". 
9 Robyn Eckersley, "The politics of carbon leakage and the fairness of border measures", Ethics & 
International Affairs 24, no. 4 (2010). 
10 See for example Lukas H. Meyer, "Compensating wrongless historical emissions of greenhouse 
gases", Ethical Perspectives 11, no. 1 (2004); Catriona McKinnon, Climate change and future justice: 
Precaution, compensation, and triage (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012). 
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climate change itself.11 Across these areas understandings of compensation vary, 
and it is important to specify at the outset how I will use the term. 
In many international settings—not least in multilateral negotiations on climate 
change—talk of compensation is uncomfortable for many developed countries, 
which see the term as carrying overtones of legal liability for past wrongs.12 
References to compensation have likewise proved problematic in some domestic 
climate policy debates (notably in Australia and the US). Accordingly, some 
commentators prefer to talk of responding to the claims of affected firms as 
“assistance”.13 However, compensation need not imply legal liability or a 
retrospective remedy for wrongful action. For present purposes I will borrow the 
following definition of compensation offered by Daniel Butt: “counterbalancing 
benefits … provided to make up for a particular loss”.14 On this understanding, 
compensation could involve restoring loss on a no-fault basis. In addition, 
compensation need not involve transfers pegged to lost revenue but could be 
provided concurrently with reforms with the aim of preventing future welfare 
losses. In all of these contexts, my usage of the term complements its common 
usage in public economics.15 However, I will have little to say specifically about the 
role of compensation in improving overall social welfare or economic efficiency, and 
will focus primarily on the question of whether compensation is owed on the basis 
of a duty of fairness or justice, either to remedy wrongful harm (“the harm 
rationale”) or to adjust an unfair distribution of costs (“the fairness rationale”).16 
                                                     
11 See for example Michael Faure and Marjan Peeters, eds., Climate change liability (Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar, 2011); and Avner de Shalit, "Climate change refugees, compensation, and 
rectification", The Monist 94, no. 3 (2011). 
12 Compare Pickering and Barry, "On the concept of climate debt" [Chapter 2]. 
13 Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review, 316. 
14 Daniel Butt, Rectifying international injustice: Principles of compensation and restitution between 
nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 22.  
15 See for example John S. Chipman, "Compensation principle" in The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics Online, ed. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
16 In the present context it is not apparent that these two rationales could be brought under a 
common rationale of protecting legitimate expectations; contrast Goodin, "Compensation and 
redistribution", 215. 
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One might seek to distinguish assistance from compensation on the basis that the 
former is only required as matter of charity or humanity rather than in accordance 
with a duty of justice that is stringent (in the sense of taking priority over other 
moral reasons) and demanding (in the sense of requiring duty-bearers to take on 
substantial costs).17 However, some duties to assist those suffering severe 
deprivation could be quite stringent and demanding.18 Conversely there may be 
cases where compensation is required as a matter not of justice but of prudence. 
Consider for example the idea that one could justify compensating vested 
interests—even if they otherwise have no stringent claims to remediation—because 
they would otherwise stymie cooperative action to address harm, as some oil-
exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia have notoriously sought to do since the 
inception of the climate change regime.19 While this line of reasoning may be worth 
pursuing as a “lesser evil” argument or on a welfare-maximising account of 
international negotiations,20 it is important first to clarify the basis on which we can 
distinguish deserving from undeserving claims. 
Conceptually then we should distinguish compensation from assistance on the basis 
that the latter may help affected parties to attain a decent standard of wellbeing 
without necessarily being oriented (as compensation typically is) towards restoring 
a pre-existing state of wellbeing. In the present context—where governments face 
the question of how to respond to a loss that they have had some hand in 
producing—it is thus preferable to evaluate the underlying moral issue as a 
question of compensation, even if governments may find it more politically feasible 
to frame remedial measures as assistance when seeking to obtain public support for 
them. 
                                                     
17 Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland, "The feasible alternatives thesis: Kicking away the 
livelihoods of the global poor", Politics, Philosophy & Economics 11, no. 1 (2012): 98. 
18 Henry Shue, Basic rights: Subsistence, affluence, and U.S. Foreign policy, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). 
19 Joanna Depledge, "Striving for no: Saudi Arabia in the climate change regime", Global 
Environmental Politics 8, no. 4 (2008). 
20 Compare Posner and Weisbach, Climate change justice; Joseph E Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, Fair 
trade for all: How trade can promote development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 205. 
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4.2.2 Characterising the non-compensable loss objection 
Whether or not the analogy between tobacco and climate is entirely apt, it points to 
the idea that regulating climate change forms part of a broader class of cases where 
government actions raise controversial questions of compensation, namely where 
governments act to curb harmful activities.  
4.2.2.1 Economic losses resulting from policies to regulate harm.  
It is common to think that considerations of welfare or justice permit private actors 
to foist some economic losses upon others without compensation in the course of 
voluntary and socially beneficial market activities.21 Nevertheless, the permissibility 
of imposing economic losses on others is widely recognised to be subject to certain 
exceptions, notably where the agent is not a private actor but a government.22 Thus 
governments generally have a duty to provide compensation for expropriation or 
“takings”—as when they acquire private land to construct public roads— because 
such actions infringe upon proprietary or contractual rights.23  
At the same time, the case for government compensation is frequently considered 
to be weaker where affected parties are subjected not to expropriation but rather 
to a decline in income or profit. Thus, in a seminal account of compensation for 
government action, Sidgwick opposed a general rule of compensation for changes 
in asset values by arguing: 
 
such loss will generally be difficult to trace and define: and perhaps the members of a 
progressive community may be supposed to look for minor changes of this kind, and 
                                                     
21 John Stuart Mill, On liberty and other writings, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989 [1859]), 95; Goodin, "Theories of compensation", 57; see also Elizabeth 
Anderson, "How should egalitarians cope with market risks?", Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9 (2008). 
22 Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights, restitution, and risk: Essays in moral theory (Cambridge, MA; 
London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1986), 160-61. 
23 See generally Sidgwick, The elements of politics, Chapter XII; Richard A. Epstein, "The harm 
principle - and how it grew", The University of Toronto Law Journal 45, no. 4 (1995); and Thomson, 
Rights, restitution, and risk: Essays in moral theory, Chapter 10. 
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may within limits be fairly expected to take the bad with the good; as they are likely 
often to receive benefits from new laws for which they are not made to pay.24  
 
He argues that the case for compensation is even narrower where a government 
restricts the exercise of rights that are “opposed to public wellbeing”: 
 
[…] if the line between mischievous and salutary use can be drawn with clearness, I 
conceive that there will be no occasion for compensation, except when a sudden 
change would inflict great hardship on individuals.25 
 
I will return to the issue of severe hardship below. However, for the present it is 
important to note that these two objections to compensation—where regulation 
restricts but does not abrogate proprietary rights, and where governments act to 
deal with public harm—converge in a particular class of cases; that is, where 
governments seek to deter harmful but otherwise lawful activities not by 
prohibiting them outright, but by raising the cost of engaging in them through 
taxation or similar policy instruments.  
4.2.2.2 Costs and benefits arising from regulation 
Let us first set out some shared features of these cases that give rise to problems of 
compensation. Measures to regulate public harms generate a range of costs and 
benefits. These may be regarded collectively as “impacts”, although I will largely use 
the term as shorthand for “adverse impacts” and interchangeably with the terms 
“costs” and “losses”. Regulatory measures for harmful products typically impose 
legal obligations on producers or consumers of those products. Thus domestic 
mechanisms to place a price on greenhouse gas emissions generally impose a legal 
obligation on firms to pay a carbon tax or to purchase permits equivalent to the 
emissions they produce. Similarly, governments may impose tax obligations on 
                                                     
24 Sidgwick, The elements of politics, 194. Michelman makes a similar point: Michelman, "Property, 
utility and fairness: Comments on the ethical foundations of "just compensation" law": 1225. 
25 Sidgwick, The elements of politics, 197. 
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producers of other harmful goods or activities such as tobacco, alcohol and 
gambling. I will refer to this type of cost as (i) direct costs. Measures to regulate 
harm may also generate two types of (ii) indirect costs. First, those who bear the 
direct cost may be able to pass on part or even all of the extra costs to consumers 
or other businesses, depending on market structure and the extent to which their 
competitors are regulated. Producers required to pay a carbon price, for example, 
can usually pass the costs on to consumers, at least in part.26 I refer to these costs 
as (ii)(a) transmitted costs. Second, policies may result in a range of (ii)(b) structural 
adjustment costs on individuals and regions that are not reducible to the 
transmission of the pricing throughout the supply chain of the harmful activity. 
Consider the following example:  
 
Worker: Worker W, a resident of country X, is employed by producer P, which operates 
a heavily polluting factory. X introduces a pollution tax, which diminishes P’s income. 
W loses her job. 
  
The pattern of direct and indirect costs together determines the overall distribution 
of costs or “incidence” of a policy.27 
In addition to these types of costs, taxing public harms may produce a range of 
benefits. Two types of benefits are particularly relevant. The first involves benefits 
from avoided harm, which may accrue to those who consume less of the harmful 
product (e.g. smokers or gamblers) but also to third parties (such as those who will 
enjoy a safer climate or lower health risks from passive smoking), including through 
economy-wide benefits. The second type of benefit involves the revenue raised 
from taxing the harmful activity, which may be used either for fiscal measures to 
address the same harm, for other socially beneficial spending, or to reduce other 
existing taxes (thus conferring financial benefits on a wider group of actors).28 It is 
                                                     
26 Stern, The economics of climate change, 212. 
27 Dorothée Boccanfuso, Antonio Estache, and Luc Savard, "The intra-country distributional impact of 
policies to fight climate change: A survey", Journal of Development Studies 47, no. 1 (2011): 100. 
28 See generally Joseph E. Aldy et al., "Designing climate mitigation policy", Journal of Economic 
Literature 48, no. 4 (2010). In some cases the prospect of revenue may provide a perverse incentive 
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this latter type of benefit that often places the question of compensation into the 
foreground: should government redistribute some or all of the revenue to those 
who bear the costs of regulation? 
4.2.2.3 Justifications for the non-compensable loss objection 
One response to the question just posed is the non-compensable loss objection 
referred to in the introduction whereby no compensation is due to those who suffer 
a loss of income or decline in asset value as a result of government measures to 
regulate harm. The alleged non-compensable nature of climate policy losses is often 
underscored by analogies with measures to regulate smoking. Thus Eckersley 
argues: 
 
It is generally accepted that taxpayers should not be required to compensate the 
tobacco industry for loss of profits or reductions in asset value following the 
introduction of new regulations, and one could argue that the same considerations 
should apply to coal.29 
 
Others have employed the analogy to argue against compensation for consumers: 
 
Carbon pricing is like the taxes imposed on the ‘sin’ industries supplying alcoholic 
beverages, tobacco products and gambling, which are subject to special high excise 
duties or imposts because of the externalities they give rise to on consumer health and 
the welfare of family members and others adversely affected by the consumption of 
these products. […] The government has not compensated drinkers, smokers and 
gamblers. Why should they compensate households for the bad caused by 
[greenhouse gas] emissions embodied in the goods and services they consume?30 
 
                                                     
for governments to tolerate activities that should instead be banned, but given that some emissions 
remain necessary to secure basic needs it is less clear that such a problem applies to the present 
case.  
29 Eckersley, "The politics of carbon leakage and the fairness of border measures": 379-80. 
30 Lloyd, "Designing a carbon price policy: Introduction": 82. 
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These analogies have some intuitive plausibility. Let us now explore whether we can 
also provide them with morally sound justifications.  
We might ground the non-compensable loss objection in both the harm and 
fairness rationales introduced above. First, the imposition of costs on polluters 
(making the “polluter pay”) helps to deter harmful activities (or internalise the costs 
of an environmental “externality”), whereas compensation (“paying the polluter”) 
may blunt the intended deterrent effect.31 Second, measures of this kind are at 
least prima facie consistent with the moral principles that people should be held 
responsible for the harmful effects of their conduct, and that those whose harmful 
activities are the target of regulation should not be entitled to profit from (or retain 
entirely the unfairly acquired benefits of) having caused harm to others.32 These 
ideas are especially stringent and demanding with respect to harmful activities that 
are discretionary on the part of consumers (even if they become addictive, such as 
smoking) or that exceed what is necessary for securing the basic necessities of life 
(such as the “luxury” greenhouse gas emissions of many wealthy countries33). In 
addition, one may plausibly argue that the consent of citizens to their government’s 
regulating certain harms on their behalf represents a core condition of the social 
compact.34 Nevertheless, there are a number of possible counter-arguments to the 
non-compensable loss objection. I turn to these next.  
4.2.3 Disproportionate losses 
Despite the apparent plausibility of the non-compensable loss objection, measures 
to regulate harm may prove unfair. At one extreme, affected parties may have a 
stronger claim for compensation where governments intentionally or negligently 
cause them unnecessary harm that could have been avoided at low cost, as where 
                                                     
31 Louis Kaplow, "An economic analysis of legal transitions", Harvard Law Review 99, no. 3 (1986): 
513. See also Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review: Final report, 397. 
32 Ethan B. Kapstein, Economic justice in an unfair world: Toward a level playing field (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 82; and Shue, "Global environment and international inequality". 
33 Shue, "Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions". 
34 See Epstein, Takings: Private property and the power of eminent domain, 121; and Broome, 
Climate matters, 65. 
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poor financial management undermines global economic stability.35 But that given 
that a range of economic actors typically have an interest in participating in lawful 
but harmful activities, in general it will be difficult to regulate harm without causing 
some initial losses to others. The key question therefore becomes whether 
governments should compensate affected parties for the adverse impacts of 
necessary measures to address public harms, or whether governments should leave 
losses to lie where they fall. 
Even though the non-compensable loss objection is frequently invoked, a concern 
for those who suffer disproportionate losses runs through much of the literature on 
government compensation. Frank A. Michelman, for example, argues: 
 
The clearer it is that the claimant has sustained an injury distinct from those sustained 
by the generality of persons in society, and the more obviously there appears to be 
some objectively satisfactory measure of his disproportionate or distinctive injury, the 
more compelling will his claim to compensation become.36 
  
Likewise, while Eckersley notes the plausibility of characterising coal as the “new 
tobacco” and the corresponding weakness of coal producers’ claims for 
compensation, she argues that in both the tobacco and coal cases the fact that 
“many workers and regions dependent on a harmful industry will bear a 
disproportionate burden of adjustment should certainly be the legitimate concern 
of policy-makers”.37  
To see how disproportionate losses could occur under the class of measures we are 
discussing, it is important to recall the distinction between direct and indirect costs. 
The fact that a small number of large producers (such as emissions-intensive 
manufacturing industries) will bear the lion’s share of direct costs hardly means that 
                                                     
35 Matt Peterson and Christian Barry, "Who must pay for the damage of the global financial crisis?" in 
Global financial crisis:The ethical issues, ed. Ned Dobos, Christian Barry, and Thomas Pogge 
(Palgrave: Macmillan, 2011). 
36 Michelman, "Property, utility and fairness: Comments on the ethical foundations of "just 
compensation" law": 1217.  
37 Eckersley, "The politics of carbon leakage and the fairness of border measures": 379-80. 
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those industries are being unfairly targeted. In most cases their burden is 
proportionate to their share of producing the harm, and in any case, the initial 
imposts are likely to be spread among a much wider range of consumers. Moreover, 
even if polluters are more commonly understood as those who produce the 
pollution, it is not disproportionate per se for indirect costs to fall on consumers. 
For we should surely attribute responsibility for pollution not only to those who 
burn the fossil fuels themselves, but also to those who stimulate demand for 
polluting activities (including consumers) as well as others along the supply chain 
(including fuel exporters and investors).38 Even if direct and indirect (i.e. transmitted 
or structural adjustment) costs combine to impose burdens in a way that is 
proportionate to causal responsibility for harm, the overall distribution of costs 
could still be unfair if it is disproportionate to (i) affected parties’ moral 
responsibility for the harm or (ii) their capacity to cope with the impacts of the 
regulation without sustaining (in Sidgwick’s phrase) “severe hardship”.  
Consider an application of the Worker case under a carbon pricing policy. Even if 
policies justifiably impose direct and transmitted indirect costs on those in the 
supply chain, some structural adjustment costs (such as unemployment) may be 
concentrated on individuals in the supply chain out of all proportion to their degree 
of responsibility for the problem as producers or consumers. A second problem is 
that indirect costs may tend to fall on the least capable. In the Worker case, the loss 
may be disproportionate not only in relation to her degree of responsibility but also 
in relation to her limited capacity to transition to alternative forms of employment, 
a concern shared by many low-skilled workers in manufacturing industries. 
Furthermore, the major distributional effects of measures to tax consumption are 
generally regressive, in that they fall relatively harder on poorer consumers.39 In the 
case of climate policies, for example, the purchase of emissions-intensive goods and 
                                                     
38 Paul G. Harris and Jonathan Symons, "Norm conflict in climate governance: Greenhouse gas 
accounting and the problem of consumption", Global Environmental Politics 13, no. 1 (2012); Karl 
Steininger et al., "Justice and cost effectiveness of consumption-based versus production-based 
approaches in the case of unilateral climate policies", Global Environmental Change In press 
(Forthcoming). 
39 Milena Büchs, Nicholas Bardsley, and Sebastian Duwe, "Who bears the brunt? Distributional 
effects of climate change mitigation policies", Critical Social Policy 31, no. 2 (2011): 289. 
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services such as fuel and electricity make up a higher proportion of poorer 
households’ incomes.40 
4.2.4 Taking the bad with the good 
How then should we respond to disproportionate losses? Even if we cannot ignore 
them altogether, one might reply (as Sidgwick suggests above) that at least some 
impacts may be left uncompensated as they are likely to be offset by other benefits. 
Let us consider two types of offsetting benefits. First, as noted above, in many cases 
measures to regulate harm will provide benefits to affected parties in the form of 
avoided harm. Smokers, for example, are likely to enjoy substantial health benefits 
even in the short term if policies encourage them to smoke less or quit altogether. 
However, given the inertia in the global climate system, mitigation measures will 
take some decades to bring about a noticeable slowing in temperature rise. Thus 
the bulk of the intended benefits of mitigation will accrue to future generations, 
while producers and consumers today bear the primary costs.41 Nevertheless, 
mitigation may also yield some short-term benefits, such as better health due to 
improved air quality, and as scientific evidence for these benefits improves it may 
be that those benefits alone could justify the costs of acting on climate change in 
some regions.42 
A second type of offsetting benefit could arise where affected parties benefit from 
other policies enacted by the same government. At the domestic level, since 
measures adopted by a government directly affect its own citizens on a wide range 
of issues, some disadvantages to a citizen resulting from one reform could be 
evened out by advantages from other reforms over time. However, some impacts 
such as long-term unemployment may be so severe that they could hardly be 
                                                     
40 Boccanfuso, Estache, and Savard, "The intra-country distributional impact of policies to fight 
climate change: A survey": 106-07. 
41 Gardiner, A perfect moral storm: The ethical tragedy of climate change, 32-34. Compare also Aaron 
James’ argument that only offsetting benefits occurring within a person’s lifetime should count 
towards estimating fair shares of the benefits of global trade: Aaron James, Fairness in practice: A 
social contract for a global economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 139. 
42 J. Jason West et al., "Co-benefits of mitigating global greenhouse gas emissions for future air 
quality and human health", Nature Climate Change 3, no. 10 (2013). 
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outweighed by other benefits. Moreover, economy-wide measures such as carbon 
pricing may be substantial enough to affect the socially progressive distribution of 
resources that a country’s taxation and social welfare system seeks to achieve.43 
Taking these considerations together, the argument that affected parties should 
take the bad with the good is likely to be weaker where—as for climate change but 
less so for smoking—a large share of the benefits of regulation will occur in future 
and the act of regulation produces systemic adverse effects on the distribution of 
resources within society. 
4.3 Does the non-compensable loss objection hold for transnational 
impacts? 
4.3.1 Characterising the transnational compensation problem 
Let us turn now to the question of whether the responsibilities we have identified at 
the domestic level carry over to the transnational level. At the outset we need to 
establish whether there is a sufficient degree of conceptual and empirical similarity 
between the two cases to ground a comparison of the merits of compensation in 
each case. Here I address the extent of similarity between the domestic and 
transnational levels on two dimensions: the structure of costs and benefits 
associated with regulation; and the policy mechanisms available for redistributing 
costs.  
4.3.1.1 Transnational costs and benefits 
Whereas in an isolated domestic case the overall policy costs distributed across an 
enacting country are roughly equivalent to the sum of the costs and benefits of its 
own policy, in a transnational case the overall costs that a country faces will include 
not only (i) any national costs and benefits resulting from policies that it enacts 
itself, but also (ii) any transnational costs and benefits resulting from policies 
addressing the same issue that are enacted in other countries.44 I focus here 
                                                     
43 Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review, 393. 
44 Compare the categories used in Michael Lüken et al., "The role of technological availability for the 
distributive impacts of climate change mitigation policy", Energy Policy 39, no. 10 (2011). In the 
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primarily on cases where the enacting country is an industrialised country and the 
affected country is a developing country, but we could envisage circumstances 
where the roles are reversed. Transnational costs may be broken down into 
categories that mirror those applicable to domestic costs. First, an enacting country 
may introduce a policy that imposes direct costs on other countries (let us call these 
(i) transnational direct costs). Thus a country adopting a carbon price on domestic 
production may erect border measures that have the effect of imposing a carbon 
price on imported goods.45 Second, climate policies may also produce a range of (ii) 
transnational indirect costs. Second, whether or not a tax directly applies to 
foreigners, the resulting tax burden may do so by changing the prices of 
internationally traded commodities, as where affected countries face higher prices 
for importing emissions-intensive goods from enacting countries ((ii)(a) 
transnational transmitted costs). A carbon price could also flow to other parts of the 
supply chain of the harmful activity that are located overseas, including to firms 
that extract fossil fuels in one country to be burnt in another country: 
 
Exporter: Producer P, located in country Y, extracts oil and exports it to country X. X 
introduces a national carbon price, which reduces demand for oil in X. P’s income falls. 
 
A final type of transnational impact involves (ii)(b) transnational structural 
adjustment costs. Thus we could envisage a transnational variant of the Worker 
case introduced above. Transnational structural adjustment costs could take the 
form of economy-wide impacts in affected countries such as higher unemployment 
or a decline in public revenue (although in some countries there may be positive 
effects on employment and public revenue).  
                                                     
climate change context, national costs would include the costs of domestic action as well those 
arising from international emissions trading, but for present purposes it is not necessary to elaborate 
on the latter aspect further.  
45 See generally Eckersley, "The politics of carbon leakage and the fairness of border measures": 369-
70; Michael Grubb, "International climate finance from border carbon cost levelling", Climate Policy 
11, no. 3 (2011). 
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Likewise the benefit of avoided harm may accrue to foreigners, although in many 
cases the benefit of revenue will accrue at least initially only to the enacting 
country, not to the affected country. 
4.3.1.2 Mechanisms for distributing costs 
Even if we may identify similar categories of costs at both the domestic and 
transnational levels, an important difference from the isolated domestic case is that 
the extent of transnational impacts may be affected by more or less coordinated 
international efforts to distribute the costs of regulating harm among enacting and 
affected countries. In some cases, coordination could be necessary simply because 
the supply chain for harmful goods crosses borders (as in the example of cigarettes 
or conventional weapons). However, in the case of transboundary pollution 
problems coordination may be required for the further reason that countries face a 
collective action problem: while it may be collectively rational for each country to 
pollute less, it is individually rational for each not to do so because other countries 
may free-ride on the actions of enacting countries.46 In both cases two policy 
mechanisms are typically central to distributing the costs of the collective effort: (i) 
agreeing to a division of self-funded domestic efforts; and (ii) resource transfers 
from one or more countries to support efforts in other countries (typically from 
wealthy to poor countries). The redistribution of costs under these methods is 
occasionally referred to as “compensation”47 but more commonly as burden-
sharing or effort-sharing. In any case, it is important to distinguish this 
understanding of compensation—where states expressly agree to distribute costs 
(typically direct costs) in a particular way—from the issue of compensation arising 
from subsequent impacts that are not the express subject of prior agreement. 
Enacting countries typically have a degree of discretion over how they fulfil their 
international commitments, and the domestic policies they select may have greater 
or lesser impacts on other countries. These impacts are not automatically factored 
                                                     
46 Barrett, Environment and statecraft: The strategy of environmental treaty-making. 
47 See for example Theodore Panayotou, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Alix Peterson Zwane, "Compensation 
for “meaningful participation” in climate change control: A modest proposal and empirical analysis", 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43, no. 3 (2002). 
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into either of the two methods for distributing costs. At the international level, 
therefore, a key question is whether enacting countries should compensate 
affected countries for indirect transnational costs, either by adjusting the 
distribution of domestic efforts or through separate resource transfers. 
4.3.2 Are transnational losses too hard to trace? 
So far we have identified some conceptual resemblances between the categories of 
costs at the transnational and domestic levels, as well as several differences due to 
the effects of coordination on the distribution of climate policy impacts. We might 
nevertheless object to the analogy on the empirical ground that there is little point 
doing anything about transnational impacts since losses transmitted through the 
global economy are too difficult to trace. Jon Barnett and Suraje Dessai, for 
example, argue in relation to oil-exporting countries that “the extent of lost 
revenues to be compensated would be impossible to define with certainty”.48  
Quantifying the overall transnational impacts of domestic policies is challenging for 
a number of reasons. First, impacts flowing from one country’s policy may be 
difficult to disentangle from the impacts of (i) policies enacted by other countries to 
address the same harm or (ii) other factors influencing global economic conditions, 
including the impacts of the harm that is being regulated (e.g. the impacts of 
climate change).49 For example, oil price fluctuations due to climate policy measures 
are likely to be much smaller—at least in the shorter term—than those caused by 
other factors influencing the global economy.50 Counterfactual estimates of lost 
revenue can only be made through sophisticated modelling of global economic 
conditions, which is highly sensitive to methodological and empirical assumptions.51 
Second, as discussed in section 4.2.4, further complexities arise in calculating any 
offsetting benefits. 
                                                     
48 Barnett and Dessai, "Adverse effects and the impacts of response measures": 235. 
49 Axel Michaelowa, "Can insurance deal with negative effects arising from climate policy 
measures?", Climate Policy 6, no. 6 (2006): 676. 
50 Jon Barnett, Suraje Dessai, and Michael Webber, "Will OPEC lose from the Kyoto protocol?", 
Energy Policy 32, no. 18 (2004): 2080. 
51 Not least how oil exporters respond to changes in demand through the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel: ibid. 
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Nevertheless, these complexities should not rule out transnational claims from 
consideration altogether. It is not clear that all indirect transnational impacts 
resulting from climate policies will be impossibly difficult to quantify. For example, 
the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition has stated that 
“hardly anybody today contests the fact that biofuel production was a major factor 
in the recent food price increases”, and that increased production was largely 
stimulated by climate-related policies to encourage biofuel consumption in wealthy 
countries.52 In any case, it is overly demanding to expect complete certainty of 
attribution in these cases when in other contexts we recognise the moral 
imperative to address deprivation even where we have incomplete information 
about its attribution.53 For example, despite difficulties in quantifying the economic 
impacts of climate change itself,54 developed countries have made substantial 
funding commitments to address adaptation in developing countries. Nevertheless, 
as we will see below, uncertainty about indirect costs may have a range of 
implications for how they are handled under the global climate change regime. 
4.3.3 Do states have stringent duties to remedy transnational losses?  
Now that we have established a conceptual and empirical foothold for the 
transnational analogy, let us consider whether the moral considerations discussed 
in the domestic case strengthen or weaken the argument that governments have 
stringent compensatory duties at the transnational level. These considerations 
appear to pull in opposing directions. On the one hand, the case for compensation 
transnationally could be stronger in circumstances where governments cannot 
absolve themselves by appealing to the idea that foreigners have consented to 
“take the bad with the good” (as their own citizens arguably have in the domestic 
context). On the other hand, if governments have no relevant duties of justice to 
                                                     
52 HLPE, "Price volatility and food security" (Rome: The High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security 
and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security, 2011), 40, 32. 
53 Compare Barry, "Applying the contribution principle". 
54 Dáithí A. Stone and Myles R. Allen, "The end-to-end attribution problem: From emissions to 
impacts", Climatic Change 71, no. 3 (2005); World Bank, "Economics of adaptation to climate 
change: Synthesis report" (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010). 
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outsiders, no compensation may be due at all. I will address these two points in 
turn. 
4.3.3.1 Taking the bad without the good? 
Duties to remedy harm are often thought not to weaken across borders to the same 
extent as duties of distributive justice.55 One could argue that duties to remedy 
harm persist in the face of the non-compensable loss objection because it is unclear 
that affected countries benefit specifically from the policies of enacting countries 
enough to annul any grievances about the adverse impacts of particular policies. 
Admittedly, policies enacted elsewhere may produce some short-term benefits for 
affected countries. Oil-exporting countries could benefit to some extent from 
climate policies enacted elsewhere through factors such as increased demand for 
cheaper oil in countries without a carbon price and reduced vulnerability to oil price 
shocks.56 However, short-term benefits such as improved air quality will accrue 
primarily to enacting countries, and the benefits of greatest value to affected 
countries—in particular a safer climate—will only materialise in the longer term.57 
Nor can we be sure that the benefits of other policies introduced by enacting 
countries will be sufficient to outweigh any adverse impacts. While debate remains 
over the relative influence of international and domestic factors on people’s life 
prospects,58 many offsetting benefits transmitted across borders are likely to be 
difficult to quantify for similar reasons to those relating to quantifying transnational 
costs. To be sure, the participation of affected countries in the global economy 
provides a conduit not only for transmitting the impacts of domestic policies across 
borders, but also for receiving benefits that countries may not have to pay for (such 
                                                     
55 Thomas Pogge, World poverty and human rights: Cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms, 2nd 
ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2008), 136-37. 
56 Barnett, Dessai, and Webber, "Will OPEC lose from the Kyoto protocol?"; Michaelowa, "Can 
insurance deal with negative effects arising from climate policy measures?": 676. 
57 Note, however, that some affected countries—notably OPEC countries—have amassed substantial 
sovereign wealth funds that are intended to benefit future generations, and it would be reasonable 
for the current generation to draw on some of this funding to offset some of the costs it is incurring 
for their benefit. Economist, "Largest sovereign-wealth funds", 10 March 2011. 
58 Pogge, World poverty and human rights; Mathias Risse, "How does the global order harm the 
poor?", Philosophy & Public Affairs 33, no. 4 (2005). 
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as the diffusion of new technologies). But we cannot take for granted that the 
benefits that countries enjoy from global trade are sufficient to set aside any claims 
they may have for remedying adverse trade-related impacts. Indeed there is ample 
evidence that unfair trade practices perpetuate—or at least fail to alleviate—
hardship in developing countries by limiting their trading opportunities through 
import tariffs and domestic subsidies.59 
Even if affected countries receive from enacting countries benefits that are 
sufficient to offset transnational losses, affected countries may not have consented 
to waive their claims to compensation. The absence of outsiders’ democratic 
consent to harm may help to explain why in some cases governments offer greater 
protections against harm to foreigners than to their own citizens (as in international 
investment law).60 Goodin invokes the absence of a democratic voice for foreigners 
in proposing a much more comprehensive obligation to compensate those 
adversely affected by the decisions of other countries: 
  
There is no prohibition on affecting interests that have no say. International law and 
public economics require, instead, simply that any interests that are affected ought be 
compensated. […] Purely as a matter of democratic third best, the price of not 
enfranchising everyone we ideally should is that we would have to pay them off for 
any harms we inflict upon them and accede to their demands for fair recompense for 
any benefits we derive from the wrongfully disenfranchised.61 
 
This seems overly broad, both as a statement of current international law and as a 
normative principle. Under general international law economic losses are subject to 
fewer restrictions than other types of transnational harm such as the use of military 
                                                     
59 Pogge, World poverty and human rights, Chapter 4; James, Fairness in practice: A social contract 
for a global economy, Chapter 1. 
60 See Goodin, "What is so special about our fellow countrymen?"; and Steven R. Ratner, "Regulatory 
takings in institutional context: Beyond the fear of fragmented international law", The American 
Journal of International Law 102, no. 3 (2008): 483. 
61 Robert E. Goodin, "Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives", Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 35, no. 1 (2007): 67. 
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force or environmental damage.62 Normative theorists likewise often consider 
duties to remedy losses that are aggregated and transmitted through the global 
economy to be less stringent than those associated with more direct forms of 
transboundary harm.63 Moreover, the moral and economic reasons outlined above 
for holding polluters responsible for their harmful actions extend readily to 
economic losses at the transnational level as well, thus providing grounds for 
thinking that the non-compensable loss objection may apply even in the absence of 
domestic consent. Finally, Goodin’s formulation does not explicitly account for the 
possibility that even if cross-border interests are not represented in domestic 
decision-making, democratically legitimate states could nevertheless waive some 
claims to compensation through mutual consent, as they have largely done 
(whether or not entirely with good reason) under the global trade regime.64 From 
these considerations we may infer that a free-standing harm rationale is likely to be 
insufficient to guide our judgments about compensation for transnational impacts. 
A more promising avenue is to evaluate the ways in which any cooperative 
arrangements may inform duties to redistribute costs under the fairness rationale. 
This approach may also help to avoid the concern raised in relation to expansive 
conceptions of global harm that they are too open-ended or overly demanding.65 
4.3.3.2 Associative duties 
Cooperative or coercive institutional arrangements at the global level may play a 
dual role in relation to compensation claims. On the one hand, sufficiently 
systematic patterns of cooperation may form the basis for limited associative duties 
                                                     
62 Maziar Jamnejad and Michael Wood, "The principle of non-intervention", Leiden Journal of 
International Law 22, no. 2 (2009), 370-71; Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, International law and the 
environment. 
63 See Judith Lichtenberg, "Negative duties, positive duties, and the 'new harms'", Ethics 120, no. 3 
(2010); and Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland, "Are trade subsidies and tariffs killing the global 
poor?", Social Research 79, no. 4 (2012). For a contrasting view see Pogge, World poverty and human 
rights: Cosmopolitan responsibilities and reforms, Chapter 5. 
64 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) may require countries to dismantle discriminatory trade 
measures, but typically without any retrospective compensation for resulting losses. See Marco 
Bronckers and Naboth van den Broek, "Financial compensation in the WTO", Journal of International 
Economic Law 8, no. 1 (2005). 
65 Lichtenberg, "Negative duties, positive duties, and the 'new harms'". 
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of distributive justice and corresponding duties of compensation where costs are 
distributed unfairly.66 On the other hand, those arrangements may give affected 
countries reasons to waive claims to compensation where doing so would advance 
other legitimate moral concerns. 
Let us grant that common participation in the global economy may give rise to at 
least some duties to share the gains of trade fairly.67 Even if we do so, arguments 
for climate policy compensation face the problem that there are often good reasons 
for modifying a prima facie fair distribution of the gains from trade in order to 
enable governments to pursue their national and collective interests in regulating 
harms. The world trading regime recognises this concern by identifying a range of 
public policy exemptions from standard trade liberalisation obligations, including 
protecting public health and exhaustible natural resources.68 These exemptions 
provide countries with some scope to regulate harms such as smoking and 
environmental degradation. However, it is less clear that appealing to the overall 
trade regime will yield duties sufficiently precise to account for the possibility that 
some policy impacts could remain unfair even if they do not substantially distort the 
overall gains from trade.69  
A more promising avenue would be to explore whether duties could plausibly flow 
from systematic and coordinated efforts to address specific harms, particularly 
those that are regulated by international conventions such as climate change, 
tobacco control, and more recently, trade in conventional arms.70 Under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; hereafter the “climate 
                                                     
66 Lea Ypi, Robert E. Goodin, and Christian Barry, "Associative duties, global justice, and the 
colonies", Philosophy and Public Affairs 37, no. 2 (2009); Valentini, Justice in a globalized world: A 
normative framework.  
67 See for example Darrel Moellendorf, "The world trade organization and egalitarian justice", 
Metaphilosophy 36, no. 1/2 (2005); Stiglitz and Charlton, Fair trade for all: How trade can promote 
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68 See World Trade Organization, "Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" (1994), Article XX; James, 
Fairness in practice: A social contract for a global economy, 160. 
69 Contrast James, Fairness in practice, 327. 
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convention”), for example, espouses the principle that parties have “common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR&RC) for protecting 
the climate system.71 This principle is widely invoked as an “ethical yardstick” for 
evaluating the distribution of the costs of addressing climate change.72 This 
principle is often interpreted to require national mitigation efforts to be distributed 
in a way that is proportionate to countries’ causal responsibility (measured in terms 
of current or historical emissions) and economic capacity (measured in terms of 
national income).73 The climate convention also contains a provision relating to 
climate policy impacts: 
 
Parties shall give full consideration to what actions are necessary under the 
Convention, including actions related to funding, insurance and the transfer of 
technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties 
arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the 
implementation of response measures….74 
 
While this provision could likewise be seen as an outworking of the principle of 
CBDR&RC, it falls short of imposing a definite commitment of funding, let alone one 
of compensation.75 The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the climate convention places a 
more wide-ranging obligation on developed country parties to “minimize adverse 
effects, including the adverse effects of climate change, effects on international 
trade, and social, environmental and economic impacts on other Parties”, but 
likewise does not incorporate determinate funding commitments.76 While these 
provisions are compatible with the idea that enacting countries may owe 
                                                     
71 UNFCCC, Article 3.1.  
72 Eckersley, "The politics of carbon leakage and the fairness of border measures": 369. 
73 See for example Baer et al., "Greenhouse development rights". 
74 UNFCCC, Article 4.8; emphasis added. 
75 Daniel Bodansky, "The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A commentary", 
Yale Journal of International Law 18 (1993): 531. 
76 Article 2.3; emphasis added. See also Kyoto Protocol, Article 3.14. More recent political (but not 
legally binding) decisions have also included references not only to minimising but also to “avoiding” 
adverse effects: UNFCCC, "The Cancún Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative action under the Convention", part III.E. 
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compensation or assistance in some instances, any such claims would need to rely 
on justifications that are supplementary to those contained in the climate 
convention. 
4.3.4 Disproportionate losses across borders 
This leads us then to a question parallel to one that we addressed at the domestic 
level: if national mitigation targets are distributed fairly, could the resulting 
distribution of transnational economic impacts still give rise to disproportionate 
losses? Let us use the same criteria for disproportionate loss as we did at the 
domestic level: losses that fall on those bearing the least moral responsibility or 
capability. We could see such an approach as compatible with the CBDR&RC 
principle, as well as giving substance to a principle expressed elsewhere in the 
climate convention: 
 
The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, especially 
those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and of 
those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have to bear a 
disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given full 
consideration.77 
 
There are some reasons for expecting that a fair distribution of direct climate policy 
costs will be less likely to lead to an unfair distribution of indirect costs at the 
transnational level than at the domestic level. Whereas within industrialised 
countries the correlation between a household’s income and its emissions is not 
particularly strong (and thus a uniform carbon price will tend to generate the 
regressive effects discussed above),78 the correlation between national income and 
emissions worldwide is considerably stronger.79 In general then we may expect that 
                                                     
77 UNFCCC, Article 3.2; emphasis added. 
78 Büchs, Bardsley, and Duwe, "Who bears the brunt? Distributional effects of climate change 
mitigation policies": 296. 
79 Thomas Bassetti, Nikos Benos, and Stelios Karagiannis, "CO2 emissions and income dynamics: 
What does the global evidence tell us?", Environmental and Resource Economics 54, no. 1 (2013). 
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if (i) wealthier countries share a greater burden of the direct costs of global 
mitigation, and (ii) the indirect costs of climate policies fall primarily on enacting 
countries,80 then (iii) the least responsible and capable countries (i.e. poorer, 
low-emitting countries) will not bear a disproportionate degree of the total costs of 
global climate policy. Nevertheless, this expectation may not hold for two reasons.  
First, even if countries distribute direct mitigation costs according to proviso (i), 
proviso (ii) may not hold. Thus, some economic modelling suggests that mitigation 
will impose higher costs on some affected countries than on enacting countries due 
to their geographic circumstances and economic structure.81 Regulation of 
international transport emissions, for example, could adversely affect many small 
island states, which are widely considered to have limited options for economic 
diversification due to their small size, limited natural resources and geographic 
remoteness.82 
Second, even if the first two provisos hold, the conclusion may not follow, 
particularly if the climate policies of a particular country affect other countries in a 
way that is more or less unrelated to their role in the production or consumption of 
emissions. Consider, for example, the impact of developed countries’ mandates for 
biofuel consumption on global food prices, an issue that has come to prominence 
during recent periods of unusually high food prices.83 Competition between biofuel 
crops and food crops for scarce land and water resources could push up food prices, 
disadvantaging those in poorer countries who are reliant on food purchases 
                                                     
80 As found in Lüken et al., "The role of technological availability for the distributive impacts of 
climate change mitigation policy": 6037. 
81 T Barker et al., "Mitigation from a cross-sectoral perspective" in In climate change 2007: 
Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ed. B. Metz, et al. (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 668; Christoph Böhringer, Carolyn Fischer, and Einar Rosendahl 
Knut, "The global effects of subglobal climate policies", The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 
10, no. 2 (2010): 29. 
82 Mark McGillivray, Wim Naudé, and Amelia Santos-Paulino, "Small island states development 
challenges: Introduction", Journal of International Development 20, no. 4 (2008). 
83 See HLPE, "Biofuels and food security" (Rome: The High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security 
and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security, 2013). 
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(including many in countries such as Brazil whose national income may nevertheless 
be increased by food or biofuel exports).84 Thus: 
 
Food Consumer. Country X introduces a biofuels mandate. Country Y increases its 
production of biofuels and exports them to X. The price of food in Y rises. Many 
residents of Y must pay more to obtain enough food. 
  
There is evidence, for example, that biofuel mandates have driven up food prices 
not only in countries growing biofuels but also in poor countries such as 
Mozambique that are dependent on food imports and therefore subject to the 
impact of biofuel production on global market prices.85 
Importantly, the account of disproportionate losses that I have provided does not 
support the claim made by some developing countries that any losses falling on 
developing countries are disproportionate.86 While the idea of “differentiated” 
responsibilities could be taken to require a substantial degree of progressivity in the 
allocation of the costs of climate policy, the fact that such responsibilities are also 
“common” suggests that there is no solid justification for prohibiting adverse effects 
on developing countries altogether without attention to variations in responsibility 
and capacity between and within developing countries.87 For example, regulatory 
measures that fall on wealthy citizens regardless of whether they live in developed 
or developing countries—as in the case of levies on airline travel—are surely not in 
principle disproportionate in the sense I have outlined.88 
                                                     
84 Existing biofuel mandates also appear to have increased price volatility, which adversely affects 
sellers as well as buyers of food. See Kimberly Elliott, "Subsidizing farmers and biofuels in rich 
countries: An incoherent agenda for food security" CGD Policy Paper 032 (September 2013) 
(Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2013), 27. 
85 HLPE, "Biofuels and food security", 16. 
86 Compare AGF, "Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change 
Financing" (New York: United Nations, 2010). 
87 Pickering, Vanderheiden, and Miller, "‘If equity’s in, we’re out’" [Chapter 3].  
88 Cameron Hepburn and Benito Müller, "International air travel and greenhouse gas emissions: A 
proposal for an adaptation levy", World Economy 33, no. 6 (2010). 
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Similarly, even if some costs fall more heavily on individual developing countries 
than on enacting countries, the resulting losses may not necessarily be 
disproportionate. Thus, although the high exposure of oil-extracting countries to 
the impacts of fossil fuel regulation is due in some measure to the arbitrary 
distribution of natural resource endowments across sovereign territories,89 this 
alone does not mean it would be unfair for them to bear significant costs. Despite 
still being classed as “developing” countries under the climate change regime, many 
long-standing oil exporters have become wealthy through their exports, thus 
providing them with the wherewithal to avoid losses by expanding into less 
emissions-intensive sectors such as renewable energy or services.90 There are only 
very few cases of oil-exporting countries that remain poor, one being Angola, which 
has only recently begun to exploit its oil reserves.91  
4.4 Fulfilling responsibilities for compensation 
Thus far we have established that both domestic and transnational impacts could 
override the non-compensable loss objection, in particular where they give rise to 
losses that are disproportionate and not outweighed by offsetting benefits. In this 
section I bring together the domestic and transnational levels for two purposes: to 
address concerns common to both levels about the scope of compensatory 
responsibilities; and to explore whether policy arrangements for fulfilling those 
responsibilities should take an integrated approach to addressing domestic and 
transnational impacts. 
                                                     
89 Compare Charles R. Beitz, Political theory and international relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999 [1979]). 
90 The International Energy Agency has estimated that the solar power generation potential in the 
Middle East and North Africa is much larger than total global energy demand: IEA, "Renewable 
energy: Markets and prospects by region" Information paper (Paris: International Energy Agency, 
2011), 70. 
91 Compare Malawi, which is one of the few low-income countries whose economy is heavily 
dependent on tobacco production: Martin G. Otañez, Hadii M. Mamudu, and Stanton A. Glantz, 
"Tobacco companies’ use of developing countries’ economic reliance on tobacco to lobby against 
global tobacco control: The case of Malawi", American Journal of Public Health 99, no. 10 (2009).  
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4.4.1 Could we rely on a single policy instrument to achieve a proportionate 
distribution of costs? 
So far I have suggested a two-pronged approach to a distribution of the costs of 
regulating harm: aiming for a proportionate distribution of direct costs across the 
spectrum of responsibilities and capabilities, but only providing compensation 
where the distribution of overall costs results in disproportionate losses for the 
least responsible or capable. But would it not be preferable simply to adjust the 
distribution of direct costs in order to achieve a proportionate distribution of overall 
costs?  
We could describe this as a “holist” approach that uses a single policy instrument to 
distribute a variety of costs (as opposed to an “atomist” approach that uses 
separate instruments for different objectives).92 Domestic policies could pursue 
such an approach by exempting certain parties from the tax, issuing emissions 
entitlements free of charge, or by otherwise differentiating the tax burden 
according to a party’s circumstances. International cooperation could seek to 
introduce similar adjustments when distributing national harm mitigation efforts. In 
some cases such a strategy may be warranted, for example in order to offset the 
impacts of a carbon price on emissions-intensive industries that will be unable to 
keep up with competitors based in other countries that lack a carbon price.93 
Moreover, some theorists have explicitly argued that national climate change 
mitigation efforts should be shared on the basis of the economic costs of mitigation 
for each country (e.g. requiring countries to dedicate a uniform proportion of their 
national income towards mitigation).94 
However, relying on the adjustment of direct costs as a strategy for addressing 
indirect costs raises several concerns. First, exemptions are likely to make the policy 
                                                     
92 Compare Simon Caney’s distinction between “holist” and “atomist” theories of climate policy 
Caney, "Just emissions": 258. 
93 Any such exceptions should be balanced against considerations of efficacy and whether they 
unfairly protect domestic industries: for a more detailed discussion see Garnaut, The Garnaut 
Climate Change Review, 316-17, 344-45 and Eckersley, "The politics of carbon leakage and the 
fairness of border measures": 375-77. 
94 Miller, "Global justice and climate change", 146. 
155 
 
less cost-effective.95 Second, exemptions may undermine the desired deterrent 
effect for groups at particular risk of harm (such as discouraging low-income groups 
from smoking). Third, exemptions could give firms or countries an incentive to shirk 
their share of direct costs by making excessive and unsubstantiated claims about 
the indirect costs that they face.96 Finally, tax adjustments may not be capable of 
benefiting those suffering disproportionate losses for, as we have seen above, 
adverse impacts may fall either on those who are not subject to a tax or whose 
losses are far greater than their tax liability. In particular, compensation to firms 
may not flow through to disadvantaged workers but instead to shareholders.  
At the international level, one option for compensating affected parties facing high 
climate policy costs would be to allocate them a generous quantity of emissions 
permits that they could sell to offset their costs. In principle this should not 
compromise the efficiency benefits of international emissions trading.97 However, 
since states generally retain some discretion over how they fulfil their international 
commitments, it may not be possible to specify the level of compensation required 
upfront if the impacts of domestic policy implementation have not yet materialised. 
Finally, given the complex ways in which taxation or the distribution of national 
mitigation targets affect economic activity, it may be difficult to predict the precise 
distribution of overall costs that an adjustment in direct costs will achieve. 
4.4.2 Tradeoffs between regulating harm and compensating for the effects of 
regulation 
Even if we acknowledge the need for an atomist approach to policy instruments, we 
might still maintain that it is desirable to adopt a holist view about applicable 
distributive principles, in that the combination of policy instruments should aim for 
proportionality in overall costs. Whether such a view is appropriate may depend on 
the magnitude and urgency of the particular harm that governments are seeking to 
                                                     
95 Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins, "The promise and problems of pricing carbon: Theory and 
experience", The Journal of Environment & Development 21, no. 2 (2012). 
96 Compare Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review, 315-16. 
97 See N Höhne, Michel den Elzen, and M Weiss, "Common but differentiated convergence (cdc): A 
new conceptual approach to long-term climate policy", Climate Policy 6, no. 2 (2006): 184; Aldy and 
Stavins, "The promise and problems of pricing carbon: Theory and experience": 171.  
156 
 
regulate. However, at least in the context of climate change I believe there are two 
reasons for arguing that compensation should focus on remedying disproportionate 
losses rather than achieving strict proportionality. First, while macroeconomic 
models are increasingly capable of producing holistic assessments of the incidence 
of carbon pricing policies,98 such assessments remain sensitive to a range of 
methodological assumptions, and in many cases the distinction between strictly and 
roughly proportionate distributions will be extremely blurry.  
Second, from a government’s point of view, the goals of addressing the original 
harm and remedying the side effects of regulation tend to encroach on one 
another: for example, the more that governments spend on remediating climate 
policy impacts, the less will be available to channel carbon pricing revenue towards 
fiscal measures that help mitigate or adapt to climate change itself (e.g. investing in 
the research and development of new technologies). Since the losses that could 
result from a significantly warmer climate far outstrip the losses that could result 
from climate policies, addressing the former should have a distinctly higher priority 
than addressing the latter.99 This is not to imply that the urgency of addressing 
global harms must necessarily displace obligations to address the indirect impacts 
of regulation if countries can do so at reasonable cost. Indeed Nicholas Stern has 
argued that “transfers to compensate countries facing disproportionately large and 
costly adjustments to the structure of their economies could also be borne at 
relatively small cost, if distributed evenly at a global level”.100 For similar reasons, 
the urgency of addressing the existing impacts of climate change (or for that matter 
eliminating global poverty) provides no good reason for displacing spending on 
climate change mitigation efforts.101 However, achieving a strictly proportionate 
distribution of overall costs in wealthy countries is likely to be significantly more 
expensive in wealthier countries and could divert a much larger proportion of 
available revenue. Focusing compensatory measures on restoring disproportionate 
                                                     
98 Boccanfuso, Estache, and Savard, "The intra-country distributional impact of policies to fight 
climate change ": 101-03. 
99 Barnett and Dessai, "Adverse effects and the impacts of response measures": 237. 
100 Stern, The economics of climate change, 259. 
101 Gardiner, "Ethics and climate change: An introduction", 61. 
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losses would therefore help to achieve an appropriate balance between the 
priorities of addressing the primary harm while addressing the most severe 
instances of secondary harm. 
4.4.3 Distributing responsibilities for domestic and international compensation 
In an isolated domestic setting it may be clear enough who bears the responsibility 
for compensating for disproportionate regulatory impacts: the government 
enacting the policy. But at the global level, where it may be difficult to attribute 
transnational impacts to a single government, a different approach is called for. 
Moreover, we face the problem that some losses that fall disproportionately on 
individuals in affected countries may not necessarily accumulate into losses that are 
disproportionate for an affected country as a whole. In order to articulate how 
domestic and international responsibilities for compensation could be distributed, I 
draw on Aaron James’ account of responsibilities for remedying the adverse impacts 
of global trade. 
James takes the view that all countries have responsibilities for evening out the 
benefits and losses that trade imposes on their own citizens.102 Many countries 
have introduced extensive domestic measures to protect their citizens from the 
adverse effects of their exposure to the global economy.103 Accordingly, particularly 
where adverse effects are reciprocal between enacting and affected countries, or 
where an affected country experiences a mix of short-term benefits and losses (as 
in the case of changes in food prices in some countries), it may be preferable for 
countries to self-insure against regulatory impacts by strengthening their own 
domestic redistributive mechanisms and social insurance mechanisms or “social 
safety nets”. However, even if many industrialised and some developing countries 
have adequate social safety nets in place, the same is not true of other developing 
countries that are unable—or in some cases unwilling—to safeguard their citizens’ 
                                                     
102 James, Fairness in practice, 20. See also Richard Vernon, "States of risk: Should cosmopolitans 
favor their compatriots?", Ethics & International Affairs 21, no. 4 (2007). 
103 See Dani Rodrik, "Why do more open economies have bigger governments?", Journal of Political 
Economy 106, no. 5 (1998); and Stefanie Walter, "Globalization and the welfare state: Testing the 
microfoundations of the compensation hypothesis", International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 2 (2010). 
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wellbeing.104 This places greater obligations on wealthy countries to cooperate in 
order to establish and strengthen international and domestic social safety nets.105 It 
also suggests that any assistance measures should be prioritised towards least 
developed countries, which are the least likely to have adequate domestic social 
protection mechanisms.  
How then should these responsibilities be distributed among enacting countries? 
Distributing responsibilities based on each country’s causal responsibility for 
adverse impacts could help to hold it accountable for the consequences of its 
policies and provide it with an incentive to minimise those impacts. However, it 
could penalise those countries that are most active in introducing harm mitigation 
policies. By contrast, requiring those with the greatest responsibility for the original 
harm to provide compensation would give them a greater incentive to reduce their 
harmful activities. Ultimately, the difficulty of attributing specific impacts to 
particular agents may mean that the only feasible option—at least in the climate 
change case—is to distribute responsibilities by reference to countries’ contribution 
to the original harm, which is easier to quantify than responsibilities for 
transnational impacts. 
4.4.4 Implications for institutional design 
What does our discussion so far imply for the design of policy instruments? First of 
all, the empirical uncertainties about indirect impacts and the transaction costs 
associated with any remedial measures underscore the importance of minimising 
such impacts as a first resort.106 When disproportionate losses occur despite 
enacting countries’ having taken reasonable harm minimisation measures, 
compensation may be required. However, the same empirical uncertainties suggest 
that an approach to compensation modelled on judicial cases of civil liability—
where the amount of compensation is often tied to the quantum of loss to specific 
individuals—is unlikely to be suitable. In the context of climate change, a better 
                                                     
104 James, Fairness in practice, 213. See also Boccanfuso, Estache, and Savard, "The intra-country 
distributional impact of policies to fight climate change: A survey": 107. 
105 James, Fairness in practice, 20, 213. 
106 Compare Goodin, "Enfranchising all affected interests, and its alternatives", 67. 
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remedy is likely to involve measures that enable affected parties or countries to 
make a “just transition”107 to an emissions-constrained economy.  
Funding to help affected parties reduce their emissions (e.g. by switching to 
renewable energy sources or implementing energy efficiency measures) could help 
some to minimise their exposure to impacts from volatile prices. Nevertheless, the 
difficulty of distinguishing the impacts of a specific policy from broader changes in 
economic circumstances suggests that an integrated approach to designing 
remedial measures is necessary. For it may matter little to an unemployed person 
whether they have lost their job due to the phase-out of a heavily polluting 
industry, the effects of trade liberalisation, or the effects of higher temperatures on 
agricultural productivity.108 In some cases, as where a coal-mining region will be hit 
by the effects a carbon price, it may be appropriate to provide retraining programs 
and assistance for industrial restructuring that are specifically tailored to those 
regional effects.109 But in many other cases it will be preferable to strengthen 
general social safety nets—such as unemployment insurance— or provide tax 
breaks for low-income earners, both of which may protect vulnerable people 
against a range of economic shocks.110 Even if these measures are delivered in an 
integrated fashion, the additional funding required could still be derived from the 
revenue raised specifically from regulating the harm in question.111 Some countries, 
for example Germany, have already earmarked a portion of their domestic carbon 
pricing revenue to support mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.112 
This could provide a model for enacting countries to earmark a share of any 
                                                     
107 UNFCCC, "The Cancún Agreements ", Paragraph 10. 
108 Social protection needs will also increase due to climate change itself: Anabella Rosemberg, 
"Building a just transition: The linkages between climate change and employment", International 
Journal of Labour Research 2, no. 2 (2010): 144. 
109 Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review, 398. 
110 Compare Eckersley, "The politics of carbon leakage and the fairness of border measures": 380. For 
similar arguments in relation to global trade, see James, Fairness in practice: A social contract for a 
global economy, 20. 
111 Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review, 394. 
112 Martin Stadelmann, Jessica Brown, and Lena Hörnlein, "Fast-start finance: Scattered governance, 
information and programmes" in Carbon markets or climate finance? Low carbon and adaptation 
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revenue raised from regulating harm in order to address impacts not only at home 
but also abroad.113 
4.5 Conclusion 
While the domestic and transnational impacts of measures to regulate harmful 
activities differ in various respects, this article has demonstrated that the moral 
differences between them are not as stark as they are often perceived to be. We 
have seen that the analogy between smoking and climate change captures a widely 
held and morally plausible belief about the legitimacy of government action to 
regulate public harms and to set corresponding limits on entitlements to 
compensation for regulatory impacts. Difficulties in estimating losses make the 
transnational case for compensation harder (though not impossible) to establish. At 
the same time, estimation problems make it harder to claim that offsetting benefits 
will outweigh any such losses. Even though we may rely on responsibilities of 
distributive justice more readily at the domestic level, global cooperation on trade 
and the regulation of specific harms provides a dual basis for grounding 
transnational duties of compensation that are more stringent than humanitarian 
duties. 
As we have seen, principles developed in the literature on government 
compensation and under the climate change regime happily converge on the idea 
that remediation may be due where impacts fall disproportionately on the least 
responsible and the least capable. This provides a strong reason for compensating 
workers (as in the Worker example) and consumers outside the supply chain (as in 
the Food Consumer example) who suffer severe hardship as a result of policies to 
regulate harm. Whether consumers of harmful products deserve compensation will 
depend on the degree of hardship, the extent to which they have alternative 
consumption options and whether they receive other short-term benefits from 
regulation. This suggests that the case for compensating low-income consumers for 
the introduction of climate policies is generally stronger than that for compensating 
                                                     
113 See also Eckersley, "The politics of carbon leakage and the fairness of border measures": 388. 
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those affected by regulating discretionary but harmful activities such as smoking 
and gambling.114 However, the idea of disproportionate loss provides little reason 
for compensating producers (as in the Exporter example), since most will have the 
means to diversify away from harmful activities at reasonable cost to themselves, 
except perhaps for the poorest countries whose economies are heavily dependent 
on producing harmful goods.  
Where duties of compensation arise, they may apply regardless of where affected 
parties live, although transnational remedies may be necessary principally where 
affected parties have insufficient recourse to safety nets in their own countries. 
Further research is necessary to assess whether the idea of disproportionate loss 
represents an appropriate standard for compensation in other areas where public 
policies cause adverse cross-border impacts. However, by focusing on 
disproportionate losses and grounding duties to address them in common 
participation in harm reduction efforts rather than in cosmopolitan obligations that 
apply irrespective of institutional relationships, I have proposed a standard that is 
demanding but not, I believe, open-ended. A balance will need to be struck 
between the urgent need to address the harms resulting from climate change itself 
and the flow-on harms resulting from measures to address climate change, which 
may be felt no less keenly by vulnerable groups in the short term. Moreover, 
striking the right balance between compensating domestic and overseas interests 
will remain challenging. But given prevailing global economic inequalities, remedial 
duties may require governments to reserve less revenue to compensate their own 
citizens and more for those beyond their borders who suffer severe hardship.  
                                                     
114 Admittedly, in weighing up consumers’ claims for compensation in these latter cases we may 
need to take into account the fact that for many consumers these activities are problems of 
addiction. By comparison, former US President George W. Bush famously observed that “America is 
addicted to oil” (Elisabeth Bumiller and Adam Nagourney, "Bush: 'America is addicted to oil'" New 
York Times 2006), although his primary response to this was to encourage a different type of 
addiction (to shale gas). 
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Chapter 5. Splitting the difference in global climate finance: Are 
fragmentation and legitimacy mutually exclusive?  
Jonathan Pickering, Frank Jotzo and Peter Wood1 
Introductory note 
The chapters so far have largely worked within the field of climate ethics. Chapters 
5 and 6 connect with broader research on environmental governance and 
development respectively, emanating from the fields of political science, 
international relations and economics. Collaboration on Chapter 5 began with a 
working paper that identified options for Australia to raise sufficient funds to meet 
its long-term climate finance commitment.2 The present chapter generalises to the 
international level a number of issues identified in the working paper, and connects 
them with broader considerations of legitimacy in global environmental 
governance. 
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Abstract 
International funding for climate change action in developing countries may 
enhance the legitimacy of global climate governance, but fragmented approaches 
to mobilising funds raise further legitimacy challenges. We analyse potential for 
unilateral and coordinated efforts to advance “output” and “input” legitimacy 
respectively by raising adequate funds and representing affected interests in 
contributing and recipient countries. While legitimacy requires coordinated 
approaches to goal-setting, oversight and effort-sharing, vesting contributing 
countries with substantial discretion over funding sources may enhance taxpayers’ 
support and boost funding more rapidly. However, some multilateral coordination 
is necessary to maximise revenue from carbon pricing and minimise adverse 
impacts of funding choices on developing countries. Our findings show that a 
moderate degree of fragmentation is necessary for achieving input legitimacy and 
output legitimacy in mobilising climate finance, but extensive fragmentation is 
compatible with neither. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Mobilising finance to address climate change in developing countries will be crucial 
for their engagement in global efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Funding 
commitments by wealthy countries may help to promote the legitimacy of global 
climate governance by ensuring a more equitable distribution of the costs of 
reducing emissions and adjusting to the impacts of rising temperatures, and by 
demonstrating good faith on the part of developed countries. Conversely, if wealthy 
countries fail to fulfil the commitment they made in 2009 to mobilise $100 billion a 
year in climate finance by 2020, the climate regime’s legitimacy will suffer lasting 
damage.  
With many developed countries continuing to experience challenging fiscal 
conditions, poorer countries are increasingly uncertain about whether the former 
are on track to scale up funding towards the long-term commitment. Against this 
backdrop, achieving legitimacy in global climate finance will require identifying 
sources of funding that are sufficient to meet the collective commitment without 
disproportionately burdening some countries and demanding too little of others. At 
the same time, legitimacy will require crafting institutional arrangements to 
represent the interests of those in contributor and recipient countries most affected 
by funding decisions.  
A notable feature of current multilateral efforts to raise climate finance is that 
developed and developing countries have agreed to “split the difference”, not only 
by sharing responsibility for funding mitigation and adaptation measures in 
developing countries, but also by spreading the task of mobilising the required 
funding across a range of sources and institutions. Recent scholarship on global 
environmental governance has drawn attention to the ways in which fragmented 
governance—for example through unilateral action or “minilateral” action 
comprising a limited group of countries rather than under a cohesive multilateral 
framework—may complicate efforts to secure legitimacy.1 However, significant 
                                                     
1 Frank Biermann et al., "The fragmentation of global governance architectures: A framework for 
analysis", Global Environmental Politics 9, no. 4 (2009); Fariborz Zelli and Harro van Asselt, 
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disagreement persists both in the scholarly literature and among negotiating 
countries over whether fragmentation necessarily undermines or potentially 
enhances legitimacy. Moreover, understanding remains limited about whether the 
effects of fragmentation vary across and within different types of institutions.  
Through the case study of climate finance, we aim to inform theoretical 
understandings of how requirements for legitimacy may vary across the policy 
functions that institutions perform. We examine how fragmentation in mobilising 
resources may affect legitimacy in ways that are distinct from its effects on other 
policy functions such as overall goal-setting, oversight, and delivery of resources. 
Thus, whereas there is a strong case for coordinated approaches to setting and 
monitoring aggregate commitments of climate finance, we argue that contributor 
countries may justifiably retain significant discretion over how they raise revenue to 
meet their international or domestic commitments. This suggests that some degree 
of fragmentation in resource mobilisation arrangements may be compatible with 
(and indeed necessary for) legitimacy. Our analysis of two major aspects of resource 
mobilisation—effort-sharing and the selection of funding sources—indicates that a 
range of countervailing reasons nevertheless point to the need for a substantial 
degree of international coordination. These reasons include deterring free-riding, 
harnessing sources that simultaneously reduce emissions, and minimising the 
adverse impacts of fundraising methods on developing countries.  
Our analysis encompasses multiple strands of evidence, including lessons from 
existing financing and mitigation efforts, deliberations under the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) spanning 2008 to late 2013, and economic 
and political analysis of longer-term financing sources. We also evaluate 
quantitative indicators for sharing the financing effort among developed countries. 
We conclude by identifying policy implications and implications of our findings for 
broader research on fragmentation and legitimacy. 
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consequences, and responses", Global Environmental Politics 13, no. 3 (2013); Sylvia I. Karlsson-
Vinkhuyzen and Jeffrey McGee, "Legitimacy in an era of fragmentation: The case of global climate 
governance", Global Environmental Politics 13, no. 3 (2013). 
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5.2 Fragmentation and legitimacy in climate policy: a conceptual 
framework 
5.2.1 Dimensions of fragmentation 
The concept of fragmentation we apply builds on the foundational work of Frank 
Biermann and colleagues, who define fragmentation in global governance as: 
 
a patchwork of international institutions that are different in their character 
(organizations, regimes, and implicit norms), their constituencies (public and private), 
their spatial scope (from bilateral to global), and their subject matter (from specific 
policy fields to universal concerns).2 
 
Thus defined, the concept of fragmentation encompasses “horizontal” 
fragmentation among and within international institutions, and to this extent shares 
common ground with debates about the value of multilateral versus minilateral 
variants of international coordination.3 At the same time, we may readily extend 
the concept to encompass “vertical” fragmentation among international, national 
and sub-national levels of governance. Conceptualising fragmentation as having a 
vertical dimension helps to orient it in relation to the literature on “top-down” 
versus “bottom-up” approaches to climate governance.4  
While much of the literature on fragmentation in climate governance has focused 
on its overall institutional setting or architecture, our analysis follows the strand of 
research that has addressed fragmentation within specific components of the 
architecture, while taking into account existing levels of overall fragmentation.5 We 
                                                     
2 Biermann et al., "The fragmentation of global governance architectures": 16. 
3 Eckersley, "Moving forward in climate negotiations"; Gregory Shaffer and Daniel Bodansky, 
"Transnationalism, unilateralism and international law", Transnational Environmental Law 1, no. 1 
(2012). 
4 William Hare et al., "The architecture of the global climate regime: A top-down perspective", 
Climate Policy 10, no. 6 (2010); Daniel Bodansky, "A tale of two architectures: The once and future 
UN climate change regime", SSRN eLibrary (2011); compare also Ostrom, "Polycentric systems for 
coping with collective action and global environmental change". 
5 Harro van Asselt and Fariborz Zelli, "Connect the dots: Managing the fragmentation of global 
climate governance", Environmental Economics and Policy Studies (2013). 
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will primarily focus on the implications of three configurations of integrated vis-à-vis 
fragmented governance that are prominent in debates about climate finance: (i) 
multilateral coordination under the UNFCCC (vertically and horizontally integrated), 
(ii) minilateral coordination among contributor countries (vertically integrated, 
horizontally fragmented) and (iii) unilateral action by contributor countries 
(horizontally and vertically fragmented). Other important configurations include 
coordination through other multilateral organisations and delegating public 
authority over the fulfillment of commitments to private investors.6 
5.2.2 Climate finance and its associated policy functions 
In recent years climate finance has become a priority for multilateral climate change 
negotiations alongside deliberations on national mitigation actions. Climate finance 
received a major boost at the fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in 
2009. Under the Copenhagen Accord, developed countries committed to provide 
climate finance approaching US$30 billion between 2010 and 2012 (“fast-start 
finance”) and to mobilise long-term finance of US$100 billion a year by 2020.7 
Parties have not agreed on an official definition of what should count as climate 
finance, but for present purposes we use the following working definition: “financial 
flows mobilised by industrialised country governments and private entities that 
support climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries”.8 
For present purposes we may distinguish three major policy functions associated 
with climate finance: (i) goal-setting; (ii) implementation; and (iii) oversight.9 These 
functions and associated sub-functions are illustrated in Figure 5.1 below. We have 
framed our typology in terms that enable us to draw comparisons with related 
                                                     
6 See Eva Lövbrand, Teresia Rindefjäll, and Joakim Nordqvist, "Closing the legitimacy gap in global 
environmental governance? Lessons from the emerging CDM market", Global Environmental Politics 
9, no. 2 (2009) and Jessica F. Green, "Order out of chaos: Public and private rules for managing 
carbon", Global Environmental Politics 13, no. 2 (2013). 
7 Copenhagen Accord, Paragraph 8. 
8 Martin Stadelmann, Axel Michaelowa, and J. Timmons Roberts, "Difficulties in accounting for 
private finance in international climate policy", Climate Policy 13, no. 5 (2013), 3. 
9 This typology modifies and expands upon one set out in Jonathan Pickering and Peter J. Wood, 
"Climate finance for developing countries" in Climate change: Global risks, challenges and decisions, 
ed. Katherine Richardson, et al. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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policy domains or sub-domains involving international commitments, including 
national climate change mitigation efforts and development assistance. 
 
Figure 5.1. Policy functions associated with climate finance and related 
international commitments 
 
Note: Functions in bold text indicate primary coverage of the present article. 
 
5.2.3 Criteria for legitimacy in climate finance 
In a recent journal special issue on fragmentation, editors Fariborz Zelli and Harro 
van Asselt called for further research aimed at “examining implications of 
institutional fragmentation beyond the level of output effectiveness, for the 
compliance and problem-solving effectiveness of affected institutions.”10 The 
concept of legitimacy provides a useful yardstick for evaluation as it can encompass 
the implications of fragmentation for institutional effectiveness (or “output” 
legitimacy) as well as for the quality of institutional decision-making procedures 
                                                     
10 Zelli and van Asselt, "Introduction: The institutional fragmentation of global environmental 
governance": 10. 
172 
 
(“input” or procedural legitimacy).11 At the same time, applying the concept of 
legitimacy enables us to situate our evaluation within the context of broader 
debates about legitimacy in political philosophy and international law.12  
In this article we adopt a normative analysis of legitimacy, according to which an 
institution is legitimate “if there are good reasons in support of its claims to 
authority.”13 To be fully legitimate, rules and institutions require both output and 
input legitimacy.14 Input legitimacy is important both instrumentally (as a means of 
securing greater output legitimacy) and intrinsically (as a measure of respect for the 
interests and autonomy of others). However, as we discuss below, difficult tradeoffs 
may arise between these two dimensions of legitimacy.  
Table 5.1 synthesises a range of criteria commonly invoked in academic discussion 
of legitimacy or fairness in climate finance15 and related official documents16—
including the Copenhagen Accord and the report of the UN High-Level Advisory 
Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF)—and maps them against the dimensions 
                                                     
11 Lövbrand, Rindefjäll, and Nordqvist, "Closing the legitimacy gap in global environmental 
governance? Lessons from the emerging CDM market"; see also Frank Biermann and Aarti Gupta, 
"Accountability and legitimacy in earth system governance: A research framework", Ecological 
Economics 70, no. 11 (2011), 1858. Some typologies also include a third aspect of “source-based” 
legitimacy: see Bodansky, "The legitimacy of international governance"; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and 
McGee, "Legitimacy in an era of fragmentation". For parsimony we largely subsume this aspect 
under criteria of participation and political acceptability, while acknowledging that future research 
could expand upon this aspect. 
12 Buchanan and Keohane, "The legitimacy of global governance institutions"; Bodansky, "The 
legitimacy of international governance". 
13 Bodansky, "The legitimacy of international governance: A coming challenge for international 
environmental law?": 601; see also Lövbrand, Rindefjäll, and Nordqvist, "Closing the legitimacy gap 
in global environmental governance? Lessons from the emerging CDM market". 
14 Lövbrand, Rindefjäll, and Nordqvist, "Closing the legitimacy gap in global environmental 
governance?": 77. 
15 Athena Ballesteros et al., "Power, responsibility, and accountability: Rethinking the legitimacy of 
institutions for climate finance", Climate Law 1 (2010); Marco Grasso, "An ethical approach to 
climate adaptation ﬁnance", Global Environmental Change 20, no. 1 (2010); Andries F. Hof, Michel G. 
J. den Elzen, and Angelica Mendoza Beltran, "Predictability, equitability and adequacy of post-2012 
international climate financing proposals", Environmental Science & Policy 14, no. 6 (2011); Liane 
Schalatek, "Democratizing climate finance governance and the public funding of climate action", 
Democratization 19, no. 5 (2012); David Ciplet, J. Timmons Roberts, and Mizan Khan, "The politics of 
international climate adaptation funding: Justice and divisions in the greenhouse", Global 
Environmental Politics 13, no. 1 (2013). 
16 Copenhagen Accord; AGF, "Report of the secretary-general’s high-level advisory group on climate 
change financing". 
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of output and input legitimacy. While some of these documents formulated criteria 
specifically for evaluating funding sources, we show how a common framework can 
encapsulate other functions associated with climate finance. We have incorporated 
some factors that could function as criteria for overall desirability but also have a 
specific bearing on legitimacy, such as efficiency and equity. For parsimony we have 
also subsumed under other criteria some factors that are often treated separately 
(reliability, practicality and additionality). 
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Table 5.1. Criteria for legitimacy in climate finance 
Principles Criteria 
Output 
legitimacy 
(effectiveness) 
Adequacy:*# Is the goal adequate for meeting recipients’ 
needs? Is the collective effort or package of financing sources 
adequate to fulfil the commitment? Are funding sources 
practicable# and reliable*#? Does funding delivered yield 
effective mitigation and adaptation?  
Efficiency:# Does the source or delivery measure create 
incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and does it 
reduce or exacerbate economic distortions? Is the funding 
delivered cost-effectively? 
Equity:# Does the financing burden (or incidence#) fall 
disproportionately on particularly disadvantaged countries or 
individuals? Is the source likely to be additional*# to or to 
displace existing resources available to developing countries? 
Is funding allocated equitably? 
Input 
(procedural) 
legitimacy 
Transparency* and accountability: Can funding mobilised 
and delivered be adequately measured, reported and 
verified? 
Participation: Are affected public and private actors involved 
or represented in decision-making? 
Acceptability:# Is the goal, source or delivery measure likely 
to be accepted by constituencies in contributor and recipient 
countries? 
Note: Symbols indicate whether criteria are mentioned (either verbatim or in synonymous terms) in 
the Copenhagen Accord (*) or Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF 2010) (#). 
 
5.3 Do coordination requirements vary across policy functions? 
Recent scholarship has highlighted a “legitimacy gap” and a “democratic deficit” in 
the institutional architecture for governing climate finance, and in doing so has 
suggested that fragmentation may be part of the problem.17 Liane Schalatek, for 
                                                     
17 Lövbrand, Rindefjäll, and Nordqvist, "Closing the legitimacy gap in global environmental 
governance?": 74; Schalatek, "Democratizing climate finance governance": 952. 
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example, argues that the present multiplicity of institutions and actors involved in 
governing climate finance  
 
creates an overall lack of transparency and accountability […], preventing citizens in 
contributor and recipient countries from having a stake or say in the way public 
climate funds are raised, governed, allocated and implemented.18  
 
However, the few works that have addressed legitimacy or fairness in implementing 
climate finance have placed less emphasis on resource mobilisation than on other 
policy functions.19 Accordingly, further analysis is necessary to determine whether 
the role of fragmentation in widening the legitimacy gap applies as much to 
resource mobilisation as to other policy functions associated with climate finance.  
5.3.1 Multilateralism as the gold standard for legitimacy 
Many commentators consider multilateral coordination to be the highest standard 
for legitimacy in international governance. Consensual multilateral decision-making 
may offer greater scope for inclusive and transparent deliberation, thereby helping 
to curb abuses of power.20 Multilateral coordination may also secure greater output 
legitimacy in addressing collective action problems such as climate change. Thus 
William Hare et al argue that only coordinated or top-down approaches to 
mitigation will be able to circumvent free-riding problems.21 Sylvia 
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Jeffrey McGee argue that, even though the UNFCCC falls 
well short of being a paragon of effective action, a range of parallel minilateral 
                                                     
18 Schalatek, "Democratizing climate finance governance": 953. 
19 Ballesteros et al., "Power, responsibility, and accountability"; Grasso, "An ethical approach to 
climate adaptation ﬁnance"; Schalatek, "Democratizing climate finance governance"; Ciplet, Roberts, 
and Khan, "The politics of international climate adaptation funding". 
20 See Michael Zürn, "Global governance and legitimacy problems", Government and Opposition 39, 
no. 2 (2004); Biermann et al., "The fragmentation of global governance architectures": 30. 
21 Hare et al., "The architecture of the global climate regime: A top-down perspective": 604; see also 
Biermann and Gupta, "Accountability and legitimacy in earth system governance: A research 
framework": 26-28. 
176 
 
forums on climate change spearheaded by developed countries have fared 
considerably worse on both output and input legitimacy.22  
While a presumption in favour of multilateral coordination to address global 
collective action problems seems plausible, it is vulnerable to two strands of 
objection. First, more fragmented approaches could potentially achieve greater 
output legitimacy—even at the cost of input legitimacy—particularly in second-best 
(or “non-ideal”) circumstances where information and compliance levels are 
limited. Given the limited timeframe available to address global climate change, it 
may be impossible to realise ideals of procedural legitimacy typically requiring 
intensive multilateral coordination such as the representation of all affected 
interests.23 Even if fragmented approaches cannot entirely overcome collective 
action problems, some argue that interstate competition for clean technology 
investment may in turn stimulate a “race to the top” among countries intent on 
cutting their greenhouse gas emissions.24  
A second objection is that even if there is a strong case for multilateral coordination 
in setting overarching goals, it may not necessitate tightly integrated 
implementation of those goals. In many areas of international law and international 
relations it is common to assert that sovereign states should enjoy a “margin of 
appreciation” in regard to how they fulfil their international commitments.25 
Indeed, in addressing collective action problems such as climate change, a degree of 
fragmentation in implementation is a matter of practical necessity, since the source 
of the problem (greenhouse gas emissions), the resources available to address the 
problem (public revenue and private capital) and those who can change their 
actions (households and firms) all reside largely within the borders of individual 
countries, and are subject to those countries’ institutions. Devolving 
                                                     
22 Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee, "Legitimacy in an era of fragmentation": 74. 
23 Eckersley, "Moving forward in climate negotiations": 28. 
24 Bodansky, "A tale of two architectures"; Keohane and Victor, "The regime complex for climate 
change"; Ostrom, "Polycentric systems". 
25 Yuval Shany, "Toward a general margin of appreciation doctrine in international law?", European 
Journal of International Law 16, no. 5 (2005). 
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implementation to national and sub-national levels may also enhance input 
legitimacy by facilitating the direct participation of affected groups.26  
Clearly the applicability of these objections may vary across policy domains. Here 
we focus on evaluating the extent to which each objection affects the legitimacy of 
fragmentation in climate finance.  
5.3.2 Does climate finance require comprehensive multilateral coordination? 
5.3.2.1 Goal-setting and oversight 
Mobilising adequate global climate finance, like climate change mitigation, involves 
a collective action problem and is therefore vulnerable to the risk that some 
countries will free-ride on the actions of others.27 For this reason, multilateral 
agreement on a common goal is strongly preferable in both cases. Developing 
countries have argued that the 2020 commitment falls considerably short of their 
financing needs. While there are relatively few systematic estimates of needs in 
2020, numerous analyses estimate that they could exceed $200 billion a year by 
2030.28 However, as with national mitigation efforts, it is unlikely that parties could 
secure funding levels higher than the present financing commitment in the absence 
of a coordinated goal.29 
The case for coordinated oversight (or, in the terminology of the UNFCCC, 
measurement, reporting and verification (MRV)) is likewise strong for both climate 
finance and national mitigation efforts, and attracts support from advocates of both 
top-down and bottom-up approaches to mitigation.30 An important rationale for 
coordinated oversight arrangements for finance and national mitigation is that both 
                                                     
26 Compare Ostrom, "Polycentric systems". 
27 Patrick Bayer and Johannes Urpelainen, "Funding global public goods: The dark side of 
multilateralism", Review of Policy Research 30, no. 2 (2013). 
28 Erik Haites, "International climate finance" in International climate finance, ed. Erik Haites 
(London: Routledge, 2013), 8. 
29 Compare Jon Hovi, Detlef F. Sprinz, and Arild Underdal, "Implementing long-term climate policy: 
Time inconsistency, domestic politics, international anarchy", Global Environmental Politics 9, no. 3 
(2009). 
30 Hare et al., "The architecture of the global climate regime": 604, 607; Bodansky, "A tale of two 
architectures". 
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those who bear the costs and those who benefit have an interest in knowing how 
much effort governments are expending and whether that effort is producing the 
desired results. 
Parties have agreed on the need for credible arrangements to oversee the delivery 
and mobilisation of funding, including periodic reporting by contributors and 
recipients, as well as the establishment of a Standing Committee on Finance to 
assist the UNFCCC in improving coherence and coordination in institutional 
arrangements for climate finance.31 However, ongoing disagreement between 
developed and developing countries over whether and how certain types of flows 
should count towards the overall commitment illustrates the risks associated with a 
fragmented approach to setting oversight standards. In particular, contributors 
have adopted widely different approaches to accounting for aid and private finance. 
Overly inclusive approaches could violate the requirement that commitments be 
“new and additional” if, for example, they divert aid from purposes that may be of 
greater immediate benefit for developing countries or count private finance that 
would have flowed to developing countries even in the absence of the 
commitment.32 Indeed, if parties were to adopt an expansive approach to 
accounting for private sources, such flows could indeed already exceed $100 billion 
a year.33 Counting these flows in their entirety towards the 2020 target with the 
wave of an accounting wand would render the target meaningless. For these 
reasons, countries should intensify coordinated international efforts to establish 
credible accounting methods for both aid and private finance.  
5.3.2.2 Implementation: distinguishing delivery and mobilisation 
The arguments canvassed above in favour of fragmented implementation appear to 
translate relatively well to the delivery of climate finance. Contributors delivered 
                                                     
31 UNFCCC, "The Cancún Agreements", Paragraphs 96, 112. 
32 Martin Stadelmann, J. Timmons Roberts, and Axel Michaelowa, "New and additional to what? 
Assessing options for baselines to assess climate finance pledges", Climate and Development 3, no. 3 
(2011). 
33 Stadelmann, Michaelowa, and Roberts, "Difficulties in accounting for private finance in 
international climate policy": 16; Barbara Buchner et al., "The global landscape of climate finance 
2013" (Venice: Climate Policy Initiative, 2013). 
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their fast-start finance through a highly fragmented range of bilateral and 
multilateral funding channels, many of which (such as bilateral aid agencies) are 
closely aligned with contributors’ priorities.34 Countries have recognised the need 
for at least some degree of decentralisation in delivery through a “country-driven” 
approach involving stakeholders in recipient countries.35 At the same time, 
developed and developing countries have acknowledged that the existing tangle of 
delivery channels will be inadequate to manage much larger volumes of funds over 
the longer term. This was a major driver for agreement to establish a UN Green 
Climate Fund (GCF), which may go some way in reducing duplication of effort (or 
what Biermann and colleagues call “conflictive” fragmentation36) and integrating at 
least some financing efforts under an institution that gives equal representation to 
developing and developed countries.37  
It is much less clear that the degree of coordination required for the policy functions 
discussed so far pre-determines the level of coordination necessary to secure 
legitimacy in mobilising funds. Admittedly, coordinated oversight standards may 
place some constraints on the range of funding sources that contributors may count 
towards meeting their commitments. Moreover, choices about some delivery 
channels imply particular configurations for mobilising funds (as in the case of 
private finance, which decentralises both mobilisation and delivery decisions to 
market actors). But beyond this, many options for delivering finance are compatible 
with a wide range of more or less fragmented options for mobilisation.38 
There are, moreover, two strong reasons for thinking that legitimacy in mobilisation 
may require a significant degree of fragmentation. Consider first the case for output 
legitimacy. Contributors began from a relatively fragmented starting point, since 
                                                     
34 Stadelmann, Brown, and Hörnlein, "Fast-start finance". 
35 UNFCCC, "Launching the Green Climate Fund", Decision 3/CP.17. 17th Conference of the Parties to 
the UNFCCC. Durban, 2011. (2012), Annex, Paragraph 3. 
36 Biermann et al., "The fragmentation of global governance architectures": 19-20. 
37 Schalatek, "Democratizing climate finance governance": 961; Ciplet, Roberts, and Khan, "The 
politics of international climate adaptation funding": 58. 
38 Alex Bowen, "Raising climate ﬁnance to support developing country action: Some economic 
considerations", Climate Policy 11, no. 3 (2011): 1026. 
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they relied on domestic aid budgets to mobilise the large bulk of their fast-start 
commitments. However, the Copenhagen Accord cleared the way for further 
fragmentation by stipulating that the long-term target would be drawn “from a 
wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including 
alternative sources of finance.”39 Despite ongoing disagreement about the range of 
eligible sources, both contributors and recipients appear to share some common 
ground on why some degree of fragmentation is necessary. First, there is 
widespread recognition that no single source will be adequate to fulfil the entire 
commitment.40 In particular, attempts to divert much larger shares of aid for 
climate change purposes will encounter strong political resistance from developing 
countries as well as constituencies supportive of aid in contributing countries. 
Second, no single source will be capable of effectively addressing the range of 
actions that require funding in developing countries. Private finance, while vital for 
adequate mitigation, is not well equipped to become the exclusive means of 
addressing climate-related financing needs, particularly since many adaptation 
measures offer little scope for commercially motivated investment and are best 
addressed through public resources.41 
A second argument for fragmented mobilisation rests on input legitimacy. 
Contributor countries have emphasised that they should be entitled to a substantial 
degree of discretion in their choices about mobilisation. The US, for example, has 
argued: 
 
There was no agreement to have the [UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties] determine, 
limit, or otherwise take decisions on sources, whether the relative contributions of 
public and private finance or otherwise. Rather, a fundamental backdrop to 
                                                     
39 Copenhagen Accord, Paragraph 8; UNFCCC, "The Cancún Agreements ", Paragraph 99. 
40 AGF, "Report"; and UNFCCC, "Report on the workshops of the work programme on long-term 
finance: Note by the co-chairs", FCCC/CP/2012/3 (6 November 2012) (Bonn: UNFCCC, 2012), 14. 
41 Bowen, "Raising climate ﬁnance to support developing country action": 1021-22. 
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[Conferences of the Parties in 2009 and 2010] was that each country is free to 
determine the mode and source of its climate finance contributions.42 
 
The EU, while apparently more open to coordinated approaches to mobilisation, 
has emphasised the importance of maintaining “fiscal sovereignty” in its choices 
about sources.43  
Developing countries, by contrast, have argued for a more systematic or 
coordinated approach not only to goal-setting and burden-sharing—by proposing 
that commitments be based on a fixed percentage of contributors’ national 
income—but also to the range of sources that contributors may employ.44 
Nevertheless, India has acknowledged that some funding “could be generated, 
according to the national discretion of such Parties concerned[,] from new 
instruments in accordance with the principles of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities.”45 
The idea of fiscal sovereignty not only reflects more general notions of national 
sovereignty in international relations, but also embodies the view that taxation and 
expenditure arrangements form part of the domestic social contract between 
governments and their citizens.46 Let us assume that procedural legitimacy requires 
at the very least the participation of those most affected (if not all those affected in 
any way) by a government’s decisions.47 On this basis it is plausible to think that 
taxpayers in contributing countries have a stronger claim to participate in 
mobilisation decisions than recipients, just as potential recipients have a stronger 
claim to participating in decisions about the delivery of funding. On this basis, we 
                                                     
42 United States, "Submission by the United States of America on long-term finance", 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/CRP.35 (27 November 2011) (2011); emphasis added. 
43 European Commission, "Submission to UNFCCC work programme on long-term finance" (UNFCCC, 
2013). 
44 South Centre, "Operationalizing the UNFCCC finance mechanism" Research Paper 39 (May 2011) 
(2011), 11. 
45 India, "India's views on elements for decision on long term finance" (Bonn: UNFCCC, 2011). 
46 Peter Dietsch, "Rethinking sovereignty in international fiscal policy", Review of International 
Studies 37, no. 5 (2011). 
47 See Eckersley, "Moving forward in climate negotiations": 27. 
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might assume that as long as contributing countries represent the interests of their 
own citizens according to domestic standards of legitimacy, little, if any, multilateral 
standardisation or scrutiny of fundraising is required. Nevertheless, as we argue in 
the following sections, a number of important countervailing considerations may 
require a more integrated approach. 
5.4 Effort-sharing: ad hoc and formulaic approaches 
Even though parties have agreed on a coordinated funding goal, disagreement 
persists over whether a coordinated process is required to apportion efforts among 
contributing countries. Contributors announced their individual fast-start 
commitments in an apparently ad hoc fashion at the Copenhagen conference and in 
the months thereafter. As it happened, individual pledges were sufficient to cover 
the collective fast-start commitment, although a substantial proportion of funds 
pledged had not yet flowed through implementing agencies towards the end of the 
2010-12 fast-start period.48 On this basis, one could argue that a “bottom-up” 
approach to effort-sharing is sufficient for securing adequate funding, as some 
countries may have reputational motivations for unilaterally making up for 
shortfalls in the overall commitment (as Japan and Norway did in the case of fast-
start finance).49  
However, when the stakes are considerably higher—as in the long-term finance 
commitment, which requires a ten-fold increase in annual funding, or for that 
matter overall mitigation commitments—it is far less likely that parties will be able 
to rely upon unilateral action of this kind. A coordinated approach to effort-sharing 
can help to build common expectations, foster transparency and dispel suspicions 
that countries are either being forced to do more than—or getting away with less 
than—their fair share.  
In this section we present quantitative analysis comparing more or less fragmented 
approaches to effort-sharing. In keeping with our focus on implementing agreed 
                                                     
48 David Ciplet et al., "The eight unmet promises of fast-start climate finance" IIED briefing (London: 
International Institute for Environment and Development, 2012). 
49 Compare ibid. 
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goals, we limit our discussion here to effort-sharing within previously agreed 
parameters, namely how to distribute responsibility for meeting the $100 billion 
commitment, or the public proportionate thereof, among “developed” (Annex II) 
countries. As we have argued elsewhere, however, there are strong reasons for 
expanding the contribution group to include a number of other countries with high 
per capita emissions and income that the UNFCCC does not currently class as 
developed countries.50 Since private flows are much harder to attribute to 
individual countries, collective agreement on a goal for public funding would 
significantly help constructive deliberation on effort-sharing. 
One option for a coordinated approach to effort-sharing widely favoured by 
developing countries is to calculate contributors’ shares on the basis of a scale or 
index of contribution.51 Scales of contribution have been adopted for several other 
multilateral funding mechanisms,52 and the European Union has supported the use 
of a uniform scale for calculating climate finance commitments.53 However, some 
countries including the United States remain reluctant to countenance formulae for 
sharing either mitigation or financing efforts.54 
Table 5.2 shows illustrative shares for the five largest Annex II contributors of fast-
start finance. We primarily use a range of indicators based on the UNFCCC principle 
of parties’ “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”, 
measured respectively in terms of national emissions and income.55 We also include 
indicators based on countries’ existing shares of funding for international purposes, 
as some contributors used these indicators as a guide to their fast-start finance 
contributions.56  
                                                     
50 Jotzo, Pickering, and Wood, "Fulfilling Australia’s international climate finance commitments: 
Which sources of financing are promising and how much could they raise?", 18, 51; Pickering, 
Vanderheiden, and Miller, "'If equity’s in, we’re out'" [Chapter 3]. 
51 See for example India, "India's views on elements for decision on long term finance". 
52 Haites, "International climate finance", 163. 
53 European Commission, "Scaling up international climate finance after 2012" (Brussels: 2011). 
54 Erik Haites and Carol Mwape, "Sources of long-term climate change finance" in International 
climate finance, ed. Erik Haites (London: Routledge, 2013), 163. 
55 UNFCCC, Article 3.1. 
56 Pickering et al., "Acting on climate finance pledges". 
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Table 5.2. Illustrative indicators for sharing the climate finance effort57 
Percentage of Annex II 
contribution Australia 
EU 
Annex II 
member 
states Japan Norway USA 
Other 
Annex 
II 
Responsibility 
(emissions) 
Current 
(2008-10) 4.7 29.6 9.9 0.2 48.6 7.0 
  
Cumulative 
(1990-2010) 4.3 31.7 9.9 0.3 47.4 6.4 
Capacity 
(income) 
GDP (2008-
10, PPP) 2.5 38.0 12.4 0.7 41.4 5.1 
 
GDP (2008-
10, MER) 2.8 40.5 13.2 1.1 36.8 5.6 
Existing pledges 
Fast-start 
finance 
(2010-12)  1.8 24.2 44.2 2.9 22.1 4.7 
  
UN Scale of 
Assessment 
(2012) 2.5 46.7 15.9 1.1 27.9 5.9 
  
                                                     
57 Emissions data are from UNFCCC, "National inventory submissions 2013" (2013) and include 
emissions from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF); GDP data are from IMF, "World 
economic outlook 2011" (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2011) and are reported at 
purchasing power parity (PPP) and market exchange rates (MER); fast-start finance data are from 
WRI, "Summary of developed country ‘fast-start’ finance pledges (November 2012)" (Washington, 
D.C.: World Resources Institute, 2012); UN Scale of Assessment figures are from United Nations, 
"Assessment of member states’ contributions to the United Nations regular budget for 2012". 
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In Figure 5.2 we use three hypothetical scenarios to illustrate the impact that 
uncoordinated choice of indicators on the basis of national self-interest might have. 
If each country chose the indicator that minimises its own contribution, the sum of 
pledges would fall considerably short of the aggregate funding required (reaching 
63 per cent of aggregate funding in the second column). However, if countries can 
only choose between measures based on capacity and responsibility (R&C, as in the 
third column), the sum of pledges only falls by about 16 per cent of the funding 
required, thus substantially reducing the shortfall. This is because national income 
and emissions levels are correlated, so the scope for minimising each country’s 
contribution is limited.58 
 
Figure 5.2. Comparing degrees of coordination in effort-sharing 
 
  
                                                     
58 Bassetti, Benos, and Karagiannis, "CO2 emissions and income dynamics: What does the global 
evidence tell us?". 
37% 
shortfall 
16% 
shortfall 
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Even if adequacy may require a substantially greater degree of coordinated effort-
sharing among contributors, it is not clear that input legitimacy also requires that 
recipient countries have the same degree of involvement in decisions on sharing the 
financing effort as in mitigation negotiations (which lack an equivalent collective 
goal for 2020). While the participation of developing countries in effort-sharing 
decisions could potentially serve to hold individual contributors to account for 
contributing their fair share, that seems clearly subsidiary to the priority of (i) 
contributors establishing satisfactory objective criteria amongst themselves to avoid 
shortfalls; and (ii) recipients holding contributors to account as a group for meeting 
the overall funding target. 
5.5 Harnessing a “wide variety” of funding sources: unilateral and 
coordinated approaches 
As noted above, within the parameters set by the Copenhagen Accord there 
remains considerable scope for more or less fragmented approaches to mobilising 
sources of climate finance. In this section we assess whether tighter international 
coordination is more or less likely to satisfy legitimacy requirements.  
5.5.1 Bundling financing sources 
Recent research has emphasised the value of evaluating options for mobilisation 
not purely on the basis of individual sources, but from the perspective of “bundles” 
or “portfolios” of sources with common characteristics. Mattia Romani and Nicholas 
Stern distinguish two dimensions along which bundles could differ.59 Along one 
dimension, a bundle could be strongly geared towards international or domestic 
sources. Along the other dimension, a bundle could be oriented exclusively towards 
raising funds, or also towards reducing emissions. Table 5.3 illustrates some 
possible configurations. 
 
                                                     
59 Romani and Stern, "Sources of finance for climate action: Principles and options for 
implementation mechanisms in this decade", 122. 
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Table 5.3. Illustrative bundles of funding sources 
 Domestic International 
Linked to emissions 
reductions objectives 
Domestic carbon pricing 
Reducing domestic subsidies 
or tax concessions for fossil 
fuels 
Taxes on emissions-intensive 
imports (“border measures”) 
Auctioning of international 
emissions entitlements 
Levies on international offsets  
Levies on international 
aviation and shipping 
Not linked to emissions 
reductions objectives 
Aid budgets 
Consolidated revenue 
Financial transaction tax 
 
We concur with a range of analysts that a carbon-linked bundle of sources is 
preferable, as this may yield substantial additional revenue outside aid budgets 
while also increasing incentives for mitigation in contributing countries (thus 
advancing the adequacy, efficiency and equity criteria in tandem).60 For this reason 
the degree of fragmentation under a carbon-linked approach to financing is likely to 
depend on the degree of fragmentation in countries’ overall mitigation efforts. We 
elaborate upon the resulting implications next.  
5.5.2 International coordination on sources linked to mitigation 
Achieving output legitimacy in mitigation will require a significant degree of 
international coordination, for example in order to secure low-cost emissions 
reductions through international trade in emissions entitlements; reduce carbon 
“leakage” of emissions-intensive industrial production to countries not covered by 
emissions reduction policies; and target transnational sources of emissions not yet 
subject to stringent regulation, notably international aviation and shipping.61  
                                                     
60 AGF, "Report"; Hepburn and Müller, "International air travel and greenhouse gas emissions"; 
Romani and Stern, "Sources of finance for climate action", 125. 
61 Romani and Stern, "Sources of finance for climate action", 125. 
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The intensive participation of developing countries will be essential not only for 
achieving these purposes, but also because cooperative mitigation will produce a 
range of economic effects on developing countries even if they do not participate 
directly in mitigation. For example, even if a levy on international transport 
emissions only covered journeys originating from developed countries, it would still 
have an impact on prices paid by consumers in developing countries. Unless the 
design of coordinated mitigation schemes takes such concerns into account, 
developing countries may block the consensus required to establish them. Ensuring 
input legitimacy by representing the interests of those most affected will therefore 
be crucial for securing output legitimacy.   
Raising adequate finance from coordinated mitigation will involve further 
challenges but also important opportunities. On the one hand, the primary 
motivation for countries to initiate domestic carbon pricing mechanisms or schemes 
to regulate international transport emissions is typically not to raise climate finance 
but to enhance mitigation efforts. Even if emissions-linked sources raise a 
substantial amount of overall revenue, other interests will compete for that 
revenue. However, this concern may be more pronounced where it takes the form 
of the “domestic revenue problem” (where taxpayers view funding raised at the 
domestic level as nationally owned62).  
In addition, the fact that coordinated action on mitigation is spread across a number 
of other multilateral organisations beyond the UNFCCC introduces further 
complications. The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) regulate international aviation and shipping emissions 
respectively, but their mandates constrain their ability to differentiate 
responsibilities according to a country’s level of development.63 However, the 
prospects of climate financing arrangements taking root in schemes administered 
by these organisations are likely to be greater if only a portion of total revenue is 
directed towards climate finance, with the remainder directed towards other 
                                                     
62 Benito Müller, "International adaptation finance: The need for an innovative and strategic 
approach" (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2008), 8. 
63 Haites and Mwape, "Sources of long-term climate change finance", 169. 
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purposes such as assisting affected industries to introduce low-emissions 
technologies.64 At the same time, political acceptability of coordinated mitigation 
efforts for developing countries could be enhanced by channelling revenue raised 
via developing countries back to them, either by directly reimbursing the poorest 
countries to avoid disproportionate burdens upon them, or by enhancing overall 
levels of climate finance.65 
A potentially more intractable barrier is that multilateral funding sources may be 
politically unacceptable to contributors if viewed as a form of global taxation (a 
particular concern of countries that are especially protective of their fiscal 
sovereignty such as the United States). One means of addressing the latter concern 
would be to adopt a more limited degree of coordination whereby revenue for a 
particular scheme is collected not by a centralised multilateral agency but by 
national governments, then disbursed as climate finance.66 
Even if coordinated mitigation efforts could raise substantial finance over the longer 
term, they may be incapable of generating adequate funding during this decade 
given existing institutional structures and constellations of interests. A corollary of 
the inclusive decision-making processes of multilateral organisations is that they are 
generally slow to reach consensus.67 This concern also applies to internationally 
coordinated sources that are not associated with emissions reductions but whose 
efficiency will suffer without the participation of major developing economies, such 
as a financial transaction tax. Thus significant reliance on domestic sources over the 
short to medium term appears unavoidable. 
                                                     
64 Romani and Stern, "Sources of finance for climate action", 131; Haites and Mwape, "Sources of 
long-term climate change finance", 164. 
65 Joanne Scott and Lavanya Rajamani, "EU climate change unilateralism", European Journal of 
International Law 23, no. 2 (2012); Haites and Mwape, "Sources of long-term climate change 
finance", 169. 
66 See for example Switzerland’s carbon tax proposal ({Bowen 2011}, 1030-31). 
67 Shaffer and Bodansky, "Transnationalism, unilateralism and international law". 
191 
 
5.5.3 Domestic sources linked to mitigation 
As at the international level, the total amount of domestic revenue that carbon 
pricing arrangements can raise is sensitive to the stringency of developed countries’ 
mitigation targets, which remains low.68 Furthermore, many developed countries—
such as the United States at the federal level—have found it politically impossible to 
date to introduce carbon taxes or emissions trading schemes. In the short term, 
therefore, it may be necessary either to augment aid budgets or draw directly on 
consolidated revenue to bridge the financing gap.  
All of these strategies will face to varying degrees the domestic revenue problem 
mentioned above. But assuming that contributor countries progressively introduce 
domestic emissions trading or emissions taxes, and that it is practically and 
politically feasible for them to earmark some proportion of for climate finance 
purposes (as Germany has done69), need we worry about any concerns of input 
legitimacy affecting recipient countries? 
Here two concerns emerge. First, even though raising revenue from regulating 
purely domestic emissions may provoke few concerns of political acceptability 
among developing countries, any attempts to implement border measures—
especially raising carbon levies on imported goods or services—are likely to be 
politically risky (as the EU found in its recent controversial attempt to regulate 
aviation emissions beyond its borders70).  
Second, where contributors raise funds unilaterally, they may be strongly inclined to 
deliver that funding through their own institutions, notably their aid programs. This 
may not greatly affect output legitimacy if those institutions operate effectively. 
However, it poses a more significant concern for input legitimacy, as many 
developing countries see existing channels for delivering aid as favouring 
contributors’ national interests. Ballesteros and colleagues have argued that it is 
therefore necessary to “de-link” sources of finance from institutions over which 
                                                     
68 World Bank, "State and trends of the carbon market 2012" (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012).  
69 Stadelmann, Brown, and Hörnlein, "Fast-start finance: Scattered governance, information and 
programmes", 128. 
70 Scott and Rajamani, "EU climate change unilateralism". 
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contributors have greater power.71 But even if multilateral sources can achieve such 
a de-linking, the practical difficulties of establishing those sources suggest that a 
realistic second-best approach would be for contributors to channel a greater 
proportion of their domestically mobilised resources through multilateral funds.  
5.6 Implications for the institutional division of labour 
Despite the presumption that contributing countries maintain fiscal sovereignty 
over how they mobilise resources to meet international commitments, our analysis 
demonstrates that legitimacy will require a division of labour among minilateral and 
multilateral institutions as well. Raising innovative sources of finance over the 
longer term will require coordinated action under the UNFCCC, ICAO, IMO and 
other organisations such as the G20 (on fossil fuel subsidies) and OECD (which has 
considerable expertise on accounting for financial transfers to developing 
countries). But given the difficulties of rapidly introducing multilateral sources, the 
UNFCCC’s primary role on mobilising resources in the short term is likely to be one 
of “orchestrating” rather than directly engaging in implementation.72  
To this end, a key role for the UNFCCC will be to facilitate the development of 
collective and national pathways, and associated effort-sharing arrangements, 
towards a bundle of private and public sources that will be capable of fulfilling the 
commitment. A two-year UNFCCC Work Programme on Long-Term Finance 
culminated in agreement at the Conference of the Parties in Warsaw in late 2013 
that contributors will “prepare biennial submissions on their updated strategies and 
approaches for scaling up climate finance from 2014 to 2020, including any 
available information on quantitative and qualitative elements of a pathway”.73 
While this is a positive development, far more rapid progress and intensive 
coordination is needed to ensure that the collective effort will be on track to meet 
                                                     
71 Ballesteros et al., "Power, responsibility, and accountability: Rethinking the legitimacy of 
institutions for climate finance": 310. 
72 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, "International regulation without international 
government: Improving IO performance through orchestration", Review of International 
Organizations 5, no. 3 (2010). 
73 UNFCCC, "Work programme on long-term finance" (2013) 
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the 2020 commitment. More broadly, there remains hope that reaching an 
ambitious long-term climate agreement under the current Durban Platform 
negotiations may stimulate further coordination on mitigation, which in turn could 
underpin expanded measures to raise funds from international and domestic 
carbon-linked sources. 
Contributor governments, in addition to engaging constructively in multilateral 
deliberations, should: develop credible national or minilateral accounting standards 
for climate finance in advance of multilateral agreement; formulate objective 
estimates of their fair share of the collective commitment; and expand unilateral 
sources of funding, with an emphasis on emissions-linked sources with minimal 
impacts on developing countries. 
5.7 Conclusion 
Our analysis indicates that multilateral coordination on goal-setting and oversight 
has a vital role to play in ensuring the legitimacy of global climate finance. Yet this 
may not always imply the same degree of coordination in implementing agreed 
commitments. Our account of mobilising finance indicates that there are good 
reasons for according contributors substantial discretion over how they raise 
funding to meet their commitments in recognition of their fiscal sovereignty. The 
fragmented decision-making arrangements implied by this discretion may retain 
input legitimacy as long as the choice of funding source does not compromise other 
fundamental interests of developing countries (such as diverting aid from other 
development priorities). Given the urgency of rapid climate change mitigation, 
unilateral action to mobilise funding sources may help to secure output legitimacy 
in the short term without cutting off options that would require lengthier 
multilateral deliberation. Nevertheless, national discretion must be tempered by 
the need for a significant degree of cooperative action among countries. 
Coordination among contributor countries is necessary in order to counter risks of 
free-riding in effort-sharing arrangements, while cooperation among both 
contributors and recipients is necessary to raise funding while simultaneously 
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stimulating mitigation efforts, and to ensure the representation of developing 
countries affected by coordinated mitigation and resource mobilisation efforts. 
While these findings reinforce the prevailing wisdom among negotiators and policy 
analysts that a variety of funding sources is essential, they provide a more 
principled set of justifications for why a moderate degree of fragmentation is 
necessary for achieving input legitimacy and output legitimacy but an extreme 
degree of fragmentation is compatible with neither. These findings can inform 
broader understanding of how fragmentation affects legitimacy in global 
environmental governance. In particular, our findings suggest that arguments for or 
against the value of multilateralism as the gold standard for legitimacy must pay 
closer attention to the ways in which the opportunities and problems that 
fragmentation creates may vary across policy functions. Our analysis also suggests 
that empirical path dependencies may arise between fragmentation in one policy 
function and fragmentation in others. However, there is a need for further 
systematic comparative analysis to identify how fragmentation affects legitimacy 
across a broader range of policy functions, issue areas and policy domains.74 
Finally, the importance of mitigation policies as a vehicle for raising international 
climate finance highlights that ensuring legitimacy for recipients need not always 
mean sacrificing legitimacy for contributor countries. Climate change poses threats 
to the long-term fiscal position for contributors and recipients alike, for example 
through potential revenue losses from declining productivity of natural resources75 
and the public costs of dealing with climate change impacts. Coordinated action to 
avoid such impacts through mitigation could therefore enhance rather than erode 
contributors’ fiscal sovereignty.76 Considered in this light, earmarking a portion of 
the revenue from carbon pricing policies for climate change measures in poorer 
countries may be a small price to pay for the global benefits it could yield. 
                                                     
74 Compare Biermann et al., "The fragmentation of global governance architectures": 18. 
75 Benjamin Jones, Michael Keen, and Jon Strand, "Fiscal implications of climate change", 
International Tax and Public Finance 20, no. 1 (2013), 30. 
76 Compare Peggy B. Musgrave, "Combining fiscal sovereignty and coordination: National taxation in 
a globalizing world" in The new public finance: Responding to global challenges, ed. Inge Kaul and 
Pedro Conceição (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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Chapter 6. What should count as aid? 
Jonathan Pickering* 
Introductory note 
The previous chapters have taken climate change as their starting point but have 
operated against the backdrop of disparities in global development. Chapter 6 
changes this emphasis by beginning with a question in development policy—what 
should count as aid—and employing the case study of climate finance in order to 
provide a clearer response to that question. 
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Abstract 
The question of what should and should not count as aid for developing countries 
has become increasingly prominent in political debates but has received very little 
attention in normative theory. Drawing on analyses of social practices, I develop an 
account of aid’s moral purposes and an associated set of criteria for evaluating 
definitions of aid. I apply these criteria to assess the OECD’s widely adopted 
definition of Official Development Assistance. I argue that the current definition—
which makes eligibility hinge on the primary developmental objective of the 
funding—can withstand common criticisms that it measures too little or the wrong 
things. However, the overall definition of aid needs to be complemented by (i) 
specified exclusions from aid eligibility for funding that contravenes the spirit, if not 
the letter, of the development objective and (ii) a broader measure of efforts by 
developed countries to promote the welfare of poorer countries. Finally, I assess 
the contentious case of whether funding to address climate change should count as 
aid. I argue that alternative policy instruments could address concerns about 
diverting funding from other development priorities to meet climate finance 
commitments, but exclusion could be considered as a last resort. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Many have argued that wealthy countries and their citizens have moral duties to 
provide aid to poorer countries.1 Over several decades wealthy countries have 
constructed a range of organisations for raising and delivering aid, spanning 
national development agencies, philanthropic initiatives and multilateral bodies for 
monitoring and coordinating aid flows. During this time the question of whether aid 
has been—or indeed can be—effective in promoting economic development has 
dominated discussion of this topic.2 However, there is another important question 
concerning aid that has become increasingly prominent in recent political debate: 
what should and should not count as aid? This question is of considerable moral and 
political importance, since it bears directly on the range of actions that wealthy 
countries may credit towards their efforts to assist the global poor and in particular 
towards their progress in meeting global and national aid targets.3 
Policy debate over the definition of aid has intensified recently as countries 
deliberate on what should replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The 
MDGs, which are due to expire in 2015, identify a range of priorities and quantified 
targets for reducing global poverty and securing human development. Aid is widely 
considered to be an important ingredient for achieving the MDGs,4 but some have 
suggested that the definition of aid should be re-aligned to reflect evolving 
understandings of development priorities and the broader range of financial and 
non-financial policy instruments that may promote development.5  
                                                     
1 See generally Singer, One world: The ethics of globalisation; Pogge, World poverty and human 
rights. 
2 See generally Roger C. Riddell, Does foreign aid really work? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007); Michael A. Clemens et al., "Counting chickens when they hatch: Timing and the effects of aid 
on growth", The Economic Journal 122, no. 561 (2012). 
3 Olav Stokke, The UN and development: From aid to cooperation (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2009), 512. 
4 See Thomas G Weiss, "How United Nations ideas change history", Review of International Studies 
36, no. S1 (2010): 5. 
5 OECD, "A post-2015 information system for international development and climate finance" 
Background research paper submitted to the High Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda 
(Paris: OECD, 2013). 
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At the same time, perceived fiscal constraints have prompted numerous donor 
countries—including the Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand and most recently 
Australia—to realign their aid programs more closely with commercial and foreign 
policy priorities. In doing so, those countries have brought a broader range of 
activities under the auspices of their aid programs.6 Notable cases currently classed 
as aid but subject to contention include funding to address climate change, initial 
costs of resettling refugees in donor countries, tuition costs for overseas citizens 
studying in donor countries, unsubsidised loans, debt relief and costs incurred by 
donors in administering their aid programs.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)—whose 
definition of aid provides the touchstone for what counts as the aid that the 
governments of wealthy countries provide—has recently begun the process of 
formulating a more comprehensive set of measures for tracking development 
finance.7 However, despite the increasing salience of this policy discussion, the 
question of how to define aid has received very little attention in scholarly analysis 
generally, let alone in moral philosophy. While some philosophers have addressed 
the question of how aid should be allocated,8 I show that questions of eligibility are 
not reducible to questions of priority. 
In what follows I begin by assessing some possible approaches to formulating an 
institutional definition of aid based on the moral principles or duties underlying the 
institution or the consequences it promotes. Drawing on analyses of international 
social practices, I adopt an approach that sets out an account of the moral purposes 
of the practice of aid and an associated set of criteria for formulating and evaluating 
a definition of aid. This approach may inform efforts to develop institutional 
                                                     
6 Benjamin Day, A new journey on a worn path? The aid cuts in context, DevPolicy blog, 7 September 
2013, accessed 20 December 2013. http://devpolicy.org/a-new-journey-on-a-worn-path-the-aid-
cuts-in-context-20130907/. 
7 OECD, "Initial roadmap for improved DAC measurement and monitoring of external development 
finance" (Paris: OECD, 2013). 
8 See for example Jennifer Rubinstein, "Distribution and emergency", Journal of Political Philosophy 
15, no. 3 (2007); Thomas Pogge, "Moral priorities for international human rights NGOs" in Ethics in 
action: The ethical challenges of international human rights nongovernmental organizations, ed. 
Daniel A. Bell and Jean-Marc Coicaud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Scott 
Wisor, "How should INGOs allocate resources? ", Ethics & Global Politics 5, no. 1 (2012). 
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definitions for practices that may advance the fulfilment of moral responsibilities of 
the wealthy towards those beyond their borders, including who should count as a 
refugee and what should count as human rights. 
I apply these criteria to assess the OECD’s widely adopted definition of Official 
Development Assistance. I argue that the current definition—which makes eligibility 
hinge on the primary developmental objective of the funding—can withstand some 
common criticisms that it measures too little or measures the wrong things. Rather 
than jettisoning the concept of official aid we should focus increased attention on (i) 
expanding the range of specified exclusions from aid eligibility for funding that 
contravenes the spirit (if not the letter) of the development objective; and (ii) 
developing a broader measure of the actions that developed countries may take to 
promote the welfare of poorer countries in a way that complements rather than 
displaces the definition of aid. 
Finally, I assess the specific case for excluding funding to address climate change in 
developing countries from counting as aid. I consider that the most pressing 
concern raised by this case is the diversion of funding from existing development 
priorities in order to meet climate finance commitments. While excluding climate 
finance altogether from aid could address the risk of diversion, I argue that 
exclusion carries risks of its own, particularly if it undermines the mutually 
reinforcing effects of many measures to promote climate change and development 
and if it fails to motivate increases in overall resources for the poor. 
6.2 Defining aid: key concepts 
6.2.1 Defining social practices 
Aid, like trade and the protection of refugees and human rights, constitutes an 
international social practice. James defines a social practice as (i) coordinated 
behaviour among agents over time (ii) that is maintained by widely understood 
behavioural expectations; and those expectations are (iii) governed and (iv) “set or 
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adjusted … according to a shared organizing purpose or aim”.9 I largely adopt James’ 
definition, except that I will argue that a single social practice may fulfil multiple 
purposes rather than only a single purpose. We must first distinguish the questions 
of (i) what counts as a particular social practice; and (ii) what should count as a 
particular social practice. The first question may be significant for normative theory, 
since we need to have some idea of the scope of a practice in order to identify how 
it should be reformed. A significant amount of normative analysis has focused on 
the first question, particularly among theorists applying constructive accounts of 
fairness or justice to social practices.10 However, if we recognise that changing the 
definition of a practice may help fulfil morally important purposes, we then have 
good reason to consider the second question as well. We cannot assume that 
approaches to answering the first question will necessarily be tailored to answering 
the second.  
6.2.2 Moral functions of defining social practices 
Let us begin with a brief account of the morally important functions that the 
definition of a social practice may serve, noting that this is a distinct question from 
the functions that the practice itself may serve. I focus in particular on definitions of 
terms that formulate institutional principles or rules (institutional terms). I discuss 
below how institutional terms relate to terms defined for the purposes of 
theoretical discussion or public debate (pre-institutional terms).  
First, institutional terms perform a conventional function in facilitating shared 
understandings among participants about the meaning of terms, thereby promoting 
institutional cooperation.11 Second, some institutional terms perform a normative 
function by constituting or regulating (encouraging, obligating or prohibiting) 
                                                     
9 James, Fairness in practice: A social contract for a global economy, 37-38. Compare also David Jason 
Karp, "The location of international practices: What is human rights practice?", Review of 
International Studies 39, no. 04 (2013): 973. 
10 See for example Charles R. Beitz, The idea of human rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); 
James, Fairness in practice; and Karp, "The location of international practices". 
11 Southwood and Eriksson, "Norms and conventions". 
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certain types of activity.12 Institutionalising certain responsibilities may help to 
overcome problems of moral motivation. As Goodin notes in relation to aid, “Some 
systematic organization for collectively discharging our duties is necessary in order 
to relieve us from the burden of attending to all of the needy cases one-by-one”.13 
Different definitions of a term may in turn enhance or undermine participants’ 
incentives to fulfil those duties. Third, institutional terms may serve more broadly to 
express the values of the institution’s participants.14 This function is particularly 
prominent where the term is explicitly associated with advancing a moral ideal or 
value, such as promoting human rights, protecting refugees, or aiding the poor.15  
6.2.3 Introducing the official definition of aid 
In order to compare in concrete terms the value of different possible approaches to 
defining aid, let us begin by outlining the definition of aid adopted by industrialised 
nations, namely that of Official Development Assistance (ODA). This definition 
originated in the work of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 
which for several decades has provided a forum for aid donors to monitor and set 
standards for aid provision. In public debate ODA and aid are commonly used 
interchangeably, and ODA levels represent the pre-eminent measure of how much 
aid countries provide.16 The DAC’s definition of ODA, first established in 1969 and 
periodically modified since that time, sets out four main components: 
1. Agents: funding provided by governments of OECD donor countries; 
2. Beneficiaries: funding must be provided to countries on the DAC’s list of 
developing countries, or to multilateral development institutions; 
                                                     
12 Compare Joseph Raz, Practical reason and norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 [1975]), 
107-10; J. Garcia, "Constitutive rules", Philosophia 17, no. 3 (1987). 
13 Robert E. Goodin, "Demandingness as a virtue", The Journal of Ethics 13, no. 1 (2009): 10. 
14 Cass R. Sunstein, "On the expressive function of law", University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144, 
no. 5 (1996). 
15 On the expressive function of “asylum” see Matthew E. Price, Rethinking asylum: History, purpose, 
and limits (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
16 Jan Vanheukelom et al., "Reporting on development: ODA and financing for development" 
(European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), 2012), 2. 
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3. Means: financial or in-kind support administered on a concessional basis 
(that is, generally in the form of grants or low-interest loans); and 
4. Interests: funding must be “administered with the promotion of the 
economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective”.17 
With these preliminaries in place, I will compare two possible approaches to 
formulating a definition of aid and evaluating the definition presented above: 
integrity-based and outcome-based approaches.  
6.3 Approaches to formulating and evaluating a definition 
6.3.1 Integrity-based approaches 
6.3.1.1 Conceptual and value integrity 
An integrity-based approach, for the purposes of our argument, requires that an 
institutional term correspond as closely as possible with either (i) the pre-
institutional term (conceptual integrity); or (ii) the moral values underlying the 
institutional or pre-institutional term (value integrity).18 
An approach based on conceptual integrity may vary depending on whether it seeks 
correspondence with a popular or theoretical definition of a term. In some cases, 
the two types of definition may come apart,19 but not greatly, I believe, in the case 
of aid. In both colloquial and theoretical usage, aid may refer at its most general to 
“Help, assistance, support, esp[ecially] of a practical nature; succour, relief from 
difficulty or distress”.20 However it also has the more specific meaning of: 
                                                     
17 OECD, "Measuring aid: 50 years of DAC statistics - 1961-2011." (Paris: OECD, 2011), 4, 7. 
18 My understanding of value integrity draws on Bernard Williams’ influential account of integrity. 
See JJC Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and against (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973). The two types of integrity bear some resemblance respectively to the 
“contextual” and “value” methods outlined in Karp, "The location of international practices": 979-83. 
Other research has discussed the issue of integrity in relation to non-government aid, but not official 
aid. See for example George E. Mitchell and Hans Peter Schmitz, "Principled instrumentalism: A 
theory of transnational NGO behaviour", Review of International Studies (Forthcoming (2013)).  
19 As, for example, in the case of understandings of “compensation”: see Goodin, "Theories of 
compensation". 
20 Oxford English Dictionary, "'Aid, n.'" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Definition 2a. 
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material help given to a country or region by another country or an international 
agency; esp[ecially] economic assistance to a poor or underdeveloped country, or 
supplies of food and medicine given to alleviate the effects of a natural disaster, war, 
etc.21 
 
Ensuring that institutional terms match up with their pre-institutional counterparts 
may facilitate the conventional function of a definition and avoid obfuscation or 
misrepresentation. Moreover, conceptual integrity gives due weight to the idea that 
existing institutions typically serve to advance some kind of pre-existing idea, as for 
example the idea of human rights.22 It should be apparent that the four 
components of the OECD definition roughly align with respective elements of the 
more specific dictionary definition, while providing more determinate content to 
each.  
Nevertheless, in some cases there may be good reasons for institutional definitions 
to depart from popular usage. First, common-sense understandings may not be a 
sufficient guide to morally appropriate practice. Thus for example it is common to 
refer to military aid, but there are good reasons for not counting it as aid for official 
purposes given its potential to harm rather than advance the interests of the poor if 
such funding is used to prop up authoritarian governments.23 For similar reasons, 
we may think that ideas sometimes treated as human rights in popular debate—
such as the right to bear arms—should not be treated as such because of their 
potential to undermine interests that have a more justifiable status as human 
rights, such as rights to life and liberty.24  
                                                     
21 Ibid., Definition 2b. 
22 C. Barry and N. Southwood, "What is special about human rights?", Ethics and International Affairs 
25, no. 3 (2011): 379-80. 
23 Michael Brzoska, "Extending ODA or creating a new reporting instrument for security-related 
expenditures for development?", Development Policy Review 26, no. 2 (2008): 147. 
24 Contrast Christopher J. Schmidt, "An international human right to keep and bear arms", William & 
Mary Bill of Rights Journal 15, no. 3 (2007). 
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We may go some way towards resolving these difficulties by seeking a more 
sophisticated form of correspondence between an institutional term and the moral 
responsibilities or rights associated with it (that is, pursuing value integrity). An 
approach that strives for value integrity is appealing particularly in relation to 
institutions that arguably owe their emergence to efforts to institutionalise moral 
values, including the human rights, refugee and aid regimes. Thus Lumsdaine has 
argued that the international aid regime represents an example of “moral vision” in 
international relations grounded in humanitarian concerns for the poor.25 Where 
certain types of actions are incompatible with the value underlying the practice, we 
may either (i) modify the overall definition or (i) retain the overall definition but 
introduce specific exemptions from aid eligibility (as the DAC has done in the case of 
military aid and several other cases discussed below).  
However, the value integrity approach encounters two difficulties, for it may not 
adequately take into account (i) the way in which moral principles map onto the 
functions that social practices perform (the problem of “functional 
correspondence”) or (ii) the fact of reasonable pluralism about values. I will group 
functional correspondence and respect for reasonable pluralism under a range of 
feasibility requirements, and I will introduce two further requirements in the 
remainder of this section. I address each difficulty in turn. 
6.3.1.2 Functional correspondence 
Let us assume for the purposes of value integrity that the relevant value is the 
humanitarian duty to assist those suffering deprivation. A plausible way of assessing 
whether a particular definition satisfies value integrity would be to assess the 
consequences of definitional change for fulfilling the particular value in question. I 
believe this view is on the right track although, as I argue below, I consider it 
preferable to subsume this perspective on value integrity under a broader 
consequentialist approach. Before outlining such an approach I highlight a problem 
that particularly affects the usefulness of straightforward appeals to value integrity 
                                                     
25 David Halloran Lumsdaine, Moral vision in international politics: The foreign aid regime, 1949-1989 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 3. 
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to resolve questions of definition, namely the lack of a reliable one-to-one 
correspondence between duties and institutions.  
On the one hand, satisfying a particular duty may require a range of institutional 
arrangements. Thus humanitarian duties to assist the needy may require not only 
aid but also reform or creation of other institutions as well, ranging from regimes 
governing trade, global finance and refugee protection. In discussions of who 
should count as a refugee, for example, broad definitions based on the moral duty 
of states to include others whose states are unwilling or unable to protect them26 
may overlook the fact that for many people in this situation—including those 
suffering from famine or natural disaster-asylum may not be the most appropriate 
response.27 Similarly, protecting the moral equality of individuals may require a 
range of other institutions other than human rights.28 
On the other hand, it is possible that a single institution may be capable of 
advancing multiple moral values. Institutions are often shaped as much by the 
means through which they protect interests—such as transfers of economic 
resources or the provision of asylum—as through the content of the interests 
themselves. Economic transfers, for example, may serve to assist the poor but may 
also serve to compensate for harm or advance other moral interests. A simple value 
integrity approach faces difficulties in taking multiple considerations into account. 
6.3.1.3 Reasonable pluralism 
A second problem with a simple value integrity approach is that public institutions 
rely on the political and financial support of a diverse range of citizens, often 
spanning many countries in the case of international institutions. Thus it may be 
necessary to invoke a diverse range of moral reasons to ensure that those 
                                                     
26 See for example Michael Dummett, On immigration and refugees (London: Routledge, 2001), 37. 
Shacknove arrives at a similarly broad definition but by invoking what I refer to as a conceptual 
integrity approach (Andrew E. Shacknove, "Who is a refugee?", Ethics 95, no. 2 (1985): 277).  
27 Matthew Lister, "Who are refugees?", Law and Philosophy 32, no. 5 (2013); More sophisticated 
integrity-based views take this point into account. See for example Shacknove, "Who is a refugee?": 
277. 
28 Karp, "The location of international practices": 983. 
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institutions are publicly justifiable.29 There is little evidence to support the claim—
advanced in a somewhat more general form by Lichtenberg—that donors are 
averse to “duty-talk” when it comes to aid.30 Available evidence from surveys of 
people’s motivations suggests instead that people support aid not only for 
prudential reasons but also for a variety of moral reasons, including duties of 
humanity, charity and justice towards the poor, as well as out of an interest in 
addressing shared problems such as controlling infectious diseases and reducing 
conflict.31 It would be hard to reach agreement within a single country, let alone 
among all donors, on a unique right reason for providing aid. Indeed there may be 
no need to agree that aid should fulfil a single reason or set of reasons in order for 
aid to give effect to the reasons that people hold in practice. Rather it may be 
sufficient that the definition of aid reflect what Cass Sunstein calls an “incompletely 
theorised agreement”.32 The absence of a single guiding value does not make the 
search for integrity fruitless, but nevertheless does make it more complex, as it 
points to the need for a definition that is compatible with a range of widely 
accepted values. 
6.3.2 Objective-based approaches 
6.3.2.1 Is the wellbeing of the poor the only objective at stake? 
An alternative to integrity-based approaches may focus less on duties than on 
advancing valuable objectives, outcomes or consequences. Such an approach may 
be better equipped to encompass reasonable pluralism, given that people may 
agree on the goals of aid if not the duties underlying it. It is, I believe, relatively 
uncontroversial that the outcomes of greatest (if not exclusive) relevance to aid are 
benefits to the global poor. This view may be justified on a number of grounds, not 
                                                     
29 John Rawls, Justice as fairness: A restatement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 26. 
30 Lichtenberg, "Negative duties, positive duties, and the 'new harms'": 576. 
31 Riddell, Does foreign aid really work?, Chapters 7 and 9; Spencer Henson and Johanna Lindstrom, 
"“A mile wide and an inch deep”? Understanding public support for aid: The case of the United 
Kingdom", World Development 42, no. 2 (2013). 
32 Cass R. Sunstein, "Incompletely theorized agreements", Harvard Law Review 108, no. 7 (1995). 
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least by reference to the large number of poor people worldwide relative to the 
number of wealthy people and diminishing marginal utility of income.33  
Nevertheless, a straightforward objective-based approach encounters a concern 
about functional correspondence similar to the one we encountered with the value 
integrity approach. For example, it may be that recasting component 3 of the OECD 
definition to include commercial transactions would be beneficial for the poor 
overall. However, such an approach is likely to raise public concerns about 
misrepresentation mentioned above in relation to conceptual integrity. We also 
need to enquire whether the practice of aid may legitimately advance other morally 
valuable objectives beyond assisting the poor.  
In order to address the functional correspondence problem we may formulate a 
modified version of the objective-based approach that borrows aspects of 
constructive or practice-dependent theories of justice, notably the idea that an 
account of an existing social practice may help to characterise in moral terms the 
overall purposes of that practice.34 The OECD definition provides some evidence for 
the primacy of the development objective in practice. However, we may also 
identify two further purposes not captured in the official definition but evident 
from existing practice.  
6.3.2.2 Expressive objectives and co-benefits 
First, as noted above, the practice of aid may serve to express the moral reasons 
that people have for providing it. This expressive objective could conceivably be 
served if altruistic action enhances the wellbeing of donors, or if the aid relationship 
provides mutual benefits to donors and recipients beyond the material benefits 
generated specifically by the aid activity in question. Hattori, drawing on the 
sociology of gift relationships, argues that aid serves to cement hierarchical 
                                                     
33 That is, a given amount of money enhances the utility or welfare of a poor person more than that 
of a wealthy person. See Riddell, Does foreign aid really work?, 130. 
34 Ronald Dworkin, Law's empire (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986); 
James, Fairness in practice: A social contract for a global economy, pp.29-30. Compare also Karp’s 
“purpose method”: Karp, "The location of international practices": 984-86. 
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relationships between the dominant donor and the subordinate recipient.35 Aid may 
indeed sometimes serve such a purpose in practice. However, a shift in the rhetoric 
of aid over the past decade toward notions of partnership, national ownership and 
mutual accountability provides evidence of an emergent shared intention to place 
aid on a less hierarchical basis.36 
Even if our primary concern is how the definition of aid affects overall outcomes, we 
may have instrumental reasons for caring about expressive objectives (and more 
broadly about integrity) because satisfying those objectives may motivate donors to 
provide more aid.37 The instrumental value of integrity may also explain why even if 
a particular type of funding (such as military aid) might benefit the poor in some 
circumstances, even a moderate risk that its misuse could harm the poor in others 
could undermine public support for the aid regime and thereby provide a strong 
reason for the exclusion of that type of funding.38  
The second insight from existing practice concerns the fact that a considerable 
proportion of aid is oriented towards securing benefits for donors, such as 
expanding export markets or gaining diplomatic support. While evidence on the role 
of these motivations in overall aid-giving is mixed, there is enough to show that aid 
is not overwhelmingly oriented towards the exclusive interests of either donors or 
recipients.39 Should we consider material benefit to donors to be a legitimate 
purpose of aid at all? If we value the welfare of all people equally—even if we value 
increases in the welfare of the poor more highly than that of the wealthy—this 
purpose need not be dismissed out of hand, as long as we recognise its subsidiary 
importance. I will refer to this as the “donor co-benefit” objective. 
                                                     
35 Tomohisa Hattori, "Reconceptualizing foreign aid", Review of International Political Economy 8, no. 
4 (2001). 
36 See for example OECD, "Paris declaration and Accra agenda for action" (Paris: OECD, 2008). 
37 Compare Sunstein’s idea that the expressive function of law may have instrumental value through 
its role in changing social norms (Sunstein, "On the expressive function of law"). 
38 Here it may be useful to distinguish between standard risks of failure in implementation (which 
apply to any aid activity) and the risk that funding could be used to deliberately harm others (as in 
the case of military aid, and possibly nuclear energy, whose peaceful use is currently counted as aid).  
39 Simon Feeny and Mark McGillivray, "What determines bilateral aid allocations? Evidence from 
time series data", Review of Development Economics 12, no. 3 (2008). 
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6.3.2.3 Empirical uncertainty and the problem of stability 
An important challenge to the view that we should rely on consequences as the 
yardstick for determining what should count as aid is that it may be very difficult to 
tell what sorts of effects any one of the many possible variations in definition could 
have in practice. This problem has two dimensions. First, the actions that will yield 
the greatest benefits for the poor may vary considerably over time as some 
countries develop while others become poorer, and (as I discuss below) as new 
development needs arise. Moreover, we have limited knowledge about what kinds 
of aid interventions work and what do not.  
Second, in evaluating the consequences of different definitions we need to 
distinguish the ways in which a definition of aid may benefit the poor from the 
broader ways in which the practice of aid may benefit the poor regardless of how 
the practice is defined. As I will argue, different definitions may enhance or 
undermine donors’ incentives to maximise benefits for the poor by affecting either 
the quantity of aid or its quality (that is, the extent of the benefits yielded by a given 
quantity of aid). However, those incentive effects will depend on a broader range of 
existing institutional incentives affecting donors’ relations with other countries. 
Thus, for example, tightening the definition of aid to focus greater attention on the 
poorest populations may improve the quality of aid. But it may be unclear whether 
and how it would affect its overall quantity. Relaxing or tightening the definition of 
aid makes it respectively easier or harder for donors to meet aid targets, such as the 
UN aid target, according to which donors undertook in 1970 to “exert [their] best 
efforts” to provide 0.7 percent of their Gross National Income (GNI) as aid.40 While 
expanding the definition could help boost overall aid, it may simply allow donors to 
count towards their targets a wider range of resource transfers that they would 
have provided anyway while keeping the overall quantity of aid the same (to the 
detriment of aid quality). 
Despite this, whether or not we adopt an integrity-based or objective-based 
approach, we will need to appeal to available evidence of likely consequences to 
                                                     
40 United Nations, "International development strategy for the second United Nations development 
decade" (1970), Paragraph 43. 
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some extent, even if we do so provisionally in order to identify requirements for 
further empirical research. I refer to this as the feasibility requirement of a robust 
evidentiary basis. Subsequent sections set out available evidence in greater detail.   
Empirical uncertainties about the effects of definitional change also underscore the 
idea that if a definition of aid is to function as a reliable guide for practice it needs 
to be flexible enough to withstand short-term fluctuations in circumstances. Since 
the adoption of definitional alteration will require consensus among a range of 
countries, it is likely to be a time-consuming process that must only take account of 
long-term trends.41 I refer to this as the feasibility requirement of stability.42 I also 
take the requirement of stability to involve the idea that a definition of aid should 
be capable of reliable application to specific cases on the basis of externally 
observable features of the resource transfer in question.43 
6.3.3 Summary 
Let us now synthesise main features of the criteria I have set out so far. The 
modified objective-based approach I have proposed focuses primarily on ensuring 
that a definition of aid advances the development objective, but a definition may 
also serve two secondary objectives, the expressive and donor co-benefit 
objectives. Although I do not adopt conceptual or value integrity as free-standing 
criteria, I incorporate them via their role in fulfilling the expressive objective, and 
through the fact that advancing the development objective may concurrently 
advance value integrity. In addition to these objectives I have outlined a range of 
further desiderata, which I group together under the rough heading of feasibility 
requirements. The objectives and feasibility requirements are outlined in Table 6.1 
below. 
 
                                                     
41 For present purposes I leave aside the question of the deliberative processes by which definitional 
change should occur. However, given that developing countries will be affected by definitional 
change, deliberations should provide for their meaningful involvement in addition to the 
involvement of the OECD DAC membership (which is comprised of donor countries).  
42 Compare Rawls, A theory of justice, 154. 
43 Compare H.L.A. Hart, The concept of law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012 [1961]), 
124. 
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Table 6.1. Criteria for evaluating a definition of aid 
Advancing valuable objectives Feasibility 
requirements  
 
 
 
 Functional 
correspondence 
 Respect for 
reasonable 
pluralism 
 Robust 
evidentiary basis 
 Stability 
Note: arrows show the directions in which one objective may influence another. 
6.4 Evaluating the official definition of aid 
Now that we have established an approach to evaluation, let us turn to the more 
specific question of whether the current definition of ODA satisfies the criteria I 
have laid out. Space precludes a detailed discussion of all the criticisms that the 
different components of the ODA definition have attracted. I focus primarily on 
whether the fourth component—containing the primary objective of aid—should be 
amended, or whether specific exceptions should be introduced, the better to 
advance the objectives outlined above. I will have somewhat less to say about 
controversies attaching to the other components, including whether aid should 
include funding provided by non-government organisations and “emerging” official 
1. Development objective 
Promoting wellbeing of the poor 
by motivating increases in (i) aid 
quantity and (ii) aid quality 
2a. Expressive objective 
Fulfilled through 
satisfying 
(i) objectives 1, 2b and  
(ii) conceptual/ value 
integrity 
2b. Donor co-benefit 
objective  
Fulfilled through 
material benefits to 
donors that are 
compatible with or 
reinforce other 
objectives 
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donors such as China and India (component 1),44 whether the list of recipients could 
be recast in order to strengthen the development objective (component 2), or how 
to measure “concessionality” (component 3).45 I will structure the evaluation 
around three common criticisms of the overall definition, which Severino and Ray 
refer to as “ODA’s three fatal sins”: that it measures too little; measures too much; 
and measures the wrong things.46 
6.4.1 Measuring too little? 
An initial concern is that the OECD definition captures too little of the range of 
factors that may benefit poor countries and is therefore inconsistent with the 
development objective. Inconsistency could arise for several reasons. First, the 
definition excludes “innovative” sources of development funding that do not 
necessarily comprise funding transfers (such as loan guarantees) or are non-
concessional in nature (such as bond financing). Second, by focusing on economic 
development, the definition excludes other flows that may advance non-economic 
interests (such as cultural interests), including those that may be a precondition for 
successful development (such as peacekeeping). 
6.4.1.1 Other factors affecting development  
The first criticism highlights the observation that the welfare of developing 
countries depends on a much wider range of financial resources than official aid 
flows from wealthy to poor countries. Indeed aid is now dwarfed by a range of 
other flows, including trade and investment flows and remittances transferred from 
                                                     
44 See Deborah Bräutigam, "Aid ‘with chinese characteristics’: Chinese foreign aid and development 
finance meet the OECD-DAC aid regime", Journal of International Development 23, no. 5 (2011); see 
also Ngaire Woods, "Whose aid? Whose influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution 
in development assistance", International Affairs 84, no. 6 (2008); Soyeun Kim and Simon Lightfoot, 
"Does ‘DAC-ability’ really matter? The emergence of non-DAC donors", Journal of International 
Development 23, no. 5 (2011). 
45 For more detailed discussion of these issues see Vanheukelom et al., "Reporting on development: 
ODA and financing for development". 
46 Jean-Michel Severino and Olivier Ray, "The end of ODA: Death and rebirth of a global public policy" 
Working Paper Number 167 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2009), 17-20. 
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migrants living in developed countries to their countries of origin.47 Moreover, there 
is increasing awareness among policy-makers of ways in which the policies of a 
wealthy country may benefit or harm developing countries through means other 
than financial flows, including policies on migration, security and environmental 
protection. Accordingly, a variety of proposals have emerged for tracking a wider 
range of financial flows that benefit developing countries such as “Official 
Development Support”, “External Development Finance” or “Global Policy 
Finance”.48 Others have formulated a broader measure of wealthy countries’ 
“commitment to development” that captures both financial and non-financial 
impacts.49  
Broader measures of this kind may be an important part of the overall picture of 
global actions that affect development. However, reasons of institutional feasibility 
and integrity suggest that there is merit in retaining a definition of aid that is limited 
to cross-border transfers of concessional resources from wealthier to poor 
countries. For even if non-concessional flows are much larger than concessional 
flows, the latter remain essential for addressing a number of purposes that would 
not otherwise attract sufficient funding from commercial or philanthropic sources, 
including aid for humanitarian emergencies and for fostering basic state 
institutions.50  
6.4.1.2 Scope of benefits 
Whether aid should encompass a broader understanding of development has been 
a prominent concern, particularly as the DAC has introduced a specific exemption 
that makes peacekeeping expenditure ineligible to be counted as aid.51 As Michael 
                                                     
47 Andy Sumner and Michael Tribe, "The case for aid in fiscally constrained times: Morals, ethics and 
economics", Journal of International Development 23, no. 6 (2011): 783. 
48 The OECD intends to develop new measures of the first two categories: OECD, "Initial roadmap for 
improved DAC measurement and monitoring of external development finance"; on the third 
category see Severino and Ray, "The end of ODA". 
49 Center for Global Development, Commitment to development index 2013, accessed 20 December 
2013. http://www.cgdev.org/initiative/commitment-development-index/index. 
50 Sumner and Tribe, "The case for aid in fiscally constrained times: Morals, ethics and economics": 
788, 89. 
51 Brzoska, "Extending ODA?". 
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Brzoska argues, even if peacekeeping may be a precondition for development, 
public debate tends to consider promoting security and development as two 
distinct spheres, and it is difficult to draw a reliable line between aspects of 
security-related funding that promote development and those that are indifferent 
to or threaten development prospects.52 The risk that over-inclusion poses in this 
context for the integrity of the aid regime suggests that a broader category of 
exclusion for security-related expenditure is preferable.   
6.4.2 Measuring the wrong things? 
A second criticism is that by tracking funding based on the amount of funding that 
donors spend towards the development objective the definition fails to capture the 
amount of funding that actually flows to developing countries or the development 
benefits flowing from that funding.53 As a result, it is argued, the current definition 
fails to give donors sufficient incentives to ensure that their funding is not only well-
intentioned but also effective.  
While there is little doubt that the delivery of international aid could be more 
effective than at present, it is not clear that changing the overall definition to count 
as aid only funding that actually benefits developing countries would be a viable 
way of promoting effectiveness. If nothing else, an outcome-based definition may 
not be compatible with the requirement of stability given difficulties in assessing 
the effectiveness of individual aid projects. In particular, such a definition could give 
donors an incentive to gain credit for short-term development benefits at the 
expense of harder to measure but more important long-term benefits.  
Nevertheless, even if the overall definition of aid is based on the objective of 
funding rather than its actual outcome, certain types of funding could be the 
subject of specified exclusions if there is little or no evidence that they reliably 
promote development outcomes. Where evidence on development outcomes is 
mixed, it may be better to count funding that has a developmental objective as aid 
(while maintaining a distinction between good and bad aid) while encouraging 
                                                     
52 Ibid., 146-47. 
53 Severino and Ray, "The end of ODA", 20-21. 
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donors to improve their compliance with agreed principles and standards for 
development effectiveness.54 
6.4.3 Measuring too much? 
A contrasting criticism is that the definition of aid includes too many types of 
funding that should not be classed as aid. I address two variants of this criticism. 
First, stipulating that the welfare of developing countries should be the primary but 
not exclusive objective gives donors too much discretion to target aid towards 
activities that benefit themselves at the expense of recipients. Second, the objective 
as formulated is so broad that it allows to too great an extent funding that may be 
compatible with the letter of the development objective but not with its spirit.55  
The exclusivity criticism could appeal to the idea that people are more likely to 
donate funds if their intrinsic or altruistic motivations for doing so are not mixed 
with self-interested motivations such as receiving material incentives to donate.56 
Appealing to material incentives could thus “crowd out” or “eclipse” virtuous 
action.57 However, even where individual aid donations are concerned, there 
appears to be little discomfort among donors or charitable organisations with 
providing material incentives by making charitable donations tax-deductible. In any 
case, for the reasons discussed above, requiring that aid aim exclusively rather than 
only primarily to benefit the poor would be to hold governments to an impossible 
standard. Moreover, doing so could dampen overall motivations of the public for 
maintaining generous aid budgets, since it would constrain governments from 
                                                     
54 There may nevertheless be value in complementary measures that specify the amount of funding 
that reaches developing countries, as the OECD has sought to capture in a concept of “Country 
Programmable Aid” introduced in 2005: OECD, "New directions in DAC measurement and monitoring 
of external development finance" (Paris: OECD, 2012), 6. 
55 A related criticism (not discussed here) relates less to the formulation of the definition than to the 
process of applying it: because donors self-report on what they count as aid, the process arguably 
gives donors too much leeway to include funding that should not be counted as aid; aid eligibility 
decisions should therefore be subject to more rigorous external scrutiny. 
56 Richard Titmuss, The gift relationship: From human blood to social policy (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1970); Robert E. Goodin, Political theory and public policy (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), 113. 
57 Bruno S. Frey, "A constitution for knaves crowds out civic virtues", The Economic Journal 107, no. 
443 (1997); Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit, The economy of esteem: An essay on civil and 
political society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 302. 
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appealing to alternative arguments such as mutual benefit that may convince some 
undecided voters.58  
A greater challenge to the current definition arises where the exclusivity criticism 
collapses into the criticism regarding the spirit of the development objective. That 
is, there may be cases where a government claims that its self-interested reasons 
for providing aid are a secondary objective when in fact they constitute the 
government’s primary objective. This concern underlies many criticisms of cases of 
funding that are currently classed as aid, including scholarships for citizens of 
developing countries to study in donor countries (where the donor’s tertiary 
education institutions benefit regardless of whether the student returns to their 
home country) or unsubsidised lending (where donors with low borrowing costs can 
still make a profit from concessional loans). As we will see in the next section, this 
concern also arises in the case of aid for climate change mitigation. 
I believe there is a valid concern that the current breadth of the definition allows 
donors to count funding that lacks an appropriate balance of benefits for recipients 
relative to donors. Measuring too much may often be the price to pay for 
maintaining the stability of the definition. However, addressing excessive breadth 
may not necessarily require changing the overall definition, but rather introducing 
specified exclusions from aid for particularly undeserving classes of funding. Over 
the years the DAC has introduced a range of exclusions from aid eligibility aimed at 
certain types of self-interested funding, including counter-terrorism assistance and 
funding for carbon offsets generated in developing countries that are used to meet 
developed countries’ climate change commitments.59 Where other categories of 
funding systematically work to the primary benefit of donor countries—as 
unsubsidised lending most clearly does among the examples just mentioned—we 
may justify their exclusion on the basis that doing so reinforces the stated 
developmental objective of aid and thereby the value integrity of the aid regime.60 
                                                     
58 Compare Riddell, Does foreign aid really work?, 113. 
59 OECD, "Is it ODA?". 
60 A similar justification could apply to excluding funding that ostensibly promotes development but 
is essentially a bribe aimed at securing votes in an international organisation for a donor’s position. 
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There is another way in which the current definition could allow donors to count 
funding that should not be classed as aid even if the funding does not primarily 
benefit them. I have in mind a kind of case whose primary objective may be 
interpreted as promoting the welfare of people in developing countries, but which 
simultaneously serves different other-regarding (rather than self-interested) aims. 
One variant of this idea is that humanitarian assistance should be excluded from aid 
in order to enable aid to focus on longer-term development challenges.61 I find the 
latter argument unconvincing. While humanitarian and long-term assistance differ 
in numerous respects, the two lie on a continuum.62 In addition, excluding 
humanitarian assistance from aid would run against what many consider to be a 
paradigm example of aid. In the next section I address the case for excluding 
funding from aid that fulfils two different kinds of other-regarding obligations, 
namely remedying harm and complying with legal obligations. 
6.5 Making exceptions: should climate finance count as aid? 
So far we have applied our criteria to the overall definition of aid. In addition, we 
may use the same criteria mutatis mutandis for evaluating whether specific 
instances of aid should be included or excluded from the definition. Thus when we 
consider contentious cases classed as aid we may ask whether exempting them 
from aid eligibility would advance valuable outcomes and whether it would be 
institutionally feasible to exempt them. 
6.5.1 Climate finance and the problem of diversion 
Whether funding to address climate change in developing countries should be 
classed as aid has been a longstanding bone of contention since the drafting of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC; or the climate 
convention), which was adopted in 1992. Under the climate convention, wealthy 
countries pledged to “provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of 
                                                     
See Natalie J Lockwood, "International vote buying", Harvard International Law Journal 54, no. 1 
(2013). However, efforts to exclude such cases from aid may pose a number of practical difficulties.  
61 As reported in Vanheukelom et al., "Reporting on development", 30. 
62 Rubinstein, "Distribution and emergency". 
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technology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full 
incremental costs” of implementing a range of measures to mitigate climate change 
(i.e. reducing greenhouse gas emissions) as well as pledging to assist them in 
meeting the costs of adaptation (i.e. adjusting to the impacts of climate change).63 
However, they did not agree on a specific level of overall funding, and for some 
years wealthy countries provided quite modest amounts of climate finance.  
More recently the debate over the relationship between climate finance and aid has 
intensified following a landmark political bargain struck between developed and 
developing countries under the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. In tandem with 
developing countries pledging to increase their mitigation efforts, wealthy countries 
committed to scale up their climate finance substantially by providing funding 
approaching US$30 billion over 2010-12 and mobilising $100 billion a year by 2020 
from a range of sources.64 Most fast-start finance was drawn from contributing 
countries’ aid budgets, and aid supporting climate change objectives represented 
around 16 percent of total aid in 2010-11.65 The long-term target is substantial 
compared to current official aid, which reached US$134 billion in 2011.66  
Developing countries have consistently argued that climate change finance should 
be “new and additional” to existing aid.67 The primary basis for this concern is that if 
developed countries were to continue to draw on aid budgets to meet their rising 
climate finance commitments, this would divert a substantial amount of funding 
that would otherwise flow to existing development priorities. Developed countries 
have instead preferred an interpretation of additionality that enables them to draw 
climate finance from aid budgets, provided that levels of climate finance are 
additional to some baseline, such as previous climate finance or existing aid levels.68 
                                                     
63 UNFCCC, Articles 4.3, 4.4. 
64 UNFCCC, "Copenhagen Accord", Paragraph 8. 
65 OECD, "DAC statistics: Climate-related aid" (Paris: OECD, 2012). 
66 OECD, "Statistics". 
67 This term features in the convention itself as well as in successive political decisions agreed under 
the convention (UNFCCC, Article 4.3; UNFCCC, "Copenhagen Accord", Paragraph 8). 
68 Stadelmann, Roberts, and Michaelowa, "New and additional to what?". 
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The problem of diversion has two aspects. The first is that when new needs emerge 
donors may not increase their overall aid but will seek instead to meet new needs 
by spending less on existing needs. The second aspect is that, whether or not the 
pool of funding grows or remains fixed when new needs arise, addressing new 
needs may involve targeting funding to less deserving recipients, thus diminishing 
the overall quality of aid. I discuss each aspect in turn. 
6.5.1.1 Emerging needs and the quantity of aid 
One argument for excluding substantial new types of funding needs from aid is that 
it may help to ensure that the definition corresponds with the range of needs that 
were envisaged when the UN aid target was set.69 There is widespread recognition 
that emerging needs in one area (e.g. control of diseases such as AIDS) may be 
offset by a decline in other needs (for example, as large economies such as China 
and India have grown).70 One could argue that the case for counting AIDS funding as 
aid is stronger because it falls within an existing class of needs (promoting health), 
whereas climate change represents a new class of need. However, the declaration 
setting out the UN’s aid target acknowledged the role of safeguarding the 
environment in achieving the “ultimate purpose of development”, and one could 
respond that climate change is to the environment as AIDS is to health.71 The key 
issue of concern therefore appears to be not so much the type of need but rather 
its magnitude compared to existing levels of need. The scale of climate change 
funding required in developing countries is indeed far greater than that required to 
address AIDS.72 However, this fact alone does not entail that redefinition is the only 
                                                     
69 Note that the relationship of the existing target with funding needs has been the subject of 
considerable criticism: see Michael A. Clemens and Todd J. Moss, "The ghost of 0.7 per cent: Origins 
and relevance of the international aid target", International Journal of Development Issues 6, no. 1 
(2007).  
70 Compare Homi Kharas and Andrew Rogerson, "Horizon 2025: Creative destruction in the aid 
industry" (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2012). 
71 United Nations. 1970. International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations 
Development Decade. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV), 24 October 1970, 
Paragraph 18. 
72 The UN estimates that addressing AIDS in developing countries will require around US$20 billion a 
year over 2014-16 (Global Fund, "Fourth replenishment (2014-2016): Needs assessment" (Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2013)). Climate finance flows to developing countries 
(including UNFCCC pledges) totalled around $39-62 billion a year in 2010-11, and funding needs are 
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solution. Excluding funding for new needs from aid also poses significant risks, 
because if donors cannot claim credit for boosting funding to tackle new problems, 
they may have fewer incentives to address those problems.  
6.5.1.2 Safeguarding the quality of aid allocation: debate over global public goods 
A second concern about diversion is that climate finance systematically distorts the 
allocation of funding away from recipients whose development needs should have 
greater priority. We have already seen one form of distortion that could justify 
exclusion from aid, namely funding that primarily benefits donor countries. A 
second form of distortion involves diversion of funding from poorer to less poor 
recipient countries. Climate finance could potentially involve both forms of 
distortion, and it shares this feature with a broader class of contentious cases 
involving funding to address global public goods.73  
The case against counting support for global public goods as aid is often based on 
the view that such funding cannot primarily benefit developing countries. However, 
while some global public goods may primarily benefit donors (e.g. reducing security 
threats from terrorist attacks aimed at wealthy countries and their citizens abroad), 
others may in fact primarily benefit recipients. Addressing global climate change is a 
good example of the latter. Action to mitigate climate change produces worldwide 
benefits, since all countries share a common climate system. However, poorer 
countries may benefit to a greater extent from mitigation initiatives undertaken in 
their own countries because (i) they are typically more vulnerable to the impacts of 
climate change than wealthy countries, and (ii) mitigation activities often bring local 
development co-benefits such as employment and reduced air pollution in cities.74 
                                                     
expected to grow considerably over coming years (Buchner et al., "The global landscape of climate 
finance 2013", i).  
73 That is, goods (i) that provide benefits that “no country can be prevented from enjoying” and (ii) 
where “no country’s enjoyment of the good [can] impinge on the consumption opportunities of 
other countries”: see Barrett, Why cooperate?, 1.  
74 World Bank, "Turn down the heat", xiii; Michael Finus and Dirk T G. Rübbelke, "Public good 
provision and ancillary benefits: The case of climate agreements", Environmental and Resource 
Economics 56, no. 2 (2013). 
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Moreover, a safe climate is widely considered to be a precondition for 
development.75 
A more pressing concern is that using aid to mitigate climate change and deliver 
other global public goods may divert funding from poorer to less poor recipients. 
This is a particular concern in relation to mitigation. Mitigation opportunities are 
generally greatest in populous and rapidly industrialising countries such as India and 
China.76 While both are still home to a large proportion of the world’s poor, 
mitigation funding is not generally targeted towards the poorest in those countries. 
While the current geographical allocation of climate finance to date has diverged 
significantly from the overall allocation of aid, there is a risk that as mitigation 
finance increases it will be more likely to divert aid funding away from the poorest 
countries, which have fewer opportunities for large-scale mitigation.77  
By contrast, adaptation funding may be more likely to be targeted towards the 
poorest given the abovementioned correlation between poverty and vulnerability 
to climate change.78 Moreover, there are strong continuities between measures 
that promote development and those that strengthen resilience to climate change, 
so much so that Nicholas Stern has described adaptation as “development in a more 
hostile climate”.79 Accordingly, there are considerable practical difficulties in 
distinguishing many aid activities that have climate adaptation co-benefits (such as 
disaster risk reduction measures) from activities that primarily address adaptation. 
Should mitigation finance be excluded from aid on account of its potential to distort 
funding priorities? One problem with doing so is that the broader issue of how 
donors should best allocate overall aid remains unresolved. International 
declarations on aid have increasingly focused on placing poverty reduction (rather 
than merely economic development writ large) and the targeting of aid towards the 
                                                     
75 World Bank, "Development and climate change". 
76 Axel Michaelowa and Katharina Michaelowa, "Climate or development: Is ODA diverted from its 
original purpose?", Climatic change 84, no. 1 (2007). 
77 Smita Nakhooda et al., "Mobilising international climate finance: Lessons from the fast-start 
finance period" (Open Climate Network, 2013), 41-42. 
78 Ibid., 42. 
79 Stern, A blueprint for a safer planet, 68. 
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poor at the heart of development cooperation.80 However, beyond this there 
remains little agreement—whether among policy-makers or theorists—about 
whether aid would be more beneficial overall if it were focused more directly on the 
poorest countries or aimed to benefit the largest number of people, which may 
involve directing aid to less poor but better governed countries.81 
Rather than making an ad hoc exclusion for mitigation finance in order to improve 
the targeting of aid towards the poor, it would be preferable to ensure that the list 
of aid recipient countries is aligned with widely accepted understandings of 
poverty.82 Donors could also strengthen their resolve to ensure that the poorest 
countries are not under-funded. Within those parameters, the definition should 
continue to allow for some flexibility in how aid is targeted. 
6.5.2 Filtering out incompatible objectives 
A further objection to counting climate finance as aid involves the idea that climate 
finance is accompanied by objectives or motivations that make it incompatible with 
the spirit (if not the letter)of the development objective, and that its inclusion 
undermines the integrity of aid. I address two potentially incompatible objectives: 
legal obligations and responsibilities to remedy harm.  
6.5.2.1 Legal obligations 
In a submission to the UNFCCC negotiations, India sets out an argument commonly 
voiced by developing countries in relation to climate finance: 
 
[…] unlike in the case of “development finance”, there is clear legal recognition in the 
UNFCCC of the “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” 
of Parties for addressing climate change. Accordingly, the provision of financial 
                                                     
80 Rainer Thiele, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Axel Dreher, "Do donors target aid in line with the 
Millennium Development Goals? A sector perspective of aid allocation", Review of World Economics 
143, no. 4 (2007). 
81 Craig Burnside and David Dollar, "Aid, policies, and growth", American Economic Review 90, no. 4 
(2000); also ‘(see n.8 above)’. 
82 The question of how to measure poverty is admittedly not without controversy: Sanjay G. Reddy 
and Thomas Pogge, "How not to count the poor" Initiative for Policy Dialogue Working Paper Series, 
May 2009 (New York: Columbia University, 2009). 
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resources for climate change must relate explicitly to this legal principle in any future 
climate change arrangements […]. The providers of finance cannot be discretionary 
“donors”, but must be legally obligated “assessees”.83 
 
We have already seen that wealthy countries do have a legal obligation to provide 
climate finance. Moreover, with few exceptions the aid regime is not underpinned 
by obligations of international law but rather by non-binding political declarations 
that lack enforcement provisions.84 But how might we justify the normative claim 
that funding subject to legal obligations should not count as aid?  
One argument would appeal to the idea that legal obligations and aid targets give 
donors two different types of incentives to increase their overall funding for 
developing countries. It is therefore preferable to separate climate finance from aid 
so that the motivational role of aid targets can serve to raise funding for purposes 
that are not covered by legal obligations, thus increasing the overall amount of 
funding available to the poor. In response it is important to note that legal 
obligations may vary in their stringency. Even though climate finance is owed as a 
matter of legal obligation, there are no agreed indicators of non-compliance or any 
penalties for countries that do not comply. For this reason the incentive effects of 
weaker forms of legal obligation are likely to be modest at best. Nor should we 
dismiss the positive incentive effects that aid eligibility could provide in such cases, 
particularly as some countries may otherwise exploit the idea that climate finance 
should not count as aid in order to backtrack on rather than bolster their climate 
finance commitments.85  
                                                     
83 India, "Supplemental submission by India: Why financial contributions to the financial mechanism 
of the UNFCCC cannot be under the paradigm of 'aid'" (Bonn: UNFCCC, 2009), 41. 
84 One exception is UN, "Food Assistance Convention" (2013). 
85 Australia’s recently elected conservative foreign minister, for example, has argued that "Climate 
change funding should not be disguised as foreign aid funding" but also declined to support UN 
climate funds (Lenore Taylor, Cabinet rethinks Australia’s backing of global green climate fund, 18 
November 2013, accessed 20 December 2013. 
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A second argument is that, since aid is associated with voluntary or charitable 
obligations, it is inappropriate to count funding that is required by reasons of 
greater legal or moral stringency, even if those reasons are morally permissible or 
laudable per se. Legalising the aid regime would tend to eclipse virtue by 
diminishing the esteem that donors could obtain from donating funds, thereby also 
damaging the integrity and expressive objectives of aid. In response we might 
observe that the institution of official aid has persisted despite—or indeed possibly 
because of—the fact that almost all donor countries impose an extrinsic legal 
motivation on aid provision, namely the obligation to support aid through individual 
income taxes. Moreover, seeking to maintain a complete separation of aid from 
legal obligation could undermine the possibility that legal obligations could be used 
to stabilise and reinforce commitments to provide aid, as the Food Assistance 
Convention aims to do. Nevertheless, as I discuss next, it is possible that some types 
of legal obligation could be incompatible with the spirit of the development 
objective when combined with other factors. 
6.5.2.2 Responsibilities to remedy harm 
In debates about climate finance the idea of legal obligation as a distinguishing 
feature frequently blends into another factor that may warrant its separation from 
aid, namely that it is associated with obligations to prevent or remedy harm. 
Developing countries have argued that adaptation finance should not be considered 
as aid because it amounts to “compensation” or “restitution” for harm caused by 
the greenhouse gas emissions of wealthy countries.86 More broadly, Thomas Pogge 
has questioned whether we should talk primarily about “assisting” the global poor 
when in fact we should be talking about avoiding and remedying the harm that we 
are doing to them.87 
Where harm-based and legal obligations converge in a single case, concerns of 
integrity and the wellbeing of the poor may provide strong reasons for excluding it 
                                                     
86 World Bank, "Development and climate change", 277; Vanheukelom et al., "Reporting on 
development", 26. 
87 Thomas Pogge, ""Assisting" the global poor" in The ethics of assistance: Morality and the distant 
needy, ed. Deen K Chatterjee (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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from aid eligibility. Think, for example, of a situation where a wealthy country is 
ordered by an international court to compensate a poor country for damage it has 
caused by polluting the latter’s rivers. It would be callous, I believe, to classify such 
a transfer as aid, since the main reason for the transfer is not so much to promote 
the country’s welfare but to right a wrong. In particular, it constitutes a payment 
that would not have been made in the absence of the wealthy country’s role in the 
harm and, moreover, one that the country would have been required to make even 
in the absence of aid eligibility. Even if the existence of a legal obligation alone does 
not warrant exclusion from aid, in this case it would provide objective evidence for 
the harm-based reason for the transfer. 
There may be some other cases of funding where the primacy of the harm-based 
reason is relatively uncontroversial even in the absence of legal obligation. One 
example would be the relief of “odious debt”, where wealthy countries or their 
investors lent money to recognisably corrupt or authoritarian governments when 
they knew (or at least should have known) that the money would be misused.88 The 
situation becomes more complex when funding involves a mix of harm-based and 
other duties. Think, for example, of aid to former colonies, where duties relating to 
remedying harm, providing assistance and honouring associative ties may all be 
relevant motivating factors.89 Even though theorists such as Pogge might classify 
these and other cases as involving harm-based responsibilities, it would be difficult 
to maintain that those responsibilities displace (or cover as large a proportion of 
needs as) responsibilities to assist.  
Climate finance also constitutes a case where duties of harm and assistance are 
both important. Thus Caney has argued that the harm-based “polluter pays 
principle” is not sufficient to allocate all moral responsibilities for climate change. In 
particular, this principle cannot adequately cover what he calls “the Remainder”, 
namely harmful impacts resulting from emissions of previous generations, naturally 
                                                     
88 See generally Barry and Tomitova, "Fairness in sovereign debt". There may be a further reason to 
exclude many cases of debt relief from aid (or at least ensure that they are additional to existing aid 
levels) where indebted countries have not been able to keep up with their interest repayments, so 
that debt relief does not immediately free up other resources for development.  
89 Ypi, Goodin, and Barry, "Associative duties, global justice, and the colonies". 
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occurring climate change, and emissions that are necessary for basic subsistence.90 
Harm-based principles are inadequate to address the Remainder for reasons of 
empirical uncertainty as well as moral disagreement about assigning responsibility 
for certain types of emissions. Accordingly, Caney argues that we must invoke other 
moral principles in order to respond to severe deprivation resulting from climate 
change, in particular the principle of a country’s ability to pay.91 
Should funding in mixed cases be excluded from aid? There is good reason to think 
that as a general rule it should not be excluded. Exclusion would run against the 
idea of respecting the plurality of permissible moral reasons that people may hold 
for providing aid. Distinguishing mixed from “pure” cases of assistance would also 
raise evidentiary difficulties in practice. The fact that climate finance is subject to 
legal obligation does not overcome the evidentiary problem, since the relevant 
obligation is not an ascription of liability for wrongful action but rather a promissory 
obligation. Whether excluding mixed cases from aid would increase or diminish 
donors’ incentives to provide funding for those cases will ultimately hinge on 
empirical evidence. However, given the limited availability of legal avenues for 
obtaining compensation for climate change damages at the international level, aid 
eligibility could give reluctant countries an incentive to provide funds.  
A final concern is that funding required on the basis of harm-based responsibilities 
should be delivered in a way that is different from the donor-recipient relationship 
associated with aid and more like that of a duty-bearer and entitlement-holder 
under a compensation arrangement. On this argument, climate finance should be 
provided in the form of a monetary transfer with no conditions attached.92 
However, funding may already be counted as aid even if it is delivered outside aid 
agencies. Improving recipients’ “ownership” over funds would not necessarily 
require exclusion from aid but could be achieved through multilateral funding 
                                                     
90 Caney, "Climate change and the duties of the advantaged": 213. 
91 Ibid. 
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arrangements that give recipients a greater voice while recognising the interest of 
taxpayers in contributing countries in the effective use of funds.93   
6.5.3 Redefinition and its alternatives 
My analysis so far has indicated that the most troubling implication of counting 
climate finance as aid is that wealthy countries could divert substantial amounts of 
funding away from other development priorities and away from the poorest if they 
rely on existing aid budgets to meet rising climate finance commitments. There 
remains the question of whether redefinition is the only or the best response to this 
problem. Here I outline some of the more widely discussed alternatives to 
redefinition. 
First, contributing countries could agree that even if climate finance is counted as 
aid it should nevertheless remain “additional” to existing aid according to some 
credible baseline (such as a projection of donors’ future aid spending). More 
detailed analysis elsewhere has noted the difficulty of constructing a baseline that is 
both robust and likely to command widespread acceptance amongst contributor 
and recipient countries.94 Second, contributing countries could set collective or 
individual caps on the proportion of aid that could be used for climate finance or 
other contentious objectives.95 While not as likely to prevent diversion as a robust 
standard of additionality, this option would provide a more readily observable 
yardstick. 
A third option is to encourage donors to redouble their efforts to meet the UN aid 
target. Stern has proposed such a strategy: 
 
                                                     
93 See Jonathan Pickering and Frank Jotzo, "Splitting the difference in global climate finance: Are 
fragmentation and legitimacy mutually exclusive?" Centre for Climate Economics and Policy (CCEP) 
Working Paper 1308, November 2013 (Canberra: Australian National University, 2013) [Chapter 5]. 
94 Stadelmann, Roberts, and Michaelowa, "New and additional to what?". 
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Rather than insisting on some hard-to-define “additionality” of adaptation funding it 
may be better to argue that the rationale for this level of aid [i.e. the 0.7% target] is 
very powerful even before we understood and considered the effects of climate 
change; when we factor climate change in, and it would be foolish to ignore it, the 
arguments are absolutely compelling.96 
 
Rolling climate finance commitments into progress towards the aid target could 
distract donors’ attention from the need to scale up their aid to meet pre-existing 
development needs, and may seem too lenient on those countries that have not 
met existing targets. But its potential downsides could be minimised if, as Stern 
suggests, this is a short-term concession. 
Stern’s proposal for a long-term approach constitutes the fourth option, namely 
redefining aid targets based on an integrated assessment of development and 
climate finance needs.97 Such an approach has the advantage of providing a more 
coherent match between the definition of aid and the intertwined development 
needs that aid targets seek to address. However, redefining the aid target may not 
by itself prompt donors to provide any more aid.  
A fifth option is to diversify sources of funding beyond aid. Many countries and 
commentators see innovative funding sources—such as establishing levies on 
international air and sea transport or stimulating private investment—as an 
essential ingredient for fulfilling long-term climate finance commitments.98 This 
approach has the advantage of reducing donors’ incentives to rely on aid budgets to 
meet their climate finance commitments. However, in the absence of a cap on the 
proportion of aid that can be allocated for climate finance purposes, it does not 
eliminate the risk that a substantial share of aid could be diverted from existing 
development priorities. 
I consider that concerns about diversion and double-counting could be substantially 
reduced by a combination of (i) plausible baselines for additionality, (ii) caps on the 
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98 See Romani and Stern, "Sources of finance for climate action". 
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proportion of aid that could be used for climate finance purposes (say five or ten 
per cent of total aid), and (iii) concerted efforts to mobilise alternative sources of 
funding. With these arrangements in place, some but by no means all climate 
finance would count as aid, and some but by no means an excessive amount of aid 
could be earmarked for climate finance. Redefinition of aid to exclude climate 
finance would only be necessary if such alternatives could not be implemented 
effectively. If any climate finance were to be excluded, mitigation finance should be 
a higher priority than adaptation finance, given that the risk of diversion is greater 
in the case of the former. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In this article I have sought to demonstrate how a more rigorous analytical 
framework may clarify the widely debated question of what should count as aid. 
Integrity-based approaches that seek a close correspondence between the 
elements of a definition and the requirements of a moral responsibility to assist the 
poor have some merits. However, such approaches face difficulties in addressing 
considerations of reasonable pluralism and functional correspondence between 
duties and institutions. A simplified objective-based approach aiming to maximise 
beneficial consequences for the poor may address the former difficulty but 
struggles with the latter. I have argued that by analysing aid as a social practice we 
may produce a modified objective-based approach that is better able to take 
account of the range of moral purposes that a definition of aid may advance, 
including expressive and co-benefit objectives, as well as meeting requirements of 
feasibility.  
Although all the components of the OECD’s definition of aid are open to criticism in 
varying degrees, I have argued that its general orientation—defining aid according 
to its primary developmental objective rather than its outcomes or the moral 
reasons underpinning it—remains a valid approach to encompassing the range of 
altruistic and self-interested reasons that donors have for assisting the poor. 
Accordingly, rather than recasting the overall objective of aid we should focus more 
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closely on whether donor practices would be improved by widening the range of 
specific exclusions from aid eligibility. 
The preceding analysis has identified several areas where exclusions from aid may 
be justifiable, namely where funding (i) primarily benefits donor countries despite 
providing some benefits to recipients (as in the case of unsubsidised loans and 
counter-terrorism assistance), or (ii) has ambivalent or harmful effects on 
development interests (as in the case of military aid). The case study of climate 
finance has identified a further area for exclusion, namely where funding (iii) 
primarily fulfils legal or otherwise definitive obligations to remedy harm (as in the 
case of judicial compensation or cancellation of odious debt). Although these 
justifications would only arise in a limited number of cases, adopting further 
exclusions could help to improve the integrity of the aid regime and its quality. 
Further analysis will be necessary to evaluate the incentive effects of such 
exemptions on the overall quantity of aid, but I have argued that there are reasons 
for thinking that applying exclusions (exclusion (iii) being particularly suggestive) 
may enhance—or at the very least will not diminish—the overall resources available 
to developing countries.  
Nevertheless, I have argued that none of these three grounds for exclusion applies 
unequivocally to climate finance. Instead, I consider the greatest concern about 
including climate finance as aid to be the risk that meeting climate finance 
commitments through aid budgets could divert funding away from the poorest and 
damage the integrity of the aid regime. This issue highlights a more general problem 
for the definition of aid: should the definition of aid change to reflect varying 
development needs, and if so, how can it do so while satisfying the requirement of 
stability. At least in the case of climate finance, however, exclusion may not be 
sufficient to solve the diversion problem and may raise further practical difficulties 
given the complementarities between many development and adaptation 
measures. Thus I have argued that it is preferable to pursue alternative policy 
responses through placing a modest cap on the proportion of climate finance in aid 
budgets and pursuing innovative sources of climate finance.  
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Improving the wellbeing of the world’s poor will clearly require much more than an 
improved definition of aid. Not least will it be important to develop a broader 
measure of wealthy countries’ development efforts. But efforts to formulate a 
broader measure should not detract from the importance of retaining a soundly 
based concept of aid. Indeed having two measures that complement one another 
may help to reduce pressure on a single concept to do all the moral heavy lifting. 
Complementarity can be seen at work, for example, in the idea of basic rights, 
which helps to identify a set of particularly urgent interests that may form part of a 
broader conception of human rights.99 Similarly, rather than stretching the notion of 
aid too far, current work to formulate a broader measure of development effort 
provides an opportunity to distil the essential features of aid so as to equip it better 
to achieve its moral purposes.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
7.1 Policy implications 
In the preceding chapters I have sought to identify pathways towards a fairer global 
climate regime that I believe are capable of gaining widespread political 
acceptance—and capable of institutional implementation—within a reasonable 
timeframe without requiring revolutionary changes to the global order. 
Key recommendations for national policy-makers include the following: 
 Identify ways of framing the global mitigation challenge that can provide a basis 
for agreement among a wide range of countries, such as sharing the global 
carbon budget (Chapter 2); 
 Strike a principled bargain on global mitigation efforts involving greater 
differentiation of countries according to objective criteria of responsibility and 
capability (national differentiation) rather than rigid and arbitrary country 
groupings (categorical differentiation) (Chapter 3); 
  Set aside a portion of revenue from the implementation of climate change 
policies to compensate domestic and foreign citizens who will suffer 
disproportionate losses from those policies (Chapter 4); 
 Strengthen domestic and international social protection mechanisms to shield 
vulnerable groups from disproportionate losses, whether those losses result 
from climate change, the introduction of climate policies, or other global 
economic risks (Chapter 4); 
 Intensify multilateral coordination to raise climate finance for developing 
countries from carbon pricing, including by regulating international aviation 
and maritime emissions (Chapter 5); 
 Concurrently pursue unilateral strategies for raising climate finance, particularly 
through earmarking funds from domestic carbon pricing and redirecting fossil 
fuel subsidies (Chapter 5); 
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 Introduce more stringent requirements for ensuring that meeting climate finance 
commitments does not come at the cost of diverting aid from existing 
development priorities (Chapter 6). 
Developed and developing countries could make substantial progress on these 
issues in current UNFCCC negotiations on a longer-term global climate agreement. 
At the same time, several of these recommendations represent opportunities and 
requirements for national action regardless of whether or when a global agreement 
is reached. 
In addition to these recommendations for climate policy, Chapter 6 also yields a 
range of recommendations for future directions in aid policy, notably the idea that 
the current review of post-2015 development goals and the role of development 
finance in supporting future goals provides an opportunity to improve the integrity 
of aid by tightening its focus on funding that accords with the spirit of the 
development objective. 
7.2 Theoretical insights 
The thesis has also generated a range of theoretical insights. I have canvassed a 
number of the insights from individual chapters in the thesis introduction.1 Here I 
comment briefly on how the chapters together may inform future theory on climate 
ethics. A central insight is that if climate ethics is to have greater influence on 
climate policy, it needs to take into account a wider range of political and 
institutional considerations in a principled and systematic way, including:  
 Divergent perceptions of fairness among developed and developing countries;  
 Opportunities for and constraints upon action presented by multilateral climate 
change institutions; and  
 Relationships between the climate change regime and other international and 
domestic institutions that affect the global distribution of resources.  
                                                     
1 See section 1.3. 
235 
 
Taking these considerations into account implies that we cannot blithely propose 
that a particular moral principle should be translated into an institutional 
prescription without having first considered (i) the likelihood of the principle’s 
acceptance internationally or (ii) the feasibility of policy instruments capable of 
advancing the principle. Nor can we ignore the fact that responsibilities associated 
with climate change form part of a broader set of global responsibilities to avoid 
harm and to assist those suffering deprivation. At the same time, taking these 
considerations into account does not mean pandering to conceptions of fairness 
that are merely a guise for self-interest. Nor does it mean that in order to address 
one source of injustice in the climate regime we must address all sources of 
injustice at once. Rather, a fair response to climate change should at a minimum 
avoid exacerbating injustices in other areas, and where possible should seek out 
opportunities for mutual reinforcement, particularly in promoting climate-resilient 
development. 
7.3 Areas for further research 
The questions I have explored in the thesis have mapped out some new areas of 
inquiry that merit further analysis. In addition, while the articles have focused on 
the case of climate change, the methods used in several chapters could readily be 
applied to other concerns of global justice. Some promising areas of further 
research that scholars could usefully investigate include: 
 Comparative analysis of alternative frames that could provide a basis for a global 
climate agreement, including carbon budgets, the emissions gap and 
equitable access to sustainable development (Chapter 2);  
 Comprehensive and updated mapping of the commonalities and differences 
among developed and developing countries in their perceptions of what a fair 
climate regime should involve (Chapter 3); 
 Development and refinement of reference frameworks that translate widely 
accepted moral principles into quantified and straightforward effort-sharing 
arrangements for mitigation, and economic modelling of their environmental 
effectiveness and feasibility (Chapter 3); 
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 Comparative analysis of the rationales for government compensation where non-
climate policies result in adverse transnational impacts on vulnerable groups, 
drawing on the account of disproportionate losses presented earlier (Chapter 
4); 
 Comparative analysis of the effects of fragmented governance on institutional 
legitimacy in other spheres of global governance, drawing on our account of 
policy functions (Chapter 5); 
 Empirical evidence to help clarify the likely effects of changing the definition of 
aid on the wellbeing of the poor (Chapter 6); 
 Extension of the approach to defining aid to other social practices, including 
questions of who should count as a refugee and what should count as human 
rights (Chapter 6). 
7.4  Concluding remarks 
Much remains to be achieved in global climate policy, and there is limited time left 
to agree upon and implement actions that will add up to a worldwide response 
capable of avoiding dangerous climate change. Moreover, clearly a much wider 
range of policy actions that fall beyond the scope of the thesis are required. These 
include (among other priorities) continually refining the scientific basis for action, 
motivating public support for domestic and international responses to climate 
change, introducing effective and equitable domestic climate policies, engaging 
non-state actors, developing and diffusing technologies for cleaner development 
and greater resilience to climate change impacts, and delivering climate change 
finance transparently and effectively. Nevertheless, I hope to have demonstrated 
that grappling at a practical level with the specific moral problems identified in the 
thesis may not only enable us to identify ways of overcoming roadblocks to 
progress on climate change but also help us to find a clearer path through the 
broader moral landscape.  
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